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Challenging the Habeas Process Rather 
Than the Result 
Justin F. Marceau∗ 
Abstract 
Habeas scholarship has repeatedly assessed whether the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) 
limitations on federal habeas relief were as severe in practice as 
they appeared to be on paper. By analyzing recent doctrinal 
shifts—particularly focusing on two Supreme Court decisions 
from this Term—and substantial new empirical data, this Article 
acknowledges that AEDPA’s bite has reached substantial 
proportions, in many ways exceeding the initial concerns and hype 
surrounding the legislation. More importantly, after 
acknowledging that federal habeas relief from state court 
convictions has become “microscopically” rare, this Article 
considers what the rarity of relief ought to mean as a prescriptive 
matter for federal oversight of state convictions.  
Contrary to the dramatic proposals of scholars who have 
recently suggested that the general futility of habeas litigation 
dictates that individual, case-by-case habeas review should be 
abolished, this Article seeks to regain intellectual and practical 
traction for the longstanding view that federal courts play an 
important role in overseeing and enforcing the Constitution. To be 
sure, the path to success for state prisoners on federal habeas 
review has become infinitesimally narrow, but the recent scholarly 
interest in abandoning federal review of state convictions in nearly 
all circumstances other than capital cases misses the mark. This 
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Article suggests that the paucity of success by habeas petitioners 
does not naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of 
federal oversight, as the scholarly trend suggests. Instead, 
scholars and courts should recognize the critical role federal 
courts play in ensuring that the state court process is 
fundamentally fair. Indeed, if the primary responsibility for 
substantive review now rests with the state courts, the need for 
federal oversight of the procedures is heightened. To this end, this 
Article makes the case for focusing more attention on the need for 
challenges of process rather than result and discusses novel 
methods, both under § 1983 and § 2254, for bringing such 
litigation. By focusing federal review on the adequacy of the state 
process, the deterrence model of federal oversight retains a 
position of importance and distinction, and principles of comity, 
federalism, and fair process are well protected. 
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I. Introduction 
Undeterred by a robust and persistent academic commentary 
criticizing as constitutionally dubious the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),1 the Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld, albeit only indirectly,2 the 
                                                                                                     
 1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 18, 21, 28, and 42 
U.S.C. (2006)). Scholars have leveled well-founded critiques of AEDPA’s 
interference with the ability of federal courts to provide a constitutional 
safeguard against unjust state convictions on various theories, ranging from the 
Suspension Clause, to the separation of powers doctrine, to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: 
The Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns 
that Underlie Modern Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1239 (2008); see also Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass 
Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 360 (2006) (arguing that the reliability of the 
justice system is in question until the AEDPA is repealed).  
 2. Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, the 
circuit courts that have considered the constitutionality of AEDPA’s central 
provisions, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), have upheld the enactment as 
constitutional. Notably, the United States Attorney General’s Office continues to 
intervene and vigorously defend the constitutionality of AEDPA when issues 
arise in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., United States Response and 
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constitutionality of AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas 
review of state criminal convictions.3 At least initially, however, 
AEDPA’s limits on federal review seemed to result more in delay, 
uncertainty, and confusion than substantially diminished access 
to federal oversight. Leading habeas corpus scholar John Blume 
characterized the first decade of AEDPA litigation as substantial 
“hype” without any serious “bite.”4 Both in terms of doctrinal 
shifts and recent empirical data, much has changed. The 
harshness of AEDPA’s restrictions has come into focus over the 
past five years.  
Recent decisions confirm that the tide has turned and the 
once academic questions of AEDPA’s application are, one by one, 
being resolved in favor of reduced federal review. Illustrative are 
two of the Court’s most recent federal habeas decisions, 
Harrington v. Richter5 and Cullen v. Pinholster,6 both of which 
resolve longstanding and divisive questions of habeas procedure 
in favor of substantially curtailing federal courts’ authority to 
overturn a state conviction or sentence. Although it is arguable 
that the “hype” around AEDPA’s enactment exceeded its “bite” in 
the years immediately following its enactment, the most recent 
wave of decisions as well as recent empirical data leave little 
doubt that AEDPA’s practical bite is even more ferocious than the 
initial legislative bark may have suggested.7 Both in terms of the 
                                                                                                     
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Declare 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) Unconstitutional at 7 n.1, Goforth v. Parker, No. 5:09-cv-00352 
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 29, 2011) (“While the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
constitutionality of Section 2254(d)(1), it has applied this provision more than 
thirty times (including in cases decided this Term) without questioning its 
constitutionality.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Although the Court has found no occasion to strike down the 
limitations on federal review of state convictions contained in AEDPA, in the 
context of executive detentions, the Court has recently reaffirmed the notion 
that the writ of habeas corpus is an essential bulwark against intrusions on our 
fundamental rights. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 588–89 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
485 (2004) (recognizing the right of foreign nationals to challenge their 
detention by the U.S. government at Guantanamo Bay).  
 4. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
259, 261 (2006). 
 5. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
 6. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
 7. There has never been any debate that many of AEDPA’s statutory 
enactments simply codified the existing habeas common law. The question, 
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factual development of a habeas claim and the standard of review 
under which the claim is considered, the Court, particularly 
through decisions this Term, has imposed an exceptional array of 
barriers to relief. In the words of Professors Nancy King and 
Joseph Hoffmann, federal habeas review of state convictions has 
become futile, illusory, and so improbable as to be “microscopic.”8 
Indeed, these scholars regard the deterrence model of federal 
oversight embraced in this Article as nothing more than a 
misguided “fairytale.”9 
After analyzing whether these claims about the demise of 
federal habeas review of state convictions have merit, this Article 
considers the range of responses to such a reality. As federal 
constitutional law becomes increasingly the exclusive domain of 
state courts—as state courts become the last, best hope for 
constitutional review of one’s conviction—certain fundamental 
changes in our thinking about federal review are necessary. One 
response—a response that has become fashionable among leading 
reform advocates—is to effectively abolish individualized federal 
habeas review.10 This Article concludes that eliminating federal 
oversight is not a natural or necessary consequence of diminished 
success on the merits but urges, instead, a re-orientation of the 
focus of judges and litigants.11 Federal habeas review may exist 
                                                                                                     
however, has been to what extent the statutory enactments present new 
limitations on federal review that were unknown to the common law of this 
area. Cf. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (explaining that Congress 
enacted AEDPA both to codify preexisting judge-made doctrines that restricted 
the habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners and to impose some new 
restrictions, all for the purpose of “further[ing] the principles of comity, finality, 
and federalism”).  
 8. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 81–84 (2011). 
 9. Joseph F. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in 
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 848 (2009). 
 10. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108 (proposing that 
Congress amend § 2254 to limit the availability of case-by-case habeas review). 
 11. Instead of reorienting federal review toward a process-based focus, one 
could also bolster the effectiveness of federal review by abandoning some of the 
key limitations on federal habeas review. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn 
Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to 
Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 473–74 (2011) (advocating for the 
abandonment of limits on habeas relief such as the procedural default doctrine 
and § 2254(d)). This Article, by contrast, starts from the premise that a 
refurbished federal habeas system that is more friendly to habeas petitioners is 
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in a realm of diminished opportunities to overturn the merits of 
state court adjudications, but this dictates that federal oversight 
of the relevant state procedures is of increased importance. As 
scholars have emphasized, the nature of federal oversight must 
remain flexible and responsive to the current legal crises of the 
day,12 and at present, challenges of process will often be at least 
as important as challenges to the ultimate result. 
As the role of deciding the substantive law, often with 
binding and nearly unreviewable finality, falls to the states, it 
becomes increasingly important to ensure that states’ post-
conviction systems are procedurally fair and reliable on an 
individual and a systemic level. Consequently—now more than 
ever—it is important for prisoners to find creative ways to litigate 
challenges to the state process rather than litigating (or as a 
means of facilitating) challenges to the result. The era of 
exhaustive, de novo federal habeas review has passed, at least for 
the time being, and so too must the focus of federal review be 
redirected. Building on the conclusion from my prior work that 
AEDPA’s deference is conditional—there is a quid pro quo such 
that states earn the newfound deference enshrined in AEDPA by 
developing state review systems that are sufficiently fair and 
reliable13—I now confront the question of what procedural 
mechanisms are available for procedural challenges to state post-
conviction processes. That is to say, the scope of the writ 
expanded in the 1960s in response to the absence of state review, 
and it has recently retreated based on the assumption that 
federalism and comity require more deference to the now-
established state post-conviction review procedures.14 But just as 
the absence of state procedures necessitated robust federal 
habeas review in the twentieth century, so too is federal oversight 
needed in the twenty-first century to ensure the adequacy of the 
                                                                                                     
unlikely and, accordingly, urges a reform that is viable within the existing legal 
framework. 
 12. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108. 
 13. See Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) 
Taken in § 2254(d) Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 64–65 
(2010) (contending that the AEDPA’s constitutionality may be dependent upon 
full and fair state procedures). 
 14. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 440–41 (describing the 
history of noncapital habeas corpus). 
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state processes in individual cases. Federal review may no longer 
be necessitated by the absence of state procedures, but its role in 
ensuring the adequacy of such procedures is no less important. 
This Article, then, accepts that under the current form of 
post-conviction review, the state habeas systems are now the 
critical forum for the litigation of constitutional challenges based 
on facts outside the direct appeal record. More significantly, this 
Article posits that with this great power, state post-conviction 
systems have assumed a commensurate level of responsibility in 
terms of providing a full and fair state process.15 Consequently, if 
state collateral review is the last, best chance for constitutional 
review, then it is critical to set forth with clarity the nature and 
proper litigation platform for challenging procedurally unfair 
state processes. This Article is the first step toward envisioning a 
shift in focus toward challenges of process as opposed to merely 
the result. As set out below, there exist procedures under both 
the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,16 and the statute 
permitting civil litigation regarding constitutional violations, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,17 as interpreted this Term in Skinner v. Switzer,18 
that provide viable methods for state prisoners to challenge the 
process through which their constitutional rights were 
adjudicated.  
In Part II, I provide the critical background for 
understanding that state habeas procedures stand as the last, 
best hope, or only viable forum, for robust constitutional 
challenges to one’s conviction. In particular, the impact of the 
recent decisions in Richter and Pinholster are discussed insofar as 
they serve to substantially alter the previous paradigm for merits 
review on federal habeas review. This Part also includes a 
modest, somewhat impressionistic original empirical study 
                                                                                                     
 15. Cf. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong 
Solution, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 49, 52 (2010), available at 
http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf (explaining 
that the federal writ is a great power that requires a commensurate level of 
discretion on the part of federal judges, “lest the courts inadvertently drain the 
deep reservoir of respect that has sustained it for centuries”).  
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 18. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1300 (2011) (determining 
that the petitioner’s request for DNA testing can properly be pursued in an 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
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analyzing AEDPA’s impacts on Supreme Court decision-making. 
In Parts III and IV, alternative scholarly reactions to the 
diminished federal writ are considered. In particular, the 
approach suggested by Professors Nancy King and Joseph 
Hoffmann, which calls for the general elimination of federal 
habeas review, is considered and ultimately rejected. Finally, 
Parts V and VI introduce alternative opportunities for process-
based challenges to state procedures; Part V discusses and 
analyzes process-based challenges through federal habeas, and 
Part VI presents a novel procedure for challenging state post-
conviction procedures through § 1983. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach to challenging the process rather 
than the result are considered in light of the statutory and 
common-law limitations on these forms of litigation. This Article, 
then, recognizes that federal habeas law has reached a critical 
crossroads insofar as recent doctrinal shifts and empirical data 
suggest that challenges as to the result of state post-conviction 
proceedings, standing alone, will rarely succeed. By urging a 
model of federal review focused on challenges of process, this 
Article posits that the deterrence model is not dead and ought not 
be euthanized, as other scholars have urged; the focus of federal 
oversight, however, should be substantially redirected in the 
manner proposed by this Article.19 
                                                                                                     
 19. This is the first comprehensive proposal for challenging state processes 
since the state post-conviction systems emerged as commonplace during the 
period between 1950 and 1970. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) 
(per curiam) (granting certiorari “to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the States afford state prisoners some adequate corrective process 
for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional 
guarantees”). The Court, however, ultimately remanded to the state in light of 
the fact that while the case was pending, the state legislature enacted a statute 
providing for post-conviction review. Id. Professor Jordan Steiker has observed 
that although the Warren Court “consistently applied an exhaustion 
requirement . . . many states did not have robust post-conviction remedies for 
non-record claims” during this period. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-
Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: 
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
315, 340; see also Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases: 
Establishing the Right Baselines in Federal Habeas to Promote Structural 
Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 308 (2007) (“State post-conviction 
forums grew in response to the emergence of federal habeas corpus as an 
effective means for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights of state 
inmates. States sought to limit the fact-finding role of the federal courts by 
providing their own vehicles for the development of non-record evidence.”). 
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II. The Federal Habeas Mirage: Recognizing Federal Review as 
Insufficient and Unreliable 
After decades of failed legislative attempts to substantially 
limit federal habeas review, in the immediate wake of the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the Republican Congress passed, and 
President Clinton signed into law, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act.20 Though the Act’s name suggests a 
focus on antiterrorism and the death penalty, the functional 
centerpiece of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, fundamentally altered 
federal habeas corpus review for all state prisoners, whether or 
not they were charged with terrorism or a capital crime.21 Section 
2254 applies to all prisoners challenging their state conviction22 
and serves to prohibit federal habeas relief for any claim 
                                                                                                     
 20. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–
2267 (2006)); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2007). 
 21. The only death-penalty specific provisions of AEDPA were limitations 
on the time within which federal habeas judges had to decide a case and an 
accelerated statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2261(b), 2263(a)–(b), 
2264(a), 2266(b)–(c). These provisions, however, were conditioned on a state 
“opting-in” by satisfying certain conditions, such as providing experienced 
counsel to defendants during state post-conviction review. Id. To date, no state 
has effectively opted in and gained the only AEDPA advantages unique to 
capital cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2261(b), 2263(a)–(b), 2264(a), 2266(b)–(c). 
 22. Habeas relief is entirely unavailable to persons who are not in custody. 
This means that a person convicted of an offense but not sentenced to any 
custodial term is not entitled to the habeas remedy. See, e.g., Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968) (holding that a habeas action that is filed 
while the prisoner is in custody does not become moot because the prisoner is 
released while the habeas petition is pending). To be sure, “the combined effect 
of the exhaustion and custody requirements” has led to a decline in the number 
of persons convicted in state court who are eligible to file for federal habeas 
relief. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 73 (describing the custody 
requirement as having “choked off federal habeas review”). Contrary to King 
and Hoffmann’s assumption, however, the existence of a short sentence, or even 
a mere sentence of probation, does not necessarily dictate that the defendant 
will not be able to exhaust state remedies and file a federal habeas petition. 
Compare id. (noting that only “two of every five people convicted of felonies in 
state court are actually sentenced to prison” and that “most will . . . never have 
the chance to seek a writ of federal habeas corpus because they will be 
sentenced to less than five years and . . . serve less than three”), with BRIAN R. 
MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1:9 (2010) (“A person who is on parole or 
probation at the time he files his federal habeas petition satisfies the custody 
requirement.”). 
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“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless one of three 
exceptions is satisfied: (1) the state court decision was “contrary” 
to clearly established federal law; or (2) the state court decision 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law; or (3) the state court decision was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts.23 For these purposes, a 
state court decision is said to be contrary to federal law only if the 
state court applies an interpretation of federal law that is 
“diametrically different” or “mutually opposed” to the binding 
Supreme Court interpretation of the provision, or if the state 
court “confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless 
arrives at a [different] result.”24 Similarly restrictive, a state 
court adjudication is “unreasonable” only if the state prisoner can 
demonstrate something “substantially” more than a 
constitutional error—that is, if “fairminded jurists” could so much 
as reasonably disagree about the decision of the state court, then 
federal habeas relief is not available.25 To be sure, “an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.”26  
AEDPA’s reforms were, almost immediately, greeted by the 
legal academe with a vast expression of fear and loathing. 
Professor James Liebman captured the sentiment of many 
academics on the topic: “Dwarfed among the many unspeakable 
evils that [Timothy] McVeigh wrought is a speakable one . . . , 
namely, the so-called Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996.”27 Stated more directly, there was a fear among 
                                                                                                     
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As discussed in more detail later in the Article, 
§ 2254(d)(2) is a potential exception to the deference prescribed by (d)(1). To 
date, however, the Court has made no effort to elaborate on the scope and 
function of the (d)(2) escape hatch. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 57–59 (noting 
that the Court has yet to decide the proper interpretation of § 2254(d)(2)). 
 24. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (“On the other hand, a 
run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from our cases 
to the facts of a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s 
‘contrary to’ clause.”). 
 25. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 
 26. Id. at 785 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). 
 27. James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error 
Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2001). 
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scholars and practitioners that AEDPA was effecting a sub rosa, 
procedural evisceration of the critical constitutional protections of 
the Bill of Rights incorporated against the states by the Warren 
Court.28 As I have previously explained, “[t]he hallmark of 
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment, or more 
precisely, selective incorporation, is the promise that 
constitutional rights must apply with the same force and breadth 
in each of the fifty states, a promise that is impossible to realize 
under the strictures of [AEDPA].”29 The enactment of AEDPA, 
then, was accompanied by predictions that federal habeas had 
been “dramatically altered” to the detriment of our constitutional 
democracy.30 
In the first several years after AEDPA’s enactment, however, 
the Supreme Court granted relief in several cases under 
AEDPA.31 Moreover, the most notable cases were grants of 
                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., id. at 420–21; see also Stevenson, supra note 1, at 360. Alan 
Chen similarly observed that the AEDPA would handcuff federal courts and 
relegate a substantial amount of constitutional litigation to the realm of shadow 
law. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, 
and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999). 
 29. Marceau, supra note 1, at 1232. Of course, not all scholars agree that 
the denigration of the Great Writ is a negative legal development. Professors 
Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King believe that federal habeas has largely 
outlived its utility and argue that, rather than “pouring tax dollars down the 
[habeas] drain[,]” we should leave post-trial review of constitutional defects “to 
the state courts.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 796; see also Hoffmann & 
King, supra note 15, at 52 (“[T]he particular crisis of federalism that gave rise to 
[the Writ’s] twentieth-century expansion has long since passed . . . .”). Notably, 
King and Hoffmann’s suggestion has been adopted in function—though not in 
form—by the Supreme Court—that is, constitutional review is largely delegated 
to state courts following the Court’s recent decisions; however, the time and 
costs associated with federal review, which animates the Hoffmann and King 
proposal, have not been alleviated.  
 30. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: 
Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
699, 702 (2002). Many other scholars and commentators joined this apparent 
consensus. Contra Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 53–54; Kent S. 
Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 888, 888–93 (1998). 
 31. For example, between 2000 and 2005, there were three Supreme Court 
decisions granting relief under AEDPA based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel. There are no prior Supreme Court decisions granting relief on this 
basis. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 379–80 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 518–19 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000); see 
also Blume, supra note 4, at 280 (discussing this phenomena). Also noteworthy 
96 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012) 
habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims under Strickland v. Washington,32 a constitutional claim 
that the Court itself had never granted habeas relief on prior to 
the enactment of AEDPA.33 This spat of post-AEDPA victories, 
among other things, led a prominent habeas scholar to conclude, 
perhaps aspirationally, that the impact of the AEDPA reforms 
was actually much less than it seemed. As Professor John Blume 
emphatically summarized the state of the law up through 2005, 
“AEDPA has been less ‘bite’ than ‘hype.’”34 Simply put, AEDPA 
had not achieved “the far reaching effects that many predicted.”35 
This is no longer true. In light of recent developments in the 
interpretation and application of AEDPA, and in view of available 
empirical data, the conclusion is unmistakable that AEDPA’s 
bite, though perhaps slow to manifest symptoms, has gradually 
and systemically infected and undermined the federal habeas 
infrastructure. As Professor Blume did in 2005, I measure the 
impacts of AEDPA based on two metrics: (1) changes in 
substantive and procedural habeas doctrine under AEDPA as 
compared to the pre-AEDPA habeas common law; and 
(2) available empirical data—both a comprehensive 2007 study of 
district court habeas cases and a more modest original empirical 
project that mirrors the empirical work done by Blume on this 
question but updates and broadens the scope of data. Based on 
empirical data I gathered, the 2007 empirical study funded by the 
Department of Justice, and, most importantly, doctrinal shifts in 
the law, this Article conclusively demonstrates that AEDPA has 
now developed into a major barrier to relief for state prisoners. As 
                                                                                                     
is the fact that in 2000, state prisoners prevailed in four of the six habeas cases 
arising under AEDPA in the Supreme Court.   
 32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (determining 
that to grant habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
plaintiff must show both that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense”). 
 33. Blume, supra note 4, at 279–80. 
 34. Id. at 261. 
 35. Id. at 274. Other leading scholars echoed this sentiment. Professor 
Larry Yackle, for example, in describing AEDPA’s effect on access to an 
evidentiary hearing noted that “on reflection I am not sure any really dramatic 
change is afoot.” Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New 
Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 144 (1996). 
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Professors King and Hoffmann have similarly observed, “the 
Supreme Court and Congress clearly no longer perceive the need 
for more aggressive federal habeas oversight of the state courts in 
non-capital cases.”36 Much more so than in the pre-AEDPA era, 
state prisoners now face unique procedural barriers and one of 
the most uncharitable standards of review known to law.  
In sum, one might fairly describe AEDPA’s impact on 
Supreme Court review as having three stages. The initial stage 
preceded some or all of the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing 
AEDPA and was characterized by substantial and vocal 
opposition and criticism—this was the “hype.”37 The next stage of 
AEDPA’s application was characterized by the Court’s 
willingness to grant relief in a handful of post-AEDPA cases in 
the early 2000s, creating a correspondingly lessened interest by 
the academic world in AEDPA. With a diminished bite, the 
AEDPA-based concerns seemed less immediate or crucial. And 
now, just as the fervent opposition to AEDPA has become less 
vocal, or at least less widespread among academics, the Court has 
entered a third phase in which the application of AEDPA has 
evolved so as to become increasingly harsh and the reversal of 
federal courts who disturb state court convictions increasingly 
brazen.38 The remainder of this Part substantiates the claim that 
federal habeas review by the Supreme Court has evolved to the 
point where it is, both from an empirical and a doctrinal matter, 
substantially hostile to the efforts of state prisoners who attempt 
to have their conviction or sentence set aside.  
                                                                                                     
 36. Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 53. 
 37. See Blume, supra note 4, at 274–87 (describing the “hype” surrounding 
AEDPA). 
 38. The tone of recent Supreme Court decisions is itself worthy of attention. 
Repeatedly this Term, the Supreme Court has reversed grants of habeas relief 
by the lower courts in sternly worded decisions that accuse the lower courts of 
judicial dereliction and “disregard.” See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 785 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740–45 (2011); see also Cavazos 
v. Smith, No. 10-1115, 2011 WL 5118826, at *9 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (per curiam) (stating that “the Court is bent on rebuking the Ninth 
Circuit for what it conceives to be defiance” as to the proper standard of review 
required under AEDPA). 
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A. Empirical Evidence of a Narrowing Scope of Habeas Review 
Analyzing federal habeas corpus cases in the Supreme Court 
from 1990 to 2005, Professor Blume concluded that the data was 
emblematic of the old saying, “What if you gave a revolution and 
nobody came?”39 Blume examined the 105 Supreme Court cases 
reviewing state convictions on habeas during this period—sixty-
one were pre-AEDPA and forty-one were governed by AEDPA—
and found that AEDPA was having no impact on the success 
rates of state habeas petitioners.40 Specifically, Blume’s data from 
1990 through 200541 shows that the pre-AEDPA petitioners 
prevailed 33% of the time and the post-AEDPA petitioners 
succeeded in 34% of the cases before the Court.42 These numbers 
Blume argued, supported the conclusion that many of the 
hardships imposed on prisoners by AEDPA were, in reality, 
already imposed under pre-AEDPA, court-created doctrines.43 
By updating Blume’s data and expanding the range of years 
studied, one is left with the impression that, as an empirical 
matter, Blume’s conclusion no longer holds true. I have updated 
Professor Blume’s empirical data so that it now runs from 1985 
through 2011 (as compared to 1990 through 2006).44 Most 
                                                                                                     
 39. Blume, supra note 4, at 260. 
 40. See id. at 276 (noting no statistical difference between petitioner 
success pre- and post-AEDPA). 
 41. It may seem anomalous that even after 1996, the year of AEDPA’s 
enactment, there were still pre-AEDPA cases. The explanation is that 
Amendments made to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2267 (2006) by AEDPA do not apply to 
cases pending in federal court on April 24, 1996—AEDPA’s effective date. See 
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (determining that AEDPA’s 
Amendments apply “only to cases filed after the Act became effective”). 
 42. Blume, supra note 4, at 277. 
 43. It is possible that Professor Blume’s finding that AEDPA had not had 
much effect fails to account for the fact that AEDPA may have discouraged 
many prisoners from even filing a petition. Knowing they were time barred, or 
aware of how onerous relief had become, it is possible that petitioners were 
discouraged from filing habeas petitions and, as such, the effective rate of denial 
may have gone up. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 70 (charting the 
declining rate of habeas filings by state prisoners). 
 44. The data was gathered by using the SCT database on Westlaw and 
running the following search: habeas & da(aft 1984). The search produced 2,789 
results. Each of the results was screened, and the cases that were not federal 
habeas appeals from state prisoners were filtered out. We also filtered out 
certiorari denials, certiorari grants, dismissals, and any orders or summary (no 
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significantly, then, my data examine the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in habeas cases brought by state prisoners from 2006 
through 2011, critical years of AEDPA development that were not 
yet available at the time of Blume’s study, and it provides a 
larger set of non-AEDPA cases for purposes of comparison.45 
Whereas Blume’s study considered only 63 pre-AEDPA cases and 
41 AEDPA decisions, my dataset includes 182 non-AEDPA cases 
and all 115 of the AEDPA decisions to date.46  
                                                                                                     
opinion) decisions. The result is that some decisions, though they contain 
significant reasoning, are not part of the dataset. See, e.g. Medellin v. Dretke, 
544 U.S. 660, 666–67 (2005) (discussing the impact of AEDPA on various claims 
but ultimately dismissing the case as improvidently granted). In order to 
minimize errors in the data collection, at least three people reviewed all of the 
cases and the coding. I personally reviewed the coding of all of the cases 
included in the dataset. The citations and prevailing party for each case are 
reproduced in the appendix. Notably, my dataset is not identical to Blume’s for 
the years that were also covered by that study, 1990–2005. While I have 
included all of the cases in his study, I have included additional habeas cases 
decided by the Court that were, for reasons not explained, not part of Blume’s 
dataset. I have included twelve cases that were not part of Blume’s study, each 
of which is denoted by an asterisk in the appendix. Although the data gathering 
involved the manual review of many cases, this study could be replicated. Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38–45 (2002) 
(“Research must be replicable.”).  
 45. Any empirical analysis that is limited to Supreme Court appeals is 
subject to a selection effect. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified 
Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 
300–01 n.224 (1995) (“Under what is known as the ‘selection effect,’ the pool of 
cases that reaches the trial and appellate courts is not representative of the 
entire body of disputes in the legal system.”); id. (compiling sources discussing 
the selection effect). Assuming, however, that the selection effect is relatively 
constant over time, the comparative results between my study and Blume’s 
should not be affected. The recent changes of Supreme Court personnel have 
tended, as a general matter, to maintain the status quo on the Court without 
any major ideological shifts to the left or the right, and, other than AEDPA 
itself, there have not been other major legislative developments that would 
make habeas relief more or less likely. I have not attempted to control for these 
changes because to do so would require modeling of variables such as judicial 
behavior that are difficult or impossible to quantify with precision. 
 46. Defining the “winner” of habeas cases is not always easy. The gradual 
accretion of habeas doctrine means that even a case that reflects a win for an 
individual may represent a loss for habeas petitioners more generally. A holding 
might, for example, narrow the set of claims that are eligible for relief, and yet 
find the petitioner before the Court within the narrowed set. It is true that, in 
this way, “‘winners can be losers’ and visa versa.” Blume, supra note 4, at 278 
n.104. Likewise, in some cases the prisoner wins on the seminal issue, but loses 
on smaller issues. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 680–81 (1993) 
(refusing to apply Stone bar on habeas review to Miranda claims and remanding 
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My study of Supreme Court decisions, suggests that there 
may have been a lag time or period of time during which the 
Court proceeded with caution as it familiarized itself with 
AEDPA.47 The updated dataset, including the years from 2006 to 
2011, demonstrates that this unofficial grace period is over. 
Between 2006 and 2011, nearly every habeas case reviewing a 
state prisoner’s conviction arose under AEDPA, and, by contrast, 
in the first two years of AEDPA’s existence, 1996 and 1997, there 
was only one AEDPA case adjudicated in the Court.48 The 
                                                                                                     
on this issue, but reversing the grant on the grounds of involuntariness). 
Moreover, this study counts as a “win” for both outright grants of relief by 
the Court as well as cases in which the Court reverses a denial of relief by the 
lower court and remands for further review. Obviously, this latter category of 
victory is contingent, and may reflect only a short, rather Pyrrhic victory under 
AEDPA; it is, nonetheless, a victory for that prisoner at that moment in an 
AEDPA case. To this extent, a reversal of a lower court denial of relief 
accompanied by a mere remand is fairly characterized as a victory in the 
Supreme Court, and likewise, a reversal of a grant of relief accompanied by a 
remand can reasonably be considered a loss for the prisoner. In light of these 
limitations, however, I readily concede that the data compiled herein, classified 
as it is in binary form and limited to Supreme Court cases, is probably less 
revealing than the discussion elsewhere in this Article examining the doctrinal 
developments that illuminate unequivocally the “bite” of AEDPA.   
 47. In studying the impact of AEDPA, I have focused only on those cases 
for which AEDPA’s provisions have been directly applied in a reasoned 
opinion—that is, the cases examined are only cases of state prisoners 
challenging the constitutionality of their detention through federal habeas. In 
this way, the dataset reflects only a study of the impact of AEDPA—positive, 
neutral, or negative—on those cases for which AEDPA’s statutory terms are 
relevant. One could re-orient this study to include, for example, the recent wave 
of cases that challenge executive detentions at Guantanamo or immigration 
detentions and perhaps get different results. Because my goal was to estimate 
the impact of AEDPA in Supreme Court decisions, I did not consider cases for 
which AEDPA was clearly irrelevant. The dataset also includes only reasoned 
opinions and not summary orders dismissing a case as improvidently granted, 
or granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding. See Zant v. 
Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989); Webster v. Cooper, 130 S. Ct. 456 (2009). If, 
however, the GVR or summary reversal took the form of a reasoned opinion, 
even if relatively brief, then it was included. See Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1 
(1989); Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005); Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005); 
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8 (2009); see also Medellin v. Dretke, 544 
U.S. 660 (2005) (excluded from my dataset because the case was dismissed as 
improvidently granted despite the fact that it contains a substantial reasoned 
majority opinion as to the application of AEDPA to the claims in question). 
 48. During the relevant time period, from 2006 through 2011, the Court 
only decided a few pre-AEDPA cases, two of which were merely summary 
reversals of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See generally Bobby v. Van 
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commonplace nature of AEDPA cases before the Court has 
allowed a fuller scope of the AEDPA limitations to be revealed in 
recent years. The doctrinal shifts resulting from these new and 
more frequent cases are discussed below, but the rate of prisoner 
success in these cases, therefore, provides impressionistic 
empirical data in support of the conclusion that AEDPA’s bite has 
become severe.49  
As indicated in Table 1, the rate of relief in all non-AEDPA 
cases from 1985 through 1995, the decade preceding AEDPA’s 
enactment, was 37.5%, and the rate of success for cases not 
governed by AEDPA in the Court from 1985 through 2011 was 
nearly 35%. By contrast, the Supreme Court has issued 91 
opinions in cases for which AEDPA applies since the legislation 
was enacted in 1996, and the rate of relief in those cases is only 
27.4%.50 
Table 1. Rate of Success in Habeas Cases 1985-2011 






1985–2011 (non-AEDPA & 
pre-AEDPA cases) 
34.8% (47/135) 
1996–2011 (AEDPA cases) 27.4% (25/91) 
Whereas Table 1 allows for a comparison of the pre-AEDPA 
cases and the AEDPA cases across the entire period of AEDPA’s 
existence, Table 2 looks at the data in five-year increments. 
                                                                                                     
Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam); Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383 
(2009) (per curiam). 
 49. For example, during 2010 and 2011, only three state prisoners out of 
eighteen, or roughly 16%, prevailed on a habeas petition before the Supreme 
Court, a dramatic downtick from previous years. 
 50. To be sure, some of the cases in which relief was denied post-AEDPA 
would have come out the same way under pre-AEDPA law. See, e.g., Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2265 (2010) (determining that prejudice could not 
be shown, even under de novo review); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409 
(2007) (holding relief is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which 
laid out the framework for when to retroactively apply a new rule to an old 
criminal case).  
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Specifically, from 1996 through 2011 there have been 91 total 
AEDPA cases, and the prisoners have prevailed in 25 of the 
cases. There are only 39 non-AEDA cases for this entire period. 




2001–2005 2006–201151 2010–2011 
AEDPA 
 






25% (5/20) 36.3% (4/11) 25% (2/8) x 
Table 2 provides support for the view that there was an 
informal grace period for AEDPA cases in the Supreme Court 
during which time the full force and scope of the statutory 
reforms had not been realized. Initially, very few AEDPA cases 
reached the Court, and the rate of success in these initial cases 
was surprisingly high. Whereas the first 19 prisoners (1996–
2001) succeeded at a rate of over 45% (6/13), the last 24 prisoners 
(2010–2011) have succeeded at a rate of about 14%. The 
percentage of cases that are governed by AEDPA is approaching 
100%, and the rate of success in these cases is plummeting.53 
To avoid the distortions of small datasets, it is most useful to 
compare a robust sample of cases. From 1985 through 1995, for 
example, 132 non-AEDPA cases were decided, and the rate of 
                                                                                                     
 51. The period from 2006 through 2011 is six years rather than five. 
 52. The non-AEDPA data is being provided in five-year increments in the 
interest of having a complete census of the cases in the post-AEDPA era, but the 
number of cases is likely too small for meaningful statistical inference. 
 53. It is worth briefly noting that there is one anomaly in the data that 
defies easy explanation. Although the rate of success for all non-AEDPA cases 
from 1985 through 2011 is roughly 35%, in the thirty-nine non-AEDPA cases 
from 1996 through 2011, relief was only obtained 28% (11/39) of the time. One 
might suggest that this low rate of success for non-AEDPA prisoners reflects a 
general mood shift away from habeas relief in the AEDPA era. Or, perhaps, it 
tends to confirm Blume’s conclusion that AEDPA had no consequence, at least 
in terms of the raw rate of success for prisoners before the Court. But the 
dataset for post-AEDPA cases that are not governed by AEDPA is relatively 
small, only thirty-nine total cases spread across sixteen years. A similarly small 
dataset reveals rates of success under AEDPA of only 14.2% for the past two 
years. Both datasets are likely too small to make meaningful statistical 
inferences. 
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success for prisoners was 37.5%. That is to say, for the eleven 
years leading up to the enactment of AEDPA, state prisoners 
were victorious in the Supreme Court in one out of every 2.6 
cases. By contrast, considering all 91 AEDPA cases from 1996 
through 2011, the rate of prisoner success was only 27.7%, or one 
out of every 3.6 cases. The data demonstrate, consistent with the 
doctrinal narrative presented in the next section of this paper, 
that the rate of success for habeas prisoners has declined. 
More to the point, the contrast between all AEDPA cases 
(1996–2011), and all non-AEDPA cases for the eleven years prior 
to AEDPAs enactment (1985–1995) reveals a stark drop in the 
rate of success, suggesting the bite of AEDPA has taken hold. To 
be sure, one could argue that comparing data from 1985–1995 to 
data from 1996–2011 is unrevealing as to AEDPA’s relative 
impact insofar as the court’s pre-AEDPA jurisprudence was more 
generous to state prisoners in the 1980s and early 1990s than it 
was later in the 1990s.54 As a practical matter, however, all of the 
judicially imposed limitations on habeas relief, including the 
Teague decision,55 had been handed down by1995, making this a 
valuable, if not conclusive, range for comparison. Indeed, 
Professor Blume identified ten key pre-AEDPA “cutbacks” on 
habeas relief that occurred prior to AEDPA and made AEDPA 
somewhat redundant and superfluous; all ten of these major 
developments occurred prior to 1995.56    
                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 4, at 266–70, 276, 280 (discussing the 
Court’s creation and use of new rules and limitations on habeas, especially in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, noting most of the Court’s habeas modifications 
were in place by 1990, and stating the Court’s reforms had significantly 
diminished the writ’s potency by the time of AEDPA); see also Mark Tushnet & 
Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997) (contrasting the previous retroactivity 
standard with the Court’s approach in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), 
which used an “extremely expansive definition of what would count as ‘new’ for 
habeas purposes” and thus greatly reduced the number of claims that could 
survive). 
 55. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299–306, 310 (1989) (stating that 
retroactivity of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure is a threshold 
issue, and asserting that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not 
be applicable to those cases that have become final before the new rules are 
announced” unless certain limited exceptions apply). 
 56. See Blume, supra note 4, at 265–68 (noting the Court’s habeas reform 
efforts from the 1970s to the 1990s). 
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A second and more salient critique of my study is that a 
study of relief in the Supreme Court is unreflective of the broader 
trends among lower courts regarding the likelihood of relief.57 I 
am also willing to concede this point and note, as Professor 
Blume did in 2006, that this is “a limited empirical argument.”58 
However, just as Professor Blume looked exclusively at success 
rates from the Supreme Court in order to support his claim that 
the likelihood of success with or without AEDPA deference was 
“remarkably stable,”59 I look at success rates in the Supreme 
Court in order to argue that while the AEDPA picture was 
initially stable, it is no longer so. My data suggest that the 
“arcane statutory language” used in AEDPA and the suddenness 
with which “Congress enacted AEDPA”60 may have caught the 
Court off guard, slowed the impacts of the statutory reform, and 
created a sort of AEDPA grace period. But the grace period 
appears to be over. The data reflected in Tables 1 and 2, although 
not conclusive, are usefully predictive of a downward trend in the 
rate of success for state prisoners in the Supreme Court, and it 
seems likely that as the rate of success in the Supreme Court 
diminishes, lower courts seeking to avoid reversal will also 
become more parsimonious with grants of relief to habeas 
petitioners.  
Finally, other available post-AEDPA research tends to 
corroborate the findings of the original empirical study I have 
presented here. Any empirical claim about the impacts of AEDPA 
would be substantially incomplete if it failed to reference the 
impressive empirical study completed in 2007 by Professors 
Nancy King, Fred Cheesman, and Brian Ostrom, with funding 
from the Department of Justice.61 There does not appear to be 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Chen, supra note 45, at 300 n.224 (discussing authority regarding 
the selection effect problem); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant of 
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 707 (2009) (noting that in 
quantitative studies of judicial politics there is a “lopsided” focus on the 
Supreme Court. This “disproportionate focus is not itself what misleads.” 
Instead the “problem arises when scholars loosely slip from making assertions 
about judging on the Supreme Court to assertions about judging generally”). 
 58. Blume, supra note 4, at 276. 
 59. Id. at 277. 
 60. Id. at 261. 
 61. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION 
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY 
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any consensus about the rate at which habeas relief was 
ultimately granted to state prisoners prior to AEDPA. Professors 
King and Hoffmann have speculated that “[e]xcluding capital 
cases, success rates for state prisoners in habeas probably never 
approached double-digit percentages.”62 Wright and Miller, for 
example, estimated, based on available studies, that no more 
than 4% of habeas petitioners were granted relief.63 Another 
study found that, prior to AEDPA, relief was granted in 40% of 
the capital habeas cases.64 The DOJ-funded 2007 study, by 
contrast, found that relief was granted in district courts in 0.35% 
of non-capital cases (7/1986), and in 12% of capital cases (33/267) 
after AEDPA.65 By any measure, and based on any available pre-
AEDPA data, the 2007 study suggests that relief is granted in 
substantially fewer cases under the AEDPA.66 
                                                                                                     
STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 
OF 1996 9, 10 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219 
559.pdf (“Each year, more than 18,000 cases, or one out of every 14 civil cases 
filed in federal district courts, are filed by state prisoners seeking habeas corpus 
relief . . . .”).  
 62. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 89. 
 63. Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict 
Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 
DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 103 n.108 (1988) (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3261 (1981)). 
 64. See JEFFREY FAGAN, ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: GETTING TO 
DEATH: FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PROCESSING AND CONCLUSION OF DEATH 
PENALTY CASES AFTER FURMAN 7, 56 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203935.pdf (reporting the conclusions of a study that 
considered more than 5,000 decisions in capital sentences and found that 40% 
were reversed by state courts performing federal habeas review and 40% were 
reversed by federal habeas courts).  
 65. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 64. This study only takes into account 
rates of relief in the trial court. Commentators who have considered the rate of 
relief including appeals have suggested that the rate of relief might actually be 
substantially higher. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 452 
(“[A]ccording to our data, the set of successful noncapital cases grows by 22% 
when appellate outcomes are considered.”).  
 66. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 59 n.109. 
The study also notes another source of empirical data regarding the 
impacts of AEDPA: In 2003 Judge Weinstein took on 500 non-capital 
habeas cases that had been pending in the Eastern District of New 
York for up to six years. . . . The concentrated disposition of 500 cases 
provides a statistical snapshot of post-AEDPA habeas processing by 
one judge in one federal district. He granted relief in 9 of the 494 
cases terminated without transfer, a grant rate of 2.0%. This is nearly 
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B. Recent Doctrinal Developments Substantially Undercut Federal 
Habeas Review 
Professor Blume supported his conclusion that AEDPA was 
over-hyped in 2005 not just through his empirical analysis of 
Supreme Court cases but also by considering the scope and effect 
of doctrinal shifts wrought by the AEDPA regime.67 Blume 
concluded that the habeas framework itself had not, contrary to 
the fears and predictions of commentators, substantially shifted 
to the detriment of the petitioners.68 This too has changed. In the 
past five years, the procedures and standards governing federal 
habeas review have substantially evolved so as to reduce the 
power of federal courts to reverse unconstitutional state 
convictions.69 The viability of federal habeas review has been 
substantially undercut, and perhaps no single Term has been 
more devastating for the modern habeas petitioner than the 
Court’s 2010–2011 Term.  
                                                                                                     
six times higher than the grant rate of 0.35% in our nationwide 
sample. 
 67. See Blume, supra note 4, at 271–74 (describing the special expedited 
capital case “opt-in” provision and § 2254(d) of AEDPA, highlighting that no 
state has successfully opted into the expedited capital provisions, and stating 
the Court has “said little about how § 2254(d) works beyond that it limits a 
federal court’s power to grant relief”). 
 68. See Blume, supra note 4, at 260–61, 297 (noting that the Supreme 
Court has been as active after AEDPA as it was before, and the success rate of 
petitioners remained essentially unchanged after AEDPA’s passage). 
 69. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1859 (2010) (“Because AEDPA 
authorizes a federal court to grant relief only when a state court’s application of 
federal law was unreasonable, it follows that ‘[t]he more general the rule’ at 
issue . . . ‘the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-
case determinations.’” (first and third alterations in original) (citation omitted)); 
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119, 121–22 (2007) (stating that AEDPA limits 
habeas and holding that a habeas “court must assess the prejudicial impact of 
constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substitute and 
injurious effect’ standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized 
the error and reviewed it for harmlessness” (citation omitted)); Shriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (noting AEDPA’s prohibition of relief unless 
the state court’s determination was unreasonable rather than incorrect is a 
“substantially higher threshold” and stating that, when determining whether to 
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must take the deferential 
standards from § 2264 into account). 
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Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Harrington v. Richter70 
and Cullen v. Pinholster,71 are illustrative of the recent might of 
AEDPA’s bite. These decisions substantially fill out the doctrinal 
contours of § 2254(d) by answering longstanding questions about 
the scope of federal habeas review post-AEDPA.72 Both decisions 
interpret § 2254(d), the modern centerpiece of federal habeas 
practice, so as to limit state prisoners’ access to Writ.73 As 
developed in detail below, the thrust of these two decisions is to 
simultaneously limit both the form and the function of federal 
habeas corpus practice. Pinholster alters the form or procedures 
of habeas practice by holding that new evidence, not originally 
part of the state court record generally, “has no bearing” on the 
federal court’s review of the state court decision.74 The Richter 
decision, by contrast, limits the functional work or substantive 
merits review of a federal habeas court75—that is to say, Richter 
elaborates on the narrow set of circumstances in which a federal 
court may disturb a state conviction. Just this Term, then, the 
Court has considerably clarified the constricted nature of the 
procedures available for federal habeas review as well as the 
                                                                                                     
 70. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
 71. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
 72. The issue presented in Richter, for example, had remained the subject 
of heated debate since AEDPA’s enactment. More than seven years ago, 
Professor Evan Lee foresaw the risk of deference to summary state dispositions 
and counseled against such an approach. See Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of 
the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 284 
(2004) (“One of the most pressing issues is how federal habeas courts should 
review ‘silent’ state court decisions—that is, summary affirmances or summary 
denials of relief, or opinions that dispose of whole claims in a perfunctory 
manner.”). 
 73. See Scheidegger, supra note 30, at 945 (recognizing § 2254(d) as the 
defining feature of the AEDPA statutory regime).  
 74. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400. 
 75. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct at 786–87 (stating § 2254(d) requires that “a 
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement”). I am not the first commentator to consider the 
standard of review language in § 2254(d)(1) to be one of AEDPA’s few 
substantive limitations on relief. Leading scholar Larry Yackle, for example, has 
observed, “One provision in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), is more 
substantive.” Larry Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell, HUMAN 
RIGHTS MAGAZINE, Summer 2001, at 8. 
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nature of the ultimate merits adjudication. In the wake of these 
decisions, it is difficult to take seriously the claim that federal 
habeas serves as a meaningful check on state post-conviction 
proceedings.76 As this subpart demonstrates, it is increasingly 
clear that state collateral review is the last best chance for 
constitutional review; the substantive deference77 owed to state 
courts provides a narrow window for achieving success on the 
law, and the constricting procedural rules ensure that federal 
habeas relief based on newly developed facts will be similarly 
difficult. 
1. The Habeas Standard of Review in Practice: 
Harrington v. Richter 
As previously mentioned, Professor Blume’s view in 2005 was 
that the dire predictions about AEDPA’s impact far outpaced its 
practical effect.78 And other leading scholars shared this view. In 
the months just after AEDPA’s enactment, for example, 
Professors Larry Yackle and Mark Tushnet theorized that 
AEDPA was largely a “symbolic” statute that made only trivial or 
                                                                                                     
 76. Professors King and Hoffmann have gone so far as to conclude that 
“federal habeas review . . . completely fails” to correct or deter state court errors. 
KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 81. The likelihood of relief, they note, is 
“very close to zero,” and thus reliance on federal habeas for any error correction 
function is, in their mind, “absurd.” Id. But see, e.g., Blume, Johnson & Weyble, 
supra note 11, at 451–52 (disputing the empirical conclusions drawn by King 
and Hoffmann by pointing out, among other things, that their study is limited to 
habeas review in district courts and that a meaningful number of habeas relief 
grants are awarded at the federal appellate level). 
 77. Some have rightly criticized the use of the term “deference” to describe 
the restrictions on relief contained in § 2254(d), and with good reason because 
the term “deference” nowhere appears in AEDPA. See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra 
note 20, at 444 (critiquing the view that “AEDPA’s legislative history supports 
an interpretive mood disfavoring habeas relief”). Nonetheless, the Court has 
embraced the term’s use in this context. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. 
Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (noting that the court of appeals decision demonstrated 
insufficient “deference to the state court’s determination”). But the term has 
been adopted by the Court in this context. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 
1855, 1862 n.1 (2010) (“The dissent correctly points out that AEDPA itself ‘never 
uses the term “deference.’” But our cases have done so over and over again to 
describe the effect of the threshold restrictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
 78. Blume, supra note 4, at 297. 
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“marginal changes” to the already existing judicially created 
limitations on relief.79 Early in AEDPA’s history, it was not 
uncommon to conclude that the statutory reform would 
ultimately only serve to “tinker at the edges” of habeas law and 
that the Court would choose very “limited interpretations” of the 
Act.80 Recent decisions interpreting one of the centerpieces of the 
AEDPA reforms, § 2254(d)(1),81 standing alone, demonstrate that 
such predictions have missed the mark. 
In a nutshell, § 2254(d)(1) insulates unconstitutional state 
convictions from federal oversight by providing that relief is 
unavailable to a state prisoner unless he can demonstrate the 
state court conviction amounted to “an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law.”82 In 2006, Professor Blume 
observed that “the Court has . . . provided almost no guidance 
regarding the necessary increment of error warranting habeas 
relief” under this provision.83 Presently, however, the Court’s 
aggressive interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) serves to ensure that 
most state prisoners are not eligible for relief despite the fact that 
their convictions rest on unconstitutional procedures—that is to 
say, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (contrasting the previous 
retroactivity standard with the Court’s approach in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288 (1989), which used an “extremely expansive definition of what would count 
as ‘new’ for habeas purposes” and thus greatly reduced the number of claims 
that could survive).  
 80. Id. at 4. The work of Tushnet and Yackle in unpacking the relationship 
between the Court and the Congress in the mid-1990s was brilliant and likely 
descriptively accurate. As time has passed, however, it is clear that the Court’s 
approach to AEDPA has far outpaced the preexisting limitations on habeas 
relief. Recent cases undermine the previously sound conclusion that “[c]ourts 
will eschew sharp breaks with judicially developed reforms and will prefer more 
modest adjustments in the system.” Id. at 26. 
 81. This provision is often the determinative barrier between relief and 
non-relief in modern habeas cases. Because of the breadth of this provision’s 
application, it is often the provision that the Court focuses on to the exclusion of 
other aspects of § 2254. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) 
(explaining that the provision “[r]elevant here” is § 2254(d)(1)); see also 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (noting that the lower court 
had “relied” exclusively on (d)(1) in denying relief in this case). 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). 
 83. Blume, supra note 4, at 292. 
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an incorrect application of federal law.”84 Unless an error is so 
patent and egregious as to amount to an intentional disregard for 
the supremacy of federal law, then the unconstitutional 
conviction must not be reversed by a federal court, “lest intrusive 
post-trial inquiry” threaten the autonomy of the states and the 
comity interests at issue in our criminal justice system.85  
Accordingly, whereas prior to AEDPA a federal habeas 
court’s review of a state court’s conclusions of law in support of a 
conviction were reviewed de novo, without any deference, cases 
like Harrington v. Richter from this Term make clear that federal 
habeas review now has considerably less of a role in defining and 
enforcing the substance of constitutional protections. In Richter, 
the Court spends more than three pages elaborating on the 
appropriate level of deference to be afforded to state courts, and 
emphasizing that the lower courts’ application of AEDPA looked 
too much like the pre-AEDPA standard of review and thus 
reflected an “improper understanding of § 2254(d)’s 
unreasonableness standard . . . .”86 Firmly rejecting an 
application of (d)(1) that is primarily semantic and largely retains 
the habeas status quo, the Court explained: 
Here it is not apparent how the Court of Appeals’ analysis 
would have been any different without AEDPA. The court 
explicitly conducted a de novo review, and after finding a 
Strickland violation, it declared, without further explanation, 
that the “state court’s decision to the contrary constituted an 
unreasonable application of Strickland.” AEDPA demands 
more. Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what 
arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have 
supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 
                                                                                                     
 84. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)); see also Larry W. Yackle, The 
Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1731, 1754 (2000) (“[T]his understanding 
keeps faith with the Court’s insistence that federal courts must sometimes 
withhold habeas relief even if they think that a state court reached an erroneous 
determination of a mixed question. The test is not whether the state court 
reached the correct decision, but whether that court reached a decision that was 
reasonable.”). 
 85. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785. 
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those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding 
in a prior decision of this Court.87 
Federal relief is precluded, in other words, unless “there is no 
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.”88 Far from a slight 
adjustment to the pre-AEDPA de novo review,89 the Court 
stressed that (d)(1)’s “unreasonableness question” is not merely a 
“test of [the federal court’s] confidence in the result it would reach 
under de novo review.”90 Instead, not even a particularly “strong 
case” for constitutional relief justifies reversal under the newly 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).  
 88. Id. Notably, the notion that state court convictions should be affirmed 
so long as any reasonable basis for denying relief exists—even if it is not 
actually the basis for the state’s denial of relief—reflects the Supreme Court’s 
rational basis review as to other constitutional questions. Under rational basis 
review, a constitutional violation does not exist if there is any rational basis for 
the government action, and under (d)(1) a violation of a constitutional right 
must go without remedy if there is any rational basis for supporting the state 
court’s misapplication of the Constitution. Compare Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2001) (“Under rational-basis review, . . . the 
State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is 
made; [rather] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification [will suffice].” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 803 (2006) (identifying cases where the Court treats 
rational basis scrutiny as satisfied “if there is any rationally conceivable basis 
for the government’s conduct”), with Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 
(2011) (“[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 
have supporte[d] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is 
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” (quoting Richter, 
131 S. Ct. at 786) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 89. Professors Yackle and Tushnet had previously predicted that “[j]udged 
by its text, and the legislative history behind that text, section 2254(d)(1) may 
reinforce the traditional scope of the writ . . . and confirm Brown’s principle of 
independent federal adjudication. Thus the federal habeas courts may grant 
relief whenever they conclude that a prisoner’s claim is meritorious, no matter 
what view the state courts previously took.” Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 79, at 
44; see also id. at 47 (“Once again, another of the AEDPA’s provisions produces 
marginal results. This is only to be expected. Symbolic statutes must 
nonetheless fit into the legal landscape.”). Obviously, in the wake of decisions 
like Harrington, this is no longer a viable position. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 
U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (recognizing that relief under (d)(1) required showing an 
unreasonable decision by the state court, which is a “substantially higher 
threshold” than showing a merely incorrect decision). 
 90. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
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explained habeas standard.91 It is no longer the case that federal 
habeas serves as a reliable “federal forum” for adjudicating 
constitutional questions regarding state convictions.92 Only 
“extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” 
justify federal intervention,93 and the key, according to the Court, 
is to recognize that “state proceedings are the central process, not 
just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas proceeding.”94 
                                                                                                     
 91. See id. (stating a “strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s 
contrary conclusion was unreasonable”).  
 92. Professor Evan Lee helpfully organized the various theories in support 
of federal habeas review into four distinct categories. Evan Tsen Lee, The 
Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 151, 152–54 (1994) 
(discussed in Yackle, supra note 84, at 1756). Lee has described the “federal 
forum” theory as the conception of habeas that was embraced by Hart, Liebman, 
Yackle, and others.  
 93. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Richter has had an immediate impact on the 
Court’s habeas decisions. In a per curiam decision later in 2011, the Court’s 
opening sentence introduced the AEDPA standard of review not by quoting 
§ 2254(d) but rather by quoting Richter. Bobby v. Dixon, No. 10-1540, 2011 WL 
5299458, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 786–87 (2011)). 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state 
prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 
“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  
AEDPA’s application during the Roberts’ Court makes it difficult to discern 
what, if any, distinction there is between the Court’s current application of 
§ 2254(d)(1) and the interpretation of that clause by the Fourth Circuit that was 
rejected by Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, in the first case 
interpreting the meaning of the unreasonableness clause. See Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (rejecting as erroneous the Fourth Circuit’s 
conclusion that a “state-court decision involves an ‘unreasonable application 
of . . . clearly established Federal law’ only if the state court has applied federal 
law in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable”). 
 94. Id. at 787. The centrality of the state proceedings does not compel the 
conclusion that the federal proceedings are irrelevant. I continue to regard 
federal habeas as a critical source of deterrence, even if relief is only 
occasionally granted. As one group of commentators has recently remarked, “If 
the prospect of subsequent federal habeas review was eliminated, there is every 
reason to believe that relief rates in state courts would decrease, not because of 
a reduction in the number of deserving cases, but because a key incentive for 
state courts to acknowledge and remedy constitutional error would be absent.” 
Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 453. 
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This approach to federal habeas review is not without 
significant practical consequences. In Valdovinos v. McGrath,95 
for example, a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit 
considered an instance of prosecutorial malfeasance in the form 
of failing to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. 
Maryland.96 Professor Scott Sundby has described the Brady 
right as a sort of “constitutional superhero that not only would 
ensure that a criminal defendant had access to all important 
exculpatory evidence before facing the State at trial, but also 
embodied the prosecutor’s ethical duty to pursue ‘justice’ and not 
simply victory in the courtroom.”97 The Brady right may be heroic 
in form, but the modern interpretations of AEDPA make Brady 
meek in function. The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was 
little doubt “Valdovinos’s Brady rights were violated” but 
nonetheless held that, because federal review is constrained by 
§ 2254(d), the petitioner was not “entitled to habeas relief.”98 The 
point is, even as to the most sacrosanct of the constitutional 
criminal procedure rights, under AEDPA, the duty of 
constitutional enforcement is largely delegated to the state 
courts.  
Related to the issue of how much deference to give to a state 
court judgment is the question of when state court judgments are 
entitled to deference. In summarizing the “important issue[s]” 
regarding AEDPA that remained unresolved up through 2005, 
Professor Blume identified as critically unresolved the question of 
“what significance an unexplained or summary state court 
decision should have.”99 Several other scholars and judges 
                                                                                                     
 95. Valdovinos v. McGrath, 42 F. App’x 720 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 96. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment”). 
 97. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The 
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 646 (2002). 
 98. Valdovinos, 423 F. App’x at 722–23. Professor Evan Lee has eloquently 
argued that a standard of review that considers the degree of error, or “how far 
off the mark” the decision is, must be recognized as nonsense. When, for 
example, there is a Brady violation, asking “how far off the mark” the state was 
in concluding that there was no Brady violation is “like asking how far off the 
mark an answer of ‘on’ is when the correct answer is ‘off.’” Lee, supra note 72, at 
289. 
 99. Blume, supra note 4, at 293. 
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similarly identified the impact of summary state court denials—
e.g., “Relief is denied on the merits”—on AEDPA deference as a 
pressing issue for purposes of understanding how severe the 
AEDPA limitations on relief would be in practice.100 Professor 
Evan Lee eloquently explained his view on the issue as follows: 
I would not require anything of state courts that is not already 
required of them. They are already required to follow federal 
law, but they are not required to write opinions justifying their 
decisions. The pending question is what sort of review a 
federal habeas court ought to perform if the state court 
chooses not to write. If the state court wishes to take 
advantage of the “unreasonable application” clause of 
§ 2254(d)(1), it can write; if not, then not. Some may still 
complain that this is tantamount to requiring state courts to 
write because, it might be said, of course all judges want their 
decisions reviewed as deferentially as possible. I am unmoved 
by this argument. The statute establishes a sort of quid pro 
quo: if state courts want their law application reviewed 
deferentially, then they owe the reviewing court an 
explanation of what they did.101 
                                                                                                     
 100. Compare Lee, supra note 72, at 315–17 (concluding that AEDPA 
deference ought not apply absent a reasoned state court decision), and Brittany 
Glidden, When the State is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA’s Adjudication 
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177, 205–14 (2002) (same), and 
Adam Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: 
How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1529 (same), and Monique Anne Gaylor, Note, 
Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State Court 
Decisions, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1263, 1284–85 (2003) (arguing state court 
decisions with no articulated reasoning should not be considered “adjudications 
on the merits” for AEDPA purposes), with Scott Dodson, Habeas Review of 
Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230–31 
(2002) (concluding that AEDPA “contemplates some sort of judicial reasoning 
process” but that the state court is not required to articulate its reasoning to get 
deference from the habeas court), and Claudia Wilner, Note, We Would Not 
Defer to That Which Did Not Exist: AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court 
Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1461–64 (2002) (describing the “adjudicated on 
the merits” language of AEDPA as including all state court decisions “except 
denials on procedural grounds” and making an analogy to exhaustion doctrine, 
in which a silent state court decision is treated as a denial on the merits). 
 101. See Lee, supra note 72, at 312 (commenting that, in the context of 
independent and adequate bars to federal litigation, the Supreme Court has 
explained that a state may insulate a decision from review by stating clearly 
and unequivocally that the decision rests on state rather than federal law 
grounds) (citations omitted). 
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Likewise Judge Calabresi provided a similar explanation of the 
proper functioning of § 2254(d)(1):  
[T]he AEDPA runs the risk of imposing a heavy, and 
sometimes unwanted and unmanageable, burden on State 
courts. Specifically, if AEDPA deference were deemed 
automatically and universally to apply, then that law would 
require extremely busy State court judges to figure out what 
can be very complicated questions of federal law at the pain of 
having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State 
court decision of these complex questions turn out to be 
mistaken (but not unreasonably so). . . . In contrast, a reading 
of the AEDPA under which AEDPA deference does not apply 
where a State court has rejected a petitioner's claim without 
expressly mentioning its federal aspects allows State courts to 
avoid this burden. It enables State courts to choose whether or 
not they wish to take on the burden and be deferred to. . . . 
Under this interpretation, State courts that wish fully to 
evaluate federal claims need only indicate that they have done 
so, and their decisions will be deferred to.102 
This question of how to deal with silent or summary state court 
decisions is not of interest only to academics or academically 
oriented judges; the deference owed to silent state court 
judgments is of immense practical importance. The Supreme 
Court has highlighted that the California Supreme Court issues 
at least “several hundred” summary denials each year, each of 
which is so cursory as to make it impossible to even discern 
whether the denial of relief is on the merits or, for example, 
because of untimeliness.103 This Term, however, also in 
Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
requirement that a “state court . . . give reasons before its 
decision can be deemed” entitled to deference under § 2254(d).104 
                                                                                                     
 102. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, 
J., concurring). 
 103. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198–99 (2006). 
 104. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Likewise, Blume 
observed that the Court’s retroactivity doctrine had yet to be reconciled with the 
strictures of AEDPA. Blume, supra note 4, at 294. But the Court has now 
granted certiorari to resolve this issue. See Brief of Petitioner at i, Greene v. 
Fisher, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011) (No. 10-637), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/other_brief_updates/
10-637_petition er.authcheckdam.pdf (“[W]hat is the temporal cutoff for whether 
a decision from this Court qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law’ under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy explained that 
“[t]here is no text in [§ 2254] requiring a statement of reasons,” 
and the Court seemingly responded to the likes of Judge 
Calabresi by commenting that the “[o]pinion-writing practices in 
state courts are influenced by considerations other than avoiding 
scrutiny by collateral attack in federal court.”105 After Richter, 
even where the state court denial of relief does not state that the 
denial of relief is on the merits, federal courts are ordered to 
presume that the state court adjudication was on the merits and, 
therefore, to apply the onerous limitations on relief contained in 
§ 2254(d).  
In short, AEDPA’s maturation process has not been good for 
state prisoners. Decisions like Richter leave no doubt that 
AEDPA has wrought significant changes to the role that federal 
courts play in substantively reviewing state convictions.106 
Federal constitutional errors by state courts present an ever-
shrinking target for federal habeas courts. Only the clearest state 
court errors—indeed, only those errors that border on outright 
defiance or rejection of federal supremacy—will warrant federal 
intervention to cure an unjust conviction or sentence. And even 
state court judgments that do not contain any reasoning are 
entitled to the full scope of AEDPA shielding deference.  
                                                                                                     
Act of 1996?”); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas 
Statute: An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 119 (1998) (“If 
‘clearly established’ is measured as of the time of the trial, then the Teague 
doctrine has been expanded. If ‘clearly established’ is measured as of the time 
direct appeals are concluded, then Teague has been codified, at least in that 
respect.”). 
 105. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the 
judgment of the case, but she did not dissent as to any of the Court’s analysis. 
Id. at 793 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at 784 (majority opinion) 
(explaining that the “issuance of summary dispositions in many collateral attack 
cases can enable a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases 
where opinions are most needed”). 
 106. A media article cited a prominent capital lawyer, reporting that “‘We all 
understood AEDPA seriously cut back federal habeas review,’ said Tarik S. 
Adlai, a Pasadena-based appellate attorney who represents defendants. ‘But the 
Supreme Court has said, “No, the pond is much more shallow than you 
thought.”’ Robert Iafolla, High Court and 9th Circuit Battle Over Federal 
Habeas Claims, LOS ANGELES DAILY J., May 16, 2011, at 1 (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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2. The Procedural Abyss of Federal Habeas Practice: 
Pinholster v. Cullen in Context 
AEDPA’s demanding substantive standard of review is not 
the only feature of the 1996 Act that has recently come into focus 
so as to substantially disadvantage state prisoners. Recent 
procedural developments further portend the conclusion that 
AEDPA’s bite has caught up to its initial hype.  
Professor Yackle has aptly observed that “[c]onstitutional 
claims invariably turn on the underlying historical facts.”107 Facts 
are the critical foundation upon which a claim of constitutional 
defect can rise to the level of “unreasonableness” as required for 
federal intervention under § 2254(d). This conclusion has been 
confirmed by the King Report from 2007.108 The study found that 
one of the most reliable predictors of ultimate success for a 
habeas petitioner was whether the federal court ordered an 
evidentiary hearing in the case.109 Specifically, “a case in which 
an evidentiary hearing was held was 32 percentage points more 
likely to result in a grant than a case in which an evidentiary 
hearing was not held, controlling for other factors.”110 Similarly, 
the study found that grants of discovery in federal habeas cases 
are also significantly correlated with ultimate success rates.111  
The study concedes that “[i]t is unclear whether evidentiary 
hearings and discovery are granted because the judge first 
determines that a claim is potentially meritorious, or whether the 
causal relationship operates in the other direction, with discovery 
and hearings revealing proof of merit that would otherwise be 
unavailable.”112 What is clear, however, is that AEDPA now 
substantially curtails the availability of hearings and discovery 
and diminishes the importance of any evidence garnered through 
these mechanisms. One study conducted prior to the enactment of 
                                                                                                     
 107. Yackle, supra note 35, at 135. 
 108. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 89 (“An evidentiary hearing has a 
more powerful relationship with the probability of relief than any variable other 
than location.”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 87 n.159. 
 111. See id. at 89 (“Also increasing the likelihood of relief (by nine to 12 
percentage points) was an order of discovery.”). 
 112. Id. 
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AEDPA found that capital habeas petitioners received hearings 
at a rate of about 19%, but the King study found that capital 
habeas petitioners received hearings in only 9.5% of cases.113 The 
King study also shows that during the relevant post-AEDPA 
years, non-capital habeas petitioners received a federal 
evidentiary hearing at the almost non-existent rate of 0.4%, or 
“one of every 243 cases.”114  
The absence of access to discovery or an evidentiary hearing 
in the period of the study, between 2000 and 2005, is not directly 
attributable to AEDPA. AEDPA contains a provision, 
§ 2254(e)(2), which specifically limits access to evidentiary 
hearings, but the limit is merely a codification of the pre-AEDPA 
rule. By its plain text, § 2254(e)(2) limits access only to those 
prisoners who are “at fault and bear[] responsibility for the 
failure” to develop the facts in state court.115 Notably, an 
unwillingness to permit factual development in federal court, 
when the prisoner could have presented such facts through 
reasonable diligence in state court, is entirely consistent with the 
pre-AEDPA barriers announced in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes.116 
That is to say, even prior to AEDPA, prisoners’ efforts to develop 
new facts in federal court after being dilatory in state court were 
                                                                                                     
 113. Id. The study also confirms that significantly fewer capital habeas 
petitioners are receiving relief post-AEDPA. See id. at 61 (finding that 
approximately 13% of capital habeas petitioners receive federal relief, as 
compared to roughly 40% of petitioners at a point in time considerably before 
the enactment of the AEDPA). The study also found that petitioners only 
received discovery in post-AEDPA cases about 12.5% of the time. Id. at 64. 
 114. Id. at 36. Interestingly, the rate of relief under AEDPA is, according to 
the King study, also less than one-half percent. See id. at 52 (finding 0.35% 
relief rate in non-capital cases). Apparently, there is not a reliable source of data 
regarding the rate at which pre-AEDPA evidentiary hearings were granted in 
non-capital cases, but the authors of the AEDPA study speculate that at least 
1.1% of all habeas cases received an evidentiary hearing prior to AEDPA. Id. at 
60. The study also found that only 0.3% of non-capital defendants received 
discovery. Id. at 36. 
 115. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000).  
 116. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). There is, however, one 
critical difference between the pre- and post-AEDPA limits on evidentiary 
hearing access. Prior to AEDPA, if a prisoner “failed” to develop the facts in 
state court through non-diligence, he was merely required to demonstrate cause 
and prejudice for the failure. Id. By contrast, under § 2254(e)(2), a prisoner who 
fails is barred from a hearing absent a showing of a set of conditions that, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, no prisoner has satisfied. 
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substantially curtailed. Perhaps, then, the decline in evidentiary 
hearings found in the King study can best be understood as a 
product of the general anti-habeas petitioner interpretive mood 
that scholars like Lee Kovarsky identified in the wake of AEDPA 
and less as a result of any direct textual or judicial limitation.117 
Notably, starting in 2007, after the King study’s data 
collection was complete, the Supreme Court began to take a more 
active approach to limiting state prisoner access to federal habeas 
hearings.118 Whereas previous AEDPA decisions had focused 
primarily on the merits of the state court decision and the proper 
application of § 2254(d)(1)’s deference, in Schriro v. Landrigan,119 
the Court granted certiorari and reversed a lower court’s mere 
grant of an evidentiary hearing.120 That is to say, the court of 
appeals had not granted habeas relief but had merely remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing in order to develop more facts in 
support of the alleged constitutional violation, and the Court 
reversed.121 Given the Supreme Court’s stingy standards for 
reviewing cases,122 it is noteworthy that the Court deemed the 
mere provision of factual discovery an issue of sufficient national 
importance to warrant briefing, argument, and ultimately, 
reversal. On a micro level, the Court’s decision resulted in Jeffrey 
Landrigan’s being executed without the benefit of factual 
development in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
sentencing counsel.123 On the macro level, Landrigan left lower 
                                                                                                     
 117. See Kovarsky, supra note 20, at 444. 
 118. In truth, some such efforts to formally limit access to new facts had 
occurred prior to 2007, but they were relatively limited. See, e.g., Holland v. 
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (holding that the AEDPA limits on 
evidentiary hearings, § 2254(e)(2), applied as well to efforts to expand the record 
to include new facts even in the absence of a hearing). 
 119. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). 
 120. Id. at 473. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only 
for compelling reasons.”); see also Cavazos v. Smith, No. 10-1115, 2011 WL 
5118826, at *5 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam) 
(criticizing the majority for taking a law correcting approach, rather than 
looking for broad issues in need of sweeping clarification, in the realm of 
AEDPA interpretation).   
 123. The Court refused to permit discovery or a hearing as ordered by the 
court of appeals, despite the fact that the trial court judge who had sentenced 
Landrigan to death signed an affidavit stating that she would not have 
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courts considerably less certain about their post-AEDPA 
authority to order evidentiary hearings in cases in which the 
prisoner was not at fault for failing to develop the facts in support 
of his claim in the state courts. Prior to Landrigan, it was de 
rigueur for a lower court, barring a failure by the prisoner that 
would trigger the onerous requirements of § 2254(e)(2), to order 
an evidentiary hearing under the generous pre-AEDPA standard 
for granting hearings. Indeed, outside of § 2254(e)(2), AEDPA did 
not explicitly mention, let alone limit, evidentiary hearing 
access.124 
Consequently, although there is not yet any empirical data 
on this point, it is very likely that lower federal courts became 
even more reluctant to grant evidentiary hearings in the post-
Landrigan world because, much more so than the text of AEDPA 
itself, the Landrigan decision called into question the preexisting 
framework for obtaining an evidentiary hearing.125 But if AEDPA 
generally, and the Landrigan decision more specifically, made 
access to evidentiary hearings more difficult, the Court’s recent 
decision in Cullen v. Pinholster126 threatens to fundamentally 
alter the way federal habeas courts consider factual development. 
Under Pinholster, new facts developed during federal habeas 
proceedings have “no bearing” on federal habeas review such that 
the “federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of 
                                                                                                     
sentenced him to death had she known about some of the mitigating evidence 
that his lawyer had failed to uncover. See Editorial, No Justification for the 
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at A30. 
 124. See, e.g., Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669–70 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing the pre-AEDPA rule of a mandatory hearing applies barring a 
failure for purposes of (e)(2) by the petitioner); United States ex rel. Hampton v. 
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 234 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Having thus determined that the 
AEDPA posed no bar to taking additional evidence on Hampton’s claim, the 
court turned to pre-AEDPA standards.”). 
 125. The pre-AEDPA law governing evidentiary hearings was generous to 
state prisoners who were not at fault for the non-development of facts in state 
court. See ANDREA LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(2d ed. 2011) (referring to these standards as the “high-water mark” for access 
to federal courts). Under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), for example, a 
federal court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing when the habeas 
petitioner stated a colorable claim of constitutional deprivation and had not had 
a full and fair opportunity to develop the facts in state court. Id. at 322. 
 126. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
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§ 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before the state court” without 
the benefit of any facts developed through a federal hearing.127 
In Pinholster, the defendant was convicted of murder by a 
California jury and sentenced to death.128 A federal district court 
judge granted Pinholster an evidentiary hearing in order to 
develop facts in support of his claim that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective during the sentencing proceedings of 
his trial and ultimately granted Pinholster relief based on the 
facts adduced during the evidentiary hearing.129 In reversing the 
grant of relief, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred 
when it considered the newly adduced evidence in determining 
the prisoner’s eligibility for relief.130 The majority opinion cited 
two reasons in support of the holding.  
First, the five-Justice majority explained: 
Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court 
adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, 
or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. 
This backward-looking language requires an examination of 
the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that 
the record under review is limited to the record in existence at 
that same time i.e., the record before the state court.131 
In addition, the Court invoked a general view of congressional 
purpose to support the result: 
This understanding of the text is compelled by “the broader 
context of the statute as a whole,” which demonstrates 
Congress’ intent to channel prisoners’ claims first to the state 
courts. “The federal habeas scheme leaves primary 
responsibility with the state courts . . . .” Section 2254(b) 
requires that prisoners must ordinarily exhaust state remedies 
before filing for federal habeas relief. It would be contrary to 
that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse 
state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal 
habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance 
effectively de novo.132 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 1400.  
 128. Id. at 1396. 
 129. Id. at 1397. 
 130. Id. at 1398. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1398–99 (citations omitted). 
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It is important not to understate the potential significance of 
the Pinholster holding on future federal habeas litigation. In the 
short term, Pinholster has resulted in a rush of GVRs from the 
Supreme Court,133 and orders from lower courts requesting 
briefing as to whether previously granted evidentiary hearings 
are no longer justified under Pinholster.134 Over the longer term, 
however, Pinholster threatens to substantially reduce the 
viability of federal habeas relief in cases where court assistance—
e.g., subpoenas or discovery orders—is needed in order to 
substantiate a claim of constitutional injury.135 Writing shortly 
after AEDPA’s enactment, Professors Tushnet and Yackle were 
confident that “[i]n the end, courts are likely to read [AEDPA] to 
authorize federal evidentiary hearings in most of the same 
circumstances in which hearings were conducted in the past.”136 
                                                                                                     
 133. See, e.g., Ryan v. Detrich, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011) (vacating and 
remanding lower court decision in light of Pinholster). For a thorough discussion 
of the Supreme Court’s GVR procedure, see generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—And an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 711 (2009). GVR stands for “grant, vacate, remand” and refers to the 
Court’s procedure for granting certiorari, vacating the lower court decision 
without a finding of error, and remanding the case back to the lower courts for 
additional review. Id. at 712. The GVR device allows “the lower court the initial 
opportunity to consider the possible impact of intervening developments and, if 
necessary, to revise its decision accordingly.” Id. 
 134. See Bruhl, supra note 133, at 712 (“[T]he purpose of the GVR device is 
to give the lower court the initial opportunity to consider the possible impact of 
intervening developments and, if necessary, to revise its decision accordingly.”). 
For an example of GVRs in this context, see Atkins v. Clarke, 642 F.3d 47, 48 
(1st Cir. 2011) (applying Pinholster to deny a hearing and relief). Illustrative is 
a recent federal district court decision in which a grant of discovery and a 
federal hearing was revoked by the court after Pinholster was decided. See 
Carter v. Bigelow, No. 2:02-cv-326, 2011 WL 2551325, at *2 (D. Utah 2011) 
(“[F]urther factual development in this case would be futile since the results of 
such factual development could not be considered by this Court in resolving 
Petitioner’s claims.”). 
 135. Factual development through discovery and evidentiary hearings has 
long been considered a hallmark of good federal habeas practice. Justin F. 
Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and 
(e)(1), 82 TUL. L. REV. 385 (2007); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 135 (noting 
that “[c]onstitutional claims invariably turn on the underlying historical facts”). 
And, for the most part, discovery orders and hearings in a § 2254 case do not 
occur until after the federal habeas petition has been filed. If district courts are 
amenable to granting hearings and discovery prior to the filing of the petition, 
then the impact of Pinholster might be mitigated for reasons discussed in the 
next Part of the Article. Infra Part V. 
 136. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 79, at 40. Professors Tushnet and Yackle 
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The limitation on access to a federal hearing under Pinholster, 
however, substantially curtails the availability of hearings by 
limiting hearings to circumstances where the defendant can 
satisfy § 2254(d)(1) without the benefits of any newly adduced 
evidence. In other words, the excruciating standard of review 
commanded by cases like Richter apparently must be satisfied 
completely on the basis of the state court record and without the 
benefit of federal court fact-finding or discovery.  
The data has shown that federal hearings are one of the best 
indicators of success on the merits, but after Pinholster, the 
circumstances in which habeas discovery or an evidentiary 
hearing is available seem perilously narrow. When § 2254(d) 
applies, a strong argument can be made that any evidence 
extrinsic to the state court record that a petitioner seeks to rely 
on is precluded for one of two reasons—either the evidence is 
merely cumulative of what was produced below and thus a 
hearing is unnecessary and unavailable, or the evidence is 
conclusively non-cumulative or novel, and thus barred under 
Pinholster.137 Stated another way, Pinhoster creates a stifling 
catch-22 for many federal habeas petitioners. On the one hand, 
Pinholster holds that “if the factual allegations a petitioner seeks 
to prove at an evidentiary hearing” would not satisfy the 
requirements for relief under (d)(1), then “there is no reason for a 
hearing.”138 In other words, a hearing is generally not permitted 
unless the facts sought to be developed at the hearing would 
satisfy the strictures of (d)(1). But on the other hand, under the 
Pinholster rule, if the new evidence that would be adduced at a 
hearing would demonstrate that (d)(1) is satisfied, then the use of 
                                                                                                     
observed that it would be quite “extraordinary” if § 2254 were read to limit 
evidentiary hearings to circumstances in which the prisoner could establish a 
strong claim of innocence and either the existence of “new” law or “new” facts 
that were previously undiscoverable. Id. at 38. The limitation on access to a 
federal hearing in Pinholster, however, may actually be even more 
extraordinary.  
 137. Habeas Rule 6, governing discovery, permits discovery only where 
“good cause” is shown. R. GOVERNING SEC. 2254 CASES IN U.S. DIST. CTS. 6, 
printed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). Surely mere cumulative factual support will 
rarely, if ever, amount to good cause. The Rule also requires that the party 
specify exactly what information will be sought. Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 60 
(1st Cir. 2007). 
 138. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing Shriro v. Londrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 
481 (2007)). 
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the evidence is conclusively barred because the review for relief 
eligibility under § 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was 
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 
merits.”139 A hearing is barred if it would not generate the sort of 
evidence that would justify relief, and yet evidence that is 
sufficiently new so as to justify relief is outside of the federal 
court’s scope of review.  
Procedural labyrinths are nothing new for those versed in 
AEDPA practice, but the Pinholster decision creates a system of 
federal review that is particularly inhospitable to efforts to 
establish an entitlement to constitutional relief. The impact of 
this limitation, particularly in view of the increased deference 
prescribed by (d)(1) in cases like Richter, will be to profoundly 
limit the availability of federal habeas relief.140 When a state 
court summarily and without explanation denies relief, the 
limitations enshrined in (d)(1) apply. Moreover, when a prisoner 
is at fault for failing to develop facts in the state court, those facts 
ordinarily cannot be raised in federal court under § 2254(e)(2). 
And even if a petitioner is diligent so as to avoid (e)(2)’s bar on 
hearings, now, under Pinholster, a hearing is permitted only 
when the prisoner can satisfy (d)(1) on the basis of the state court 
record alone. This trifecta of procedural barriers ensures that the 
safekeeping of substantive federal constitutional rights in the 
realm of criminal law is increasingly outside the purview of 
federal courts, and instead reserved for state post-conviction 
review.141 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 1398. 
 140. The most robust limitation on Pinholster that could reasonably be 
imagined would be that a federal hearing is permitted whenever the petitioner 
attempts and fails, through no fault of his own, to develop facts in state court. 
The expectation that a hearing is available under such circumstances would 
require the Court to read very narrowly its own recent and nearly unanimous 
decision in Pinholster, a seemingly unlikely result. It is far from clear that the 
sort of diligence—i.e., non-fault—required to satisfy the strictures of § 2254(e)(2) 
will also suffice to satisfy Pinholster. 
 141. There will still be rare instances in which new evidence will be 
admitted in federal habeas proceedings in support of a prisoner’s claim of 
constitutional injury. Ervin v. Cullen, No. C 00-01228, 2011 WL 4005389, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011) (applying the “new claim” exception and permitting 
discovery in service of a Brady claim); Bemore v. Martel, No. 08cv0311, 2011 WL 
2650337, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (permitting an expansion of the record to 
include an affidavit that confirms the factual allegations that were assumed to 
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III. Considering the Consequences of a Diminished Writ: Abolish 
or Reorient the Writ in Criminal Cases? 
There is a distinguished line of scholars and judges who have 
argued federal habeas must function so as to “guarantee[] a 
federal forum for every claim of non-harmless constitutional error 
by a state convict.”142 As illustrated by the discussion above, this 
theory of federal habeas review—the “federal forum” theory—is 
almost entirely rejected by the AEDPA-centered decisions of the 
Roberts Court in this past Term.143 Under AEDPA, the primary, 
and often final, arbiters of federal constitutional law are state 
post-conviction courts,144 and federal habeas review of state 
convictions is substantively de minimis for the first time since 
1867, when federal habeas review of state convictions became 
statutorily recognized and roundly accepted.145 Accepting that 
                                                                                                     
be true by the state court adjudicating the claim). 
 142. See Lee, supra note 92, at 153 (compiling authorities). 
 143. As Professor Lee has explained, it is possible to understand the 
conceptual underpinnings for a broad approach to federal habeas review as 
being rooted either in a belief in the “federal forum” imperative, or in a belief 
(which I share) that regards federal review as playing a necessary role in 
deterring state court errors as to constitutional law. Id. at 153–54. Despite 
commentary to the contrary, there is still room to argue that the existence of 
federal habeas review deters state courts from defying federal constitutional 
mandates. The relief may be rare, but this could be explained, in part, by the 
existence of federal review itself, which serves as a deterrent to state courts 
reviewing constitutional challenges. But see Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 
811 (“[B]ecause grants of habeas relief are so infrequent, and often occur long 
after the trial is over, they cannot possibly pose a meaningful deterrent for state 
actors in noncapital cases.”).  
 144. See supra Part I. 
 145. Commentators and courts frequently invoke the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867 as the point at which habeas corpus was first made generally available to 
state prisoners. See, e.g., DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION 
REMEDIES & RELIEF HANDBOOK § 5:8 (2010) (compiling Supreme Court cases and 
academic commentary making this point). But one leading commentator has 
compellingly explained that the modern view that the writ was unavailable to 
state prisoners prior to the Act of 1867 is entirely ahistorical. Eric Freedman 
has explained: 
In approaching Suspension Clause issues, the Court, like scholars, 
proceeds on the assumption that the [Suspension] Clause originally 
protected only federal, not state, prisoners. This assumption is a 
mistake. It should be corrected, lest it undermine the Court’s 
willingness to recognize the applicability of the Clause to state 
prisoners and encourage Congress to disregard the constitutional 
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AEDPA has stripped substantive federal habeas review to the 
bone, it is necessary to consider what, if any, doctrinal or policy 
changes ought to result.146 Stated another way, in light of the 
general futility of the federal habeas remedy, the necessary 
question is what statutory- or case-law-based changes should be 
pursued. Presently, scholars have charted two related but 
divergent paths for federal review based on the empirical and 
doctrinal reality of the writ’s diminished power.147 
First, Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann have 
urged courts and commentators to regard the infinitesimally 
small rate of relief in non-capital habeas cases post-AEDPA as 
justifying a nearly complete abandonment of the writ in this 
context.148 King and Hoffmann conclude that “the federal courts 
                                                                                                     
limits on its ability to deny those prisoners federal vindication of their 
rights. 
Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John 
Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory 
Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 535–37 (2000); see also id. at 537 (“To 
the extent that legal arguments regarding the meaning of the Suspension 
Clause proceed from history, they should recognize that, since the Constitution 
came into force, the federal courts have had the authority—both by statute and 
independently of it—to free state prisoners on habeas corpus.”). Moreover, a 
strong argument has been advanced that, even if the writ did not originally 
apply to state prisoners, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had the 
effect of extending federal habeas review to state prisoners. Jordan Streiker, 
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994). 
 146. Alternatively, there is certainly room for robust scholarly criticism of 
the cramped federal review permitted under AEDPA. See, e.g., Blume, Johnson 
& Weyble, supra note 11, at 452–53 (calling for the limitations on habeas relief 
to be revisited). I have previously joined a chorus of scholars in making novel 
constitutional challenges to AEDPA. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 1. The 
present Article, however, takes the AEDPA framework for granted and 
considers what, if any, logical conclusions one can draw about the future of 
federal habeas review. 
 147. Presently, only one academic article provides a detailed critique of the 
conclusions reached by King and Hoffmann. See Blume, Johnson & Weyble, 
supra note 11, at 452–53 (urging, as an alternative to the general elimination of 
non-capital habeas, the elimination of certain restrictions on federal review—
e.g., the statute of limitations and the procedural default rules—so as to 
enhance the deterrent effect of federal habeas). 
 148. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–107; see also Hoffmann & King, 
supra note 9, at 819–23. King and Hoffmann have also made their case to the 
general public in op-eds. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Op-Ed., 
Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8 
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remain in a 1960s-style habeas rut [and] continue to receive tens 
of thousands of habeas petitions from convicted state 
prisoners,”149 and argue the statistics indicating the 
improbability of federal relief “speak for themselves: habeas 
review of routine state criminal cases is no longer needed to 
enforce federal constitutional rights.”150 According to this view, 
federal habeas ought to be relied on only for certain fundamental 
structural corrections to our democratic system. In other words, 
the use of habeas corpus to safeguard against novel uses of 
executive power to detain, for example, alleged enemy 
combatants at Guantanamo is a necessary and appropriate use of 
habeas corpus jurisdiction.151 Likewise, King and Hoffmann 
acknowledge that the expansion of federal habeas review of state 
convictions during the Warren Court era played a similarly 
important role in preserving the structure of our democracy by 
insisting on federal supremacy at a time when “defiant state 
judges . . . [might] thumb their noses at, or deliberately ignore, 
federal law.”152 Maintaining a flexible and prudently applied 
habeas remedy, however, requires, according to King and 
Hoffmann, that when the conditions giving rise to the need for 
the writ recede, so too must the writ’s use in that arena cease.153 
Consequently, they summarize their conclusions by explaining 
that: “Retaining that system might make sense today if the 
problems that gave rise to it persisted, but they do not. Retaining 
the current system might also make sense today if it represented 
                                                                                                     
(“Congress should limit habeas review of state criminal cases to two categories 
in which it actually can do some serious good: capital cases and cases in which 
the prisoner can produce persuasive new evidence of his innocence.”). 
 149. Hoffmann & King, supra note 148, at WK8 (“Still, the habeas 
machinery runs on, wasting resources and dissipating respect for the Great 
Writ, while benefiting almost nobody.”); Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 793 
(“In 99.99% of all state felony cases—excluding those cases in which the 
defendant is sentenced to death—the time, money, and energy spent on federal 
habeas litigation is wasted, generating virtually no benefit for anyone.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 150. Hoffmann & King, supra note 148, at WK8. 
 151. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 42–47 (describing the writ’s 
“starring role” as preserving democracy by serving to balance or offset executive 
detentions). 
 152. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 805. 
 153. Id. 
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an effective and efficient way of enforcing the Constitution’s 
commands in individual cases, but it does not.”154 
In a nutshell, King and Hoffmann conclude that, because 
there is no longer a crisis of federalism like that of the 1960s and 
because the rate of habeas relief is extremely small,155 federal 
habeas review of state convictions should be largely 
abandoned.156 For King and Hoffmann, “[t]he resources now 
wasted on reviewing and rejecting claims of constitutional error 
in habeas litigation should be redeployed” such that the money 
currently spent on federal habeas would be diverted to funding 
programs in support of trial-level indigent defense.157 Federal 
habeas review for non-capital prisoners would be permitted in 
only two circumstances:  
The first category would include those petitioners incarcerated 
in violation of federal law who can offer ‘clear and convincing’ 
proof of factual innocence . . . . The second category would 
allow for the postconviction enforcement of new constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. King and Hoffmann defend maintaining federal habeas review of all 
capital sentences, in part, based on the relatively higher rates of federal relief in 
capital cases. That is to say, they regard the fact that “habeas courts continue to 
grant relief regularly” in capital cases as an indication that “there is a special 
need for habeas review in capital cases that is not present in noncapital cases.” 
KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 147, 149. It is worth noting, however, that 
only capital petitioners have a statutory right to counsel for federal habeas 
review, and thus the disparity in relief rates, for those who practice in the field, 
is not terribly surprising in view of the disparate provision of rights facilitating 
meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2011); McFarland v. 
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 858 (1994) (discussing the statutory right to habeas 
counsel in capital cases, holding that the right to counsel applies, and holding 
that a motion for appointment of counsel provides a federal court with the 
authority to stay a state execution); Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 
803, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a capital habeas petitioner’s statutory 
right to counsel encompasses the right to competence in habeas proceedings).  
 155. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 52 (noting non-capital prisoners 
obtain habeas relief post-AEDPA in just 0.35% of all cases).  
 156. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 818; see also KING & HOFFMANN, 
supra note 8, at 100–01. These sentiments, though more empirically supported, 
are not new. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 104 (referring to Judge Friendly’s 
path-marking 1970 article and explaining that “Friendly referred to federal 
habeas corpus as ‘a gigantic waste of effort’ because the remedy produces no 
result in the overwhelming majority of cases and a good result only rarely”).  
 157. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 818; see also KING & HOFFMANN, 
supra note 8, at 100–01. 
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rules that have been held to apply retroactively to cases 
already final on direct appeal [under Teague v. Lane].158 
So for non-capital habeas petitioners, only those who can 
demonstrate their innocence or the retroactivity of a new rule of 
law would be entitled to federal habeas review.  
To be sure, increased funding for trial-level indigent defense 
would improve the criminal justice system in many 
jurisdictions.159 But conditioning such funding on the elimination 
of non-capital habeas review in nearly all cases is a conclusion 
that, with due respect for King and Hoffmann’s empirical work, 
does not naturally or necessarily flow from the observation that 
the Constitution is already severely under-enforced through post-
AEDPA habeas corpus litigation. Neither of the two explanations 
proffered for the elimination of non-capital habeas review stands 
up to scrutiny. First, by their own admission, the question of 
whether there remains a crisis of federalism justifying such 
review is, at the very least, an open question. To their substantial 
credit, King and Hoffmann concede that reasonable persons could 
disagree about the conclusion that the federalism concerns that 
justified the expansion of habeas corpus litigation in the 1960s 
have passed,160 but they do not acknowledge that such a 
concession substantially undermines their conclusion that the 
federal review of state convictions is futile and “utterly 
                                                                                                     
 158. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 820–21. 
 159. It must be noted that the sort of political trade that is envisioned by 
King and Hoffmann seems improbable. If federal habeas review is regarded as 
disposable at the whim of Congress, then initially some of the funding may be 
diverted to a federal resource center for trial level representation. However, in 
tight budgetary times, surely this office would see cuts to its budget just as 
similar systems at the state level have. See, e.g., Blume, Johnson & Weyble, 
supra note 11, at 468 (“To [succeed], the new federal initiative that Hoffmann 
and King advocate would require . . . a massive amount of federal money, a 
commitment by Congress and the President to spend that money on indigent 
defense, and a willingness on the part of the states to commit their own 
resources to improving defense representation. None of these ingredients are in 
good supply . . . .”). 
 160. King and Hoffmann note that “[r]easonable people . . . may resist our 
claim that the serious federalism conflict that originally provoked the Warren 
Court into action has passed. But whatever one might think about that claim, 
the stark statistical picture . . . is impossible to ignore.” KING & HOFFMANN, 
supra note 8, at 169. 
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worthless.”161 In reality the empirical data raises more questions 
than it answers.  
As an initial matter, if federal habeas is rarely a source of 
relief under AEDPA, does the conclusion that the system should 
be scrapped “speak for itself” as they have concluded? Certainly 
not. Data suggesting that federal oversight has become 
increasingly futile might be used just as compellingly to support 
the conclusion that some of the modern limitations on federal 
habeas review should be revisited and abandoned. Indeed, one 
group of commentators has explained:  
If . . . the chief problems with the existing noncapital habeas 
review scheme are too much volume (and corresponding cost) 
and too little success, then we would offer a different recipe for 
fixing them. The most obvious solution to the problem of too 
many habeas filings is to stop imprisoning so many people for 
such long periods of time. . . . [Moreover,] Congress could 
effectively address the problem of too little success in 
noncapital habeas by modifying, rather than abandoning, the 
current scheme.162 
Interestingly, King and Hoffmann flippantly reject a loosening of 
the AEDPA noose with little discussion, noting only that peeling 
back the limitations on federal habeas review reflects a “possible 
way to respond,” but “not a sensible” one.163  
While reasonable people could differ as to whether curtailing 
limits on federal review is the best approach, King and 
Hoffmann’s abrupt rejection of such reforms as not only 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. King and Hoffmann’s approach also appears to be unabashedly 
utilitarian. They ultimately argue that retaining habeas corpus review would 
only make sense if “habeas actually corrected or deterred enough error to be 
worth its cost.” Id. at 81. It is not obvious that habeas corpus, the most 
cherished writ, ought to be subject to a raw cost-benefit metric like that applied 
to the exclusionary rule—perhaps there is some intrinsic value in having a 
safety net, even if the safety net is often more theoretical than practical or 
actual. 
 162. Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 471–72. 
 163. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 85; see also Hoffmann & King, 
supra note 9, at 813 (explaining that “[r]emoving the AEDPA- and Court-
imposed restrictions on habeas” would not be effective at curbing 
unconstitutional state practices because, among other reasons, many state 
prisoners are not in custody long enough to file federal habeas petitions, plea 
bargains limit the range of viable claims, and the deterrent effect of such 
reversals is suspect). 
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impractical but nonsensical is surprising. Habeas relief for state 
prisoners has not been a common phenomenon over the last 
several decades,164 but relief was not so entirely implausible as to 
justify the “futile,” “worthless,” and “illusory” labels that King 
and Hoffman use to describe the modern habeas review and 
justify its elimination. Specifically, King and Hoffmann defend 
the retention of federal habeas review in capital cases, in part, by 
concluding that the courts “continue to grant relief regularly” and 
by describing the post-AEDPA rate of relief as non-futile and 
“broad.”165 Notably, the rate of relief in capital cases post-AEDPA 
according to their data is only about 12%.166 Certainly, if rates of 
relief around 10% are considered to be substantial and “regular” 
so as to justify retaining habeas review, then rates of relief that 
are only 5–9% lower should not be dismissed out of hand as 
useless and futile.167 More to the point, it is, contrary to the 
conclusions of King and Hoffmann, entirely “sensible” to consider 
whether relaxing some of the restrictions on federal habeas might 
serve a role no less important than the funding of indigent 
defense proposed by King and Hoffmann.168 The rates of relief in 
                                                                                                     
 164. See KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 89 (stating that success rates for non-
capital state prisoners in “habeas probably never approached the double digit 
percentages”). Just prior to AEDPA’s enactment, it is likely that the rate of relief 
was already substantially diminished based on court-created limitations. Id. at 
58; see also Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 809 (“The grant rate for 
noncapital cases has dropped from 1% in the early 1990s to only 0.34% today.”). 
The study also reports that the rate of relief in capital cases has dropped from 
40% pre-AEDPA to about 12% post-AEDPA. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 61.  
 165. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 146–48 (explaining one key 
difference between sentences of death and life in prison is the more generous 
stance taken by courts toward granting relief to those sentenced to death and 
identifying specific categories of cases associated with a higher likelihood of 
habeas relief). 
 166. See id. at 46. 
 167. See id. at 149 (describing the 12% rate of relief as illustrating a 
perception of a “continuing need for broad habeas jurisdiction in capital cases” by 
the federal courts).  
 168. To be sure, it is unlikely that King and Hoffmann would agree with this 
view, but I merely point out that the data does not, as they suggest, speak for 
itself. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 52 (“The problem with habeas 
review of state criminal cases is that, even though the particular crisis of 
federalism that gave rise to its twentieth-century expansion has long since 
passed, the federal courts continue to entertain, on a routine basis, vast numbers 
of habeas petitions . . . .”). That is to say, their conclusion—that federal habeas 
ought to be largely abandoned—does not necessarily follow from the low grant 
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non-capital cases might not ever reach the level of relief seen in 
capital cases; the higher rates of relief in capital cases, however, 
do not necessarily suggest some innate connection between 
reversible errors and capital convictions. Rather, a variety of 
factors, including a statutory right to counsel in capital cases, 
substantially explain the lower rates of relief for capital and non-
capital prisoners. As one group of commentators observed: 
Hoffmann and King fail to acknowledge a key distinction 
between capital and noncapital habeas petitioners: the former 
enjoy a statutory right to the assistance of appointed counsel 
while the latter do not. If noncapital habeas petitioners had 
access to counsel like their death-sentenced counterparts 
already do, their success rates would undoubtedly be 
higher . . . .169 
In short, the rate of relief in non-capital cases is likely to be much 
higher if these prisoners are also afforded a right to counsel. And 
even without counsel, in the years preceding AEDPA, non-capital 
prisoners obtained relief at a rate that King and Hoffmann have 
themselves regarded as non-trivial and as justification for 
retaining federal review. Nonetheless, the reform proposed by 
King and Hoffmann would, with only the narrowest of exceptions, 
abolish non-capital habeas review.  
Professor Eve Brensike Primus proposed a second and 
slightly more measured reform based on the empirical data 
regarding the low rate of habeas grants post-AEDPA. The 
empirical data convinced Professor Primus, like King and 
Hoffmann, that habeas review as currently structured is not 
working and that the “the federal habeas system is broken 
largely because of its resolute focus on individual petitioners.”170 
                                                                                                     
rate in habeas cases, but rather reflects their policy view, consistent with 
Bator’s institutional competence model of habeas review, that because state 
courts are less “defiant” as to federal law and because all states have “appellate 
and collateral review procedures,” habeas is simply not the “best place to invest 
federal resources.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 795—96; see also Andrea 
Lyon, Liberty Requires More Habeas in This Corpus, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 
2011, 12:56 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-lyon/ liberty-requires-
more-hab_b_853020.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 169. Blume, Johnson & Weyble, supra note 11, at 461. 
 170. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2010) (emphasis added). King and Hoffmann, in reviewing Primus’s 
work, actually congratulate her for accepting their premise that habeas 
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Rather than suggesting an outright abandonment of federal 
criminal habeas review, however, Primus suggests that the 
system be reconfigured so as to focus its resources and attention 
on “systemic state violations” of the Federal Constitution.171 
Under this systemic model of habeas review, “a petitioner would 
have to show that his individual rights were prejudicially violated 
and would also have to produce some evidence that the violation 
was systemic rather than an idiosyncratic error in his case.”172 
Stated another way, Primus would limit relief in much the same 
way that Monell v. Department of Social Services curtails 
municipal liability under § 1983.173 Just as Monell conditions 
relief on a showing by the plaintiff of a pattern or custom of 
violations by the municipality,174 Primus would condition habeas 
                                                                                                     
litigation should no longer be permitted as a means of vindicating individual 
violations of the Constitution on a case-by-case basis: “This is the crucial lesson 
of the recent empirical findings, and it is a lesson that Professor Primus takes to 
heart.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 50. 
 171. Primus rejects the notion that individual litigation regarding 
constitutional violations is appropriate in federal habeas: “On all sides, the 
literature is large. But from each perspective, these scholars share the 
assumption that the point of federal review of state convictions should be to 
correct errors in individual cases. They only differ as to which errors they think 
are worth correcting—process errors, guilt-innocence errors, or errors affecting 
certain favored federal rights.” Primus, supra note 170, at 4. 
 172. Id. at 7. Although Primus would condition habeas relief on a two-part 
showing: (1) denial of the individual’s constitutional rights; and (2) a systemic 
constitutional problem in the state, she does not address the order of decision-
making problem that is common to this sort of two-part constitutional decision-
making. Cf. John C. Jeffries Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional 
Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 137 (advancing the idea that the Saucier v. Katz 
order of decision-making for constitutional tort claims should still be used when 
money damages are the best remedy for violation of the right in question); 
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 667–71 (2009) (providing an empirical analysis of 
sequencing issues arising from a two-part test for qualified immunity under 
§ 1983); Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in 
Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 53, 57 (2008) (urging continued use of the order of the two-part 
qualified immunity test announced in Saucier).  
 173. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690 (1978) 
(removing municipal immunity from § 1983 suits and limiting that liability to 
deprivations of constitutional rights stemming from any formally adopted policy 
or custom not formally adopted). 
 174. See id. at 690. 
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relief on a showing that the state’s post-conviction process had 
engaged in a pattern of unfairness or systemic failures.175  
Interestingly, there is notable overlap between Primus’s 
proposal for reform, which apparently would permit only facial 
challenges to a state’s post-conviction system, and the constraints 
on King and Hoffmann’s proposal that they regard as 
constitutionally required. For King and Hoffmann, the 
Suspension Clause necessitates federal substantive review when 
the state fails to provide a “reasonable level” of constitutional 
oversight,176 and for Primus, when there are systemic state 
failures, federal oversight is available. The common denominator, 
then, is that individual constitutional violations, even if 
prejudicial to the prisoner, do not warrant relief under either 
proposal—“If the federal court found no systemic problem, it 
would dismiss the petition.”177 
The two approaches are not, however, identical. Despite the 
similarities in approach and ultimate conclusion, there is a 
feature of Primus’s reform that is fundamentally at odds with 
King and Hoffmann’s proposal. Primus still believes that federal 
habeas can and should correct extreme errors of state court 
process in individual cases, although she requires a showing of 
systemic harm in the individual case.178 King and Hoffmann, by 
contrast, reject federal oversight on a case-by-case review basis 
even when the individual litigant can demonstrate a systemic 
defect.179 Whereas King and Hoffmann urge a near complete 
abandonment of the habeas remedy when the state has a facially 
due-process-compliant post-conviction system,180 Primus seeks to 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Primus, supra note 170, at 7. 
 176. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 836–37. 
 177. Primus, supra note 170, at 7.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 836–37. 
 180. King and Hoffmann acknowledge “[p]roblems in state criminal justice” 
but argue that such problems “are not the kinds of problems that habeas is 
designed to, or can, solve.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 15, at 54. King and 
Hoffmann’s proposal, apparently, would only permit relief when the state’s 
system, as intended to function, was, in effect, an inadequate substitute for 
federal review; it is almost as though the state system must be facially invalid—
i.e., non-existent—in order for suspension problems to arise under this model. 
Primus would allow challenges to the state process, as applied, but only when 
the defect in the prisoner’s case was representative of a systemic failure—in 
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retain federal habeas for individual litigants in the limited class 
of cases in which a systemic injury can be demonstrated by an 
individual litigant.181 For my purposes, however, the similarity 
between the proposals is more striking than the difference. Both 
reforms advocate for reimagining habeas in a way that refuses 
relief to individual petitioners whose constitutional rights have 
been demonstrably, even patently, violated.182 Under either 
                                                                                                     
other words, the first several constitutional errors of the same type and form 
would be without remedy and would serve, instead, only as a necessary element 
of a later prisoner’s entitlement to relief. Id.  
[W]e think Professor Primus does not go far enough with her 
structural analysis. When Professor Primus refers to the ‘structural 
vision’ of habeas, she is talking about using habeas to try to force a 
change in the structure of state criminal justice. When we talk about 
a ‘structural approach’ to habeas, by contrast, we are talking about 
using habeas to force a change in the relationship between institutions 
of government—either a change in the federal balance of powers, or a 
change in the balance of federalism. 
Id. 
 181. See Primus, supra note 170, at 7. 
 182. Primus stated: “I do not object in principle to federal courts’ reviewing 
state criminal convictions to correct individual errors. . . . Given a world of 
limited resources, however, we must slice the habeas pie somehow,” and for 
Primus this means limiting federal review to systemic violations of the Federal 
Constitution. Id. at 26–27. One wonders, however, whether the systemic 
approach proffered by Primus saves as many resources as she suggests, or 
protects as many state prisoners as she hopes. In each case in which relief is 
available under her proposal, the prisoner would have to prove not just a 
violation of his rights, but a systemic pattern of such violations in the state 
system. Id. at 7. Presumably the judicial labor, the amount of proof, and the cost 
of establishing a violation in a series of past cases will not be significantly less 
than the burden of proving that same violation in each case. Indeed, it is 
generally less resource intensive, not more, to prove an error of constitutional 
magnitude occurred in one’s own case. I also suspect that litigation attempting 
to establish a pattern and practice of constitutional deprivation will, in many 
instances, be subject to the same sort of litigation gamesmanship that she finds 
too resource intensive.  
Moreover, in those cases in which Primus says “demonstrating a systemic 
problem will be easy” because, for example, the constitutional error is “clear on 
the face of trial and appellate records,” id. at 30, should it not be equally clear 
that there was an individual violation worthy of relief under AEDPA in each of 
these cases? In other words, if there is truly a body of cases, as Primus predicts, 
in which the entitlement to relief is so clear-cut, then one would expect that 
these cases would result in reversal even under AEDPA’s deferential standard 
of review. In short, I am skeptical that proving systemic harms will be so easy. 
And if demonstrating the harm really is clear-cut or obvious, then I suspect that 
relief should generally be available for these claims under AEDPA. 
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reform, an individual instance of constitutional deprivation, no 
matter how grave and no matter how many rights were violated, 
does not justify federal habeas review. 
**** 
Leading commentators like Primus, King, and Hoffmann 
have responded to the empirical data that indicates the general 
impotence of federal habeas review of state convictions with 
groundbreaking calls for reform. I agree that the data suggests a 
need for change, but I part ways with these scholars as to the 
appropriate course change. Rather than abandoning federal 
habeas or permitting federal habeas relief only upon a showing of 
a systemic failure, federal review should continue on a case-by-
case basis, but more of the resources should be focused on the 
state process. Although it is true that AEDPA and other limits on 
federal habeas review have cast a long shadow over federal 
habeas proceedings, the absence of substantive relief ought to 
inspire increased attention to challenges of process and not the 
elimination of all federal review. As substantive challenges 
become increasingly impotent, it is the duty of the federal courts, 
all the more, to ensure that the state court process served as a 
minimally adequate substitute for federal habeas review.183 As I 
have previously explained, due process forbids a federal court 
from turning a blind eye to federal challenges to the validity of 
one’s sentence or conviction when the state post-conviction 
system fails “to provide a procedurally fair and full review of 
one’s federal constitutional claims.”184 Accordingly, there is a 
need for federal challenges to the process rather than the result 
of state post-conviction proceedings.185  
                                                                                                     
Consequently I regard as dubious the claim that this systemic model would save 
resources and as doubly dubious the claim that this systemic model of habeas 
will actually increase opportunities for relief in many instances.  
 183. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (holding that the 
Suspension Clause requires either full federal habeas review or an adequate 
substitute). 
 184. Marceau, supra note 13, at 7.  
 185. Professor Ann Woolhandler, among others, has described the limited 
theory of habeas review associated with procedural fairness as the “institutional 
competence” model of habeas review. See Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling 
Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1993) (“Under this model, federal courts 
considering habeas applications from state prisoners would be precluded from 
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In Part IV, the need for a basic check on the fairness of the 
state procedures as a constitutional matter is briefly developed. 
Part V then considers methods of challenging inadequate state 
procedures on federal habeas review. And finally, in Part VI, the 
viability and potential advantages of a novel non-habeas 
challenge, such as a § 1983 action, to the fairness of state 
procedures is considered.  
IV. Federal Courts Have a Constitutional Duty to Remedy State 
Procedural Unfairness 
For the last fifty years the federal habeas debate has 
centered on the appropriateness of substantive federal review of 
state court convictions. On one side of the debate, many scholars 
have argued that the integrity of the Constitution requires a 
merits-based review of every conviction’s constitutionality, even 
at the great cost of occasionally disturbing the final convictions of 
state courts.186 At the other extreme, some have called for a more 
parsimonious, purely proceduralist model of federal oversight 
such that a state court conviction could not be overturned unless 
the state process for ensuring federal constitutional compliance 
was less than full and fair.187 Presently, however, federal habeas 
                                                                                                     
reconsidering most issues of federal constitutional law provided there had been 
a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to address those issues in the state court.”). 
“Institutional competence” is a term of art employed by legal process theorists to 
describe those features of an institution that make a certain system the best 
suited to solve a particular problem.  
 186. See id. (summarizing the “full-review” model as requiring federal courts 
to provide de novo review of all federal constitutional issues properly raised in 
state court). 
 187. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 455–56 (1963) (explaining that 
if the procedure was not full or fair there is no need to immunize the state 
court’s result, and if the process employed for fact determination was fit for the 
task, there had already been an opportunity to litigate the issue and it should 
not be re-litigated); see also Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 579 (describing 
Bator). For decades legal scholars have identified Paul Bator as having voiced 
the most “extreme” set of limitations on federal habeas review. Woolhandler, 
supra note 185, at 577; see also Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 
MINN. L. REV. 247, 277 (1988) (describing Bator’s theory); Lee, supra note 92, at 
152 (describing Bator’s approach as the stingiest). Under this approach, the 
range of “[q]uestions appropriate for habeas would include allegations that the 
state accorded no meaningful opportunity to litigate the federal question” 
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petitioners are at risk of having the worst of both worlds—all of 
the disadvantages of both approaches without the respective 
advantages. On the one hand, petitioners today are theoretically 
entitled to a merits-based, non-procedural review of the state 
court adjudication188; the AEDPA regime, however, has wrought 
a world in which less than 1% of non-capital habeas petitions 
obtain relief, and over 40% of the petitions are dismissed by the 
district court on the basis of one of AEDPA’s procedural 
provisions, without any consideration of the actual merits of the 
claim.189 So merits review exists as a theoretical mirage but not 
as a practical reality. But on the other hand, the low rate of 
substantive-based relief has generated a vocal group of scholars 
calling for the substantial elimination of case-by-case habeas 
litigation, to include, apparently, the rejection of case-by-case 
procedural oversight of state post-conviction procedures.190  
Stated more directly, the writ of habeas in 2012 presents a 
lose-lose situation for state prisoners. There is very little 
substantive review of the merits of constitutional claims, and the 
review of state processes, which was previously the backbone of 
the stingiest form of relief, has been substantially called into 
                                                                                                     
insofar as the state process was not fundamentally fair and adequate. 
Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 585 n.55; see also id. at 584–85 (“[T]he Court 
undertook what Bator saw as a salutary expansion of the concept of 
institutional competence by allowing federal courts to consider whether the 
state court system had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal 
constitutional issue.”). 
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2011). 
 189. KING ET AL., supra note 61, at 56, 61. 
 190. Conceptual support for a robust federal habeas review, according to 
Professor Evan Lee, can generally be linked to theories recognizing either the 
need for a federal forum for constitutional adjudication or the need for a federal 
deterrent against non-compliant or disinterested state court judges. Lee, supra 
note 92, at 153–54. But Lee also points out that the deterrent theory does not 
require one to assume bad faith on the part of state court judges:  
A much larger number of state court judges accepts and respects the 
Supreme Court’s criminal procedure edicts, but from time to time 
considerations of economy and convenience tempt such judges to cut 
corners on enforcement. Even more commonly, these judges do not 
always do their best to keep track of where the Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions are headed. According to the deterrence theory, 
the ready availability of federal habeas review encourages greater 
effort by state judges to toe the constitutional line. 
Id. at 154.  
CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS 139 
question. In a paradox of habeas history, then, the proceduralist 
reforms of legal process theorists like Paul Bator, once deemed 
draconian and overly dismissive of the writ, now seem generous 
when juxtaposed with modern practice and proposed reforms of 
commentators like King and Hoffmann.191 Such a narrow view of 
federal habeas is problematic from a constitutional standpoint.192 
As Bator elaborated: 
Let me now put the point specifically in terms of due process 
and the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . . When should 
state determinations, subject to direct Supreme Court review, 
not be final? I suggest that one answer, at least, fits into the 
very category we have been discussing: cases where the state 
has, in effect, failed itself to provide process. It is, after all, the 
essence of the responsibility of the states under the due 
process clause to furnish a criminal defendant with a full and 
fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case: the 
state must provide a reasoned method of inquiry into relevant 
questions of fact and law (including, of course, all federal 
issues applicable to the case). If a state, then, fails in fact to do 
so, the due process clause itself demands that its conclusions 
of fact or law should not be respected: the prisoner's detention 
                                                                                                     
 191. See Primus, supra note 170, at 24–26 (describing the situations in 
which federal courts could consider state criminal cases under Bator’s process 
model and King and Hoffmann’s more recent proposal to eliminate federal 
habeas review entirely for most state prisoners). Bator subscribed to the views 
of the legal process theorists who reasoned that so long as the state courts had 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, then they had the institutional 
competence required to make final and binding determinations as to one’s 
detention. Woolhandler, supra note 185, at 584. But Bator regarded “allowing 
federal courts to consider whether the state court system had provided a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the federal constitutional issue” as a “salutary 
expansion of the concept of institutional competence” such that “questions of 
jurisdiction, together with the question of full and fair opportunity to litigate, 
exhausted the appropriate scope of collateral review of criminal convictions.” Id. 
at 584–85; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103–04 (1959) (describing a more limited process 
of habeas review such that the habeas court is limited to inquiring “into the 
competence of the tribunal—that is, its jurisdiction—to enter the judgment of 
conviction as well as into the question whether the judgment which it had 
entered authorized the detention”).  
 192. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due 
Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American 
Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1365–67 (2010) (arguing that the Due 
Process Clause supersedes and invalidates portions of the Suspension Clause 
that are inconsistent with due process—e.g., the authority to suspend the writ 
in times of rebellion or invasion). 
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can be seen as unlawful, not because error was made as to a 
substantive federal question fairly litigated by the state 
tribunals, but because the totality of state procedures did not 
furnish the prisoner with a fair chance to litigate his case. 
Thus if a state fails to give the defendant any opportunity at 
all to test federal defenses relevant to his case, the need for a 
collateral jurisdiction to afford this opportunity would seem to 
be plain, and federal habeas is clearly an appropriate remedy: 
the state has furnished no process, much less “due” process, for 
the vindication of an alleged federal right. Similarly, if the 
state furnishes process, but it is claimed to be meaningless 
process—if the totality of state procedures allegedly did not 
provide rational conditions for inquiry into federal-law (or, 
indeed, state-law) questions, it seems to me clear that the 
federal habeas jurisdiction may appropriately examine the 
allegation.193 
Stated more concisely, when the state fails “to provide 
adequate process to correct the constitutional violation,” due 
process requires a federal “backstop.”194 It is far from clear that 
the proposals for reform discussed above sufficiently account for 
this due process requirement, and as such they raise substantial 
constitutional questions. To be sure, King and Hoffmann are 
correct in concluding that, at least in some important ways, the 
crisis of federalism that motivated more expansive habeas review 
in the past has substantially receded. All fifty states now have 
post-conviction review, thus making federal habeas review a truly 
duplicative layer of constitutional litigation. It is, however, a 
serious misstep to conclude that the mere existence of a state 
post-conviction system is, without more, a full and 
constitutionally adequate substitute for federal review. In 
support of her conclusion that proposes limiting habeas relief to 
                                                                                                     
 193. Bator, supra note 187, at 456–57. 
 194. Bator asked, “Is there not political wisdom in using a federal collateral 
jurisdiction as a ‘backstop’ for inadequacies of state process . . . ?” Id. at 492. In 
the context of challenging a denial of parole, the Supreme Court has recently 
recognized that due process regulates the state parole system in an extremely 
limited fashion. Swarthout v. Cooke, 13 S. Ct. 859, 862–63 (2011). But as I have 
explained previously, there is a strong pedigree for recognizing a right to a 
fundamentally fair post-conviction review process. Marceau, supra note 13, at 
24–34. To the extent that the Suspension Clause might provide more extensive 
protections than due process in ensuring fundamental fairness, id. at 20 n.7, it 
is beyond the scope of this Article to address whether the Suspension Clause 
might give rise to a cause of action in a § 1983 action. 
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cases demonstrating a pattern of violations, Professor Primus 
notes that due process and the Suspension Clause clearly permit 
“some restrictions on the scope of federal review of state court 
convictions, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s removal of 
most Fourth Amendment claims from federal habeas review in 
Stone v. Powell.”195 Critically, however, Stone v. Powell196 is 
constitutional precisely because of what it does not do; it does not 
remove federal oversight from unfair state proceedings. Under 
Stone, any state court review that is not “full and fair” is entitled 
to a complete round of federal habeas proceedings. Even one of 
the most far-reaching examples of limitations on federal review, 
Stone v. Powell, is tempered by a requirement of federal oversight 
of the state procedures on a case-by-case basis. 
Notably, neither Primus nor King and Hoffmann explicitly 
provide for federal oversight on a case-by-case basis of the 
procedural adequacy of the state process. These scholars 
recognize the need to temper reform proposals to federal habeas 
with an “escape valve” like the one carved out in Stone.197 
However, the proposed reforms seem to take for granted that 
failures of substance or process by a state will not, in any single 
case, give rise to a right to federal review—that is to say, they 
would permit only facial or systemic challenges to the state’s 
procedures rather than challenges based on the circumstances of 
a particular case.198 Professors King and Hoffmann identify as a 
virtue of their proposal the fact that the litigation of challenges to 
a state’s procedures under the Suspension Clause will “be a 
                                                                                                     
 195. Primus, supra note 170, at 40.  
 196. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 197. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 823. “Escape valve” in this context 
may be considered synonymous with “adequate substitute” for federal review, 
both of which serve as core constitutional protections based on due process and 
the Suspension Clause. Notably, I have discussed at length in a previous article 
the link between due process and the full-and-fair requirement of Stone. See 
Marceau, supra note 13, at 24–34. Contra Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas 
Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 17 n.115 (1982) (suggesting that due process does not mandate Stone’s 
limitation). 
 198. By contrast, Richard Fallon has observed that the “normal if not 
exclusive mode of constitutional adjudication involves . . . as-applied 
challenge[s].” Richard H. Fallon Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2000). 
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temporary rather than a long-term problem.”199 They specifically 
emphasize that:  
Any Suspension Clause litigation generated by our proposal 
thus would initially impose a new and additional burden on 
the federal courts,—which might appear to undermine our 
goal of conserving resources[;] however, [it] should diminish 
quickly as the Supreme Court decides whether the review 
processes in various states are such that the proposed new 
habeas restrictions comply with the Suspension Clause.200  
In other words, they anticipate one-time general challenges, 
perhaps even consolidated cases, challenging the state’s 
procedures, and not repeated, case-specific challenges to the 
procedures applied in any particular case. Professor Primus 
seems to agree with this sentiment, explaining that as a general 
matter, “[i]f the systemic challenge were rejected or if the state 
remedied the systemic problem, the ban on successive petitions 
would prohibit other petitioners from raising the same 
challenge.”201  
This once-and-for-all approach to procedural challenges is 
incompatible with a vision of due process as a backstop for fair 
state processes. Permitting only facial or one-time challenges to 
the robustness of the state’s post-conviction review system is 
irreconcilable with due process and the Suspension Clause.202 For 
                                                                                                     
 199. Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 846. 
 200. See id. (“While the Court may have to evaluate the constitutionality of 
the proposed statute as applied in several different states with varying 
appellate and postconviction review, it could do so in one or two consolidated 
cases.”). 
 201. See Primus, supra note 170, at 42–43 (“Once that initial determination 
is made, federal review would be streamlined.”). Nowhere does Professor Primus 
suggest that procedural failings on the part of the state review would, as under 
the institutional-competence model of review, justify federal intervention. 
Indeed, in her only direct reference to the constitutional frailty of her argument, 
she concludes that the availability of original writs and certiorari review would 
indicate that her proposed “systemic habeas review system would not entail an 
unconstitutional suspension.” Id. at 40. 
 202. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, at 837 (“Should the states fail to 
maintain robust postconviction review . . . the Suspension Clause would prohibit 
our proposed cutback of federal habeas.”). The idea of one-time litigation 
regarding procedural adequacy was rejected in the context of another AEDPA 
challenge. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1016–18 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reviewing Arizona’s compliance with AEDPA after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari because petitioner was not appointed counsel in a timely manner). 
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example, in the context of describing the Stone v. Powell escape 
valve, Professor Wayne LaFave has explained that the 
“opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment 
claim . . . appears to require assessment of what was done in the 
particular case rather than what is customarily done.”203 
Consistent with this view, nearly all courts and scholars have 
rejected and criticized a narrow reading of the Stone bar as 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit, which holds that in the absence of 
proof that the state’s processes are “routinely or systematically 
applied” in an unfair manner, Stone precludes federal habeas 
review.204 Just as the constitutional limitation on eliminating 
review under Stone is not appropriately understood as requiring 
a showing of systemic or facial defects with the state process, 
reforms to federal habeas must, more generally, retain a process 
for overseeing the fairness of the state process in individual 
cases. In other words, the Stone bar is limited such that state 
courts in each individual case must provide an adequate 
substitute for federal habeas review. Each prisoner is entitled to 
challenge the fairness of the state system as applied to his 
particular case.205 Contrary to the proposals of Hoffmann and 
                                                                                                     
 203. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 11.7(g) (2010) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 
(1976)). But see Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) (considering 
customary practice and finding no due process violation in a particular case 
based, in part, on the fact that “[r]epeated instances are reported of verdicts and 
judgments set aside and new trials granted for [constitutional defects within the 
trial]”). There is some language to the contrary in Frank. See id. at 335 
(concluding that due process was not violated in a particular case based, in part, 
on the fact that “[r]epeated instances are reported of verdicts and judgments set 
aside and new trials granted for” constitutional defects with the trial). 
 204. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Epps, No. 1:04CV865(LG), 2010 WL 1141126, at 
*16 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2010) (quoting Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220 
(5th Cir. 1979)). 
 205. In this way, federal oversight of state convictions can be placed on a 
simple continuum—the more process the state provides, the less need there is 
for federal oversight. A doctrinal analogue exists in the realm of the adequate-
and-independent-state-grounds doctrine, which essentially allows a state to 
apply its procedural rule so as to bar federal oversight so long as the state’s rule 
is rational, reasonable, and fairly applied. See Catherine T. Struve, Direct and 
Collateral Federal Court Review of The Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 243, 277, 315 (2003) (recognizing the need for the lower federal 
courts to conduct an “as-applied analysis of state procedures” on habeas review). 
Professor Struve supports the claim that the denial of post-conviction relief 
based “merely on a hypertechnical application of a procedural rule” must be 
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King and Primus, to date, the Court has not permitted the 
modern writ to be interpreted so as to foreclose relief in an 
individual case when the state process in that particular case was 
not full and fair.206  
In short, there is room for debate as to whether state court 
review ought to be considered a substantially adequate substitute 
for federal review in any circumstances, but if the state court 
review is not procedurally full and fair, then such processes ought 
to be easily recognized as an insufficient substitute for federal 
habeas review.207 “[D]ue process mandates that every prisoner 
                                                                                                     
avoided through case-by-case review. Id. at 315. Given that procedural defaults 
in the context of federal habeas review arise in the same federalism-fraught 
setting, it is useful, if not dispositive, to realize that such challenges are 
available on a case-by-case basis and that a “state procedural rule that violates 
due process will be inadequate.” Id. at 252. 
 206. Individual challenges are, after all, the bread and butter of 
constitutional criminal procedure. Just as challenges to a death sentence could 
be brought as facial challenges to the state’s capital sentencing system or as 
challenges to the state system as it applies to the individual case, it is only 
logical that a state prisoner ought to be able to challenge the state system as it 
applied in his particular case and not just the state system in a more general 
sense as the reform proposals seem to anticipate. See Struve, supra note 205, at 
177–86 (compiling cases where federal habeas review is not precluded when the 
state process as applied to a particular prisoner was an inadequate procedural 
bar). 
 207. I have previously advanced this argument with considerably more 
detail and care. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 8–9 (“[T]he constitutional 
pedigree of a right to full and fair review, so as to ensure fundamental fairness 
in the justice system, is beyond question.”). It is true that the Supreme Court 
held that the Suspension Clause was not violated by AEDPA’s limits on 
successive habeas petitions. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996) 
(“Conclud[ing] . . . that the operative provisions of the [Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty] Act do not violate the Suspension Clause of the 
Constitution, Art. I, § 9.”). However, the Suspension Clause is much less directly 
implicated by efforts to file multiple habeas petitions, as opposed to efforts to 
obtain a single, meaningful opportunity to litigate the constitutionality of one’s 
conviction. Accordingly, I reject the conclusion that Supreme Court review is an 
adequate safeguard for purposes of due process and the Suspension Clause. 
Contra Primus, supra note 170, at 40 (“Given the Supreme Court’s small docket 
and the rarity with which original writs have been issued, [the alternatives for 
Supreme Court habeas review may not be adequate], but the Supreme Court 
may well consider them to be enough.”). Certiorari review is not available on 
direct review for many post-conviction claims, and the Supreme Court has 
specifically and repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to grant review of state 
post-conviction proceedings. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme Court traditionally waits for 
“federal habeas proceedings” to consider federal constitutional claims rather 
CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS 145 
receive at least one full and fair review of his constitutional 
claims, either through direct or collateral proceedings, and either 
in state or federal court.”208 And, any reform in the scope of 
federal oversight must be mindful of this limitation. Defects in 
state process will not magically or spontaneously manifest 
themselves.209 Accordingly, determining whether a state court’s 
review of a constitutional claim relating to one’s detention was 
procedurally adequate is of the utmost importance. If substantive 
review is to be rare and limited, as it is under AEDPA, then 
process-based review must be all the more frequent and 
capacious.210 Consequently, understanding the proper procedural 
mechanisms for litigating challenges of process is critically 
important. The remainder of this Article proposes and considers 
the available federal procedures for developing and litigating 
                                                                                                     
than use its certiorari review power (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 
(1990))). 
 208. Marceau, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 
298–99 (1992) (White, J., concurring)); see also id. (compiling authorities 
regarding the scope of a due process right to one full and fair review of one’s 
conviction). 
 209. Moreover, when a core unfairness or absence of state process is 
detected, contrary to the conclusions of King and Hoffmann’s reform, it is 
insufficient to simply revert to the current model of deferential AEDPA review 
permitted under cases like Harrington v. Richter. Under King and Hoffmann’s 
approach, an unfair state process would simply “reinstate the existing, post-
AEDPA version of habeas for state prisoners.” Hoffmann & King, supra note 9, 
at 843. As I have explained in detail, deference under § 2254(d)(1) to a 
procedurally unfair state process is not constitutionally compliant. See Marceau, 
supra note 13, at 7 (“Due process forbids the substantive deference announced 
in § 2254 where a prisoner has not received a full and fair review of his 
constitutional claims, either in state or federal court.”).  
 210. Contrary to the conclusions of scholars like King and Hoffmann that 
state post-conviction systems have developed in a manner that is sufficiently 
fair and adequate so as to reduce the need for federal oversight, there is good 
reason to believe that states remain resistant to providing robust state post-
conviction review that would approximate the protections provided through 
federal review. By way of example, AEDPA provides substantial procedural 
benefits, such as a shortened statute of limitations, to any state that satisfies 
certain minimal procedural requirements in state capital post-conviction 
procedures. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–66 (providing that “[a]ny application under 
this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the 
appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court 
affirmance of the conviction and sentence”). To date, however, no state has 
created a mechanism for the timely appointment of qualified counsel that would 
satisfy the attorney general, as the certifying authority under § 2265, that the 
state is entitled to opt-in to the procedural benefits. See id. § 2265. 
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challenges to failures of process in the state post-conviction 
system on a case-by-case basis. 
V. Challenging Deficient State Procedures Through Federal 
Habeas Litigation 
One forum that affords an opportunity for a federal challenge 
based on the inadequacy of state proceedings is federal habeas 
review. To be sure, federal habeas review is presently centered on 
challenges to the state court’s result, but federal review, even 
constrained by AEDPA, can function as a meaningful review 
mechanism for state procedures.211 In a process-based habeas 
challenge, clearly demonstrating that the state process for 
litigating a constitutional challenge was unfair is, in a very literal 
sense, collateral to resolving the issue of whether the prisoner is 
in fact in “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”212 Insofar as that is the case, a 
habeas-based challenge will surely not result in reversal of 
conviction. Nonetheless, on habeas review, challenges to process 
rather than to pure result will play a critical role in the next 
wave of habeas litigation as courts attempt to understand the 
scope of the limitations on federal habeas imposed by recent 
decisions like Pinholster v. Cullen.  
In habeas cases, as in other forms of constitutional litigation, 
one’s success in developing facts correlates strongly with his 
                                                                                                     
 211. I have previously discussed the reasons that process-based habeas 
litigation has faded into the background:  
In view of the Court’s willingness [for decades] to revisit the merits of 
federal constitutional litigation impacting a state conviction, 
regardless of the adequacy of the state process, the diminished role of 
federal courts in reviewing the [due process] question—whether the 
state court’s process was full and fair—was inevitable.  
Marceau, supra note 13, at 15–16 (explaining that the emergence of “selective 
incorporation cases, and the Warren Court’s habeas jurisprudence” 
overshadowed the process-based rights and made them less important and, 
therefore, less litigated).  
 212. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (providing for federal review of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a state court defendant “only on the ground that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”); 
see also id. § 2241(d) (providing federal habeas review for “a person in custody 
under the judgment and sentence of a State court”). 
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ultimate success on the merits.213 Accordingly, an important 
feature of pre-Pinholster habeas law was the recognition by 
federal courts of appeal that, even after AEDPA, evidentiary 
hearings were mandatory so long as the prisoner was relatively 
diligent, he made a colorable claim of constitutional violation, and 
there were material issues of fact.214 As the Tenth Circuit 
summarized the state of the law after AEDPA:  
We now join every other circuit that has confronted this 
question and hold that where, as here, a habeas petitioner has 
diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his 
habeas petition, but a state court has prevented him from 
doing so . . . . [T]he AEDPA does not preclude [him] from 
receiving an evidentiary hearing.215 
The focus of litigation efforts aimed at obtaining a hearing or 
factual development was oriented toward demonstrating some 
defect in the state process, whether the problem was a one-time 
procedural lapse or a longstanding systemic gap. More precisely, 
the issue of whether the prisoner was entitled to federal factual 
development turned on whether he was diligent in his efforts in 
state court or, in the language of § 2254(e)(2), whether he had 
“failed” to develop the facts in support of his claim.216 If the 
defendant was to blame—non-diligent—for the lack of factual 
development, then federal hearings and discovery were generally 
not permitted.217 Alternatively, where a defect in the state 
                                                                                                     
 213. Cf. Yackle, supra note 35, at 142 (“[I]f a prisoner failed to develop the 
facts in state court in circumstances constituting ‘a deliberate bypass’ of state 
procedures, a federal court could decline to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” 
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963))). 
 214. See, e.g., Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670–71 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing a hearing as mandatory when the petitioner states a colorable 
claim (citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313)); United States ex rel. Hampton v. 
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 233–34 (7th Cir. 2003) (determining “AEDPA posed no 
bar to taking additional evidence” after finding “no evidence that prisoner had 
been anything but diligent in pursuing his ineffectiveness claim in state court”); 
Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Mr. Miller is entitled 
to receive an evidentiary hearing so long as his allegations, if true and if not 
contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief.” 
(citing Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d 363, 368–69 (10th Cir. 1995))). 
 215. Miller, 161 F.3d at 1253 (citing Medina, 71 F.3d at 368–69). 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). 
 217. See Hampton, 347 F.3d at 233 (“Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), forbids a district court from holding an 
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process was to be blamed for the failure to develop the factual 
record in state court, a federal hearing was not barred by 
§ 2254(e)(2).218 Satisfying (e)(2), in other words, was generally 
regarded as synonymous with establishing an entitlement to 
federal factual development through a hearing, discovery, or an 
expansion of the record. 
Pinholster imposes novel limitations on a prisoner’s access to 
a federal hearing and other less formal discovery devices.219 The 
pre-Pinholster question that seemed to be dispositive as to 
whether a hearing was permitted—whether the petitioner 
satisfied (e)(2) through diligent pursuits of the relative 
evidence—is now substantially displaced by the question of 
whether § 2254(d)(1) can be satisfied without the benefit of new 
facts developed during federal habeas proceedings.220 As the 
seven-justice majority explained, “[i]t would be strange to ask 
federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication 
resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law [for 
purposes of (d)(1)] to facts not before the state court.”221 And 
because the majority expressly addressed the interaction of (d)(1) 
and (e)(2) regarding evidentiary hearing access—“section 
                                                                                                     
evidentiary hearing on a habeas claim if the petitioner failed to develop the 
factual basis of that claim in state court.”). 
 218. See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (noting an 
evidentiary hearing is not barred “where [appellant] was unable to develop his 
claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary 
hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2)”).  
 219. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (“We now hold 
that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state 
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”). I equate less formal factual 
development mechanisms with evidentiary hearings because the Supreme Court 
has explained that, for purposes of federal habeas, unless one has satisfied the 
requirements for obtaining a hearing, then he is generally ineligible for other 
factual development as well. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004) 
(“Those same restrictions [respondent was diligent in state court, or the 
conditions required by § 2254(e)(2) were met] apply a fortiori when a prisoner 
seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” (citing 
Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009))). 
 220. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (rejecting the contention of the 
petitioner and the dissent that the Court’s holding renders § 2254(e)(2) 
substantially superfluous). 
 221. Id. at 1399. But see id. at 1419–20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that there is nothing strange about allowing consideration in federal court of 
new evidence under § 2254(d)(1)). 
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2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar 
federal habeas relief”222—it seems that the threshold question in 
determining access to an evidentiary hearing is now a question of 
§ 2254(d), and the questions of diligence and non-fault that 
dominate the (e)(2) analysis may be only secondarily important. 
Nonetheless, the best reading of Pinholster is that its 
limitations on federal factual development are, like the deference 
in (d)(1) more generally, conditioned on a full and fair state 
process. When either section of 2254(d) is satisfied—either (d)(1) 
or (d)(2)—then the Pinholster bar on evidentiary hearings does 
not apply.223 Likewise, when the claim presented in federal court 
was not “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, the limitations 
contained in (d)(1) and in Pinholster do not apply.224 Accordingly, 
understanding the limitations on (d)(1)’s reach is of the utmost 
importance in understanding not just whether the federal review 
is de novo but also whether new facts may be adduced during the 
federal proceedings. Although it is too early to predict with 
confidence the ultimate application of Pinholster, my careful 
study of the decision has led me to conclude that the bar on 
factual development is still implicitly conditioned on the existence 
of a full and fair underlying state process; as Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissenting opinion explains: “I assume that the majority does not 
intend to suggest that review is limited to the state-court record 
when a petitioner’s inability to develop the facts supporting his 
claim was the fault of the state court itself.”225  
The remainder of this Part sets out to demonstrate that the 
due process command of procedural fairness will operate so as to 
condition Pinholster’s application to circumstances in which the 
state process for developing and litigating factual disputes was 
full and fair. Specifically, I contend that unfairness in the state 
factual development procedures will render (d)(1) and Pinholster 
inapplicable because of two separate but related safeguards 
within the text of § 2254. When factual development 
opportunities are robust and adequate in state court, Pinholster 
                                                                                                     
 222. Id. at 1402. 
 223. See Pape v. Thaler, 645 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2011) (summarizing 
Pinholster and applying the (d)(1) and (d)(2) tests). 
 224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996). 
 225. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223)). 
150 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012) 
serves as a more definitive barrier to federal hearings and fact 
development, but when the state process is inadequate, 
Pinholster does not impose any new barriers to relief.  
A. Section 2254(d)(2) as a Safety-Valve to Pinholster and 
Deferential Review 
When a state court process is patently unfair and this 
unfairness taints the factual conclusions, then the state court 
adjudication rests on an “unreasonable determination of the 
facts” such that § 2254(d)(2)’s limitation on relief is satisfied.226 
Because § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) serve as alternative limitations 
on relief,227 a petitioner who is able to satisfy (d)(2) in this 
manner is no longer constrained by (d)(1). Stated more directly, 
a prisoner who, in the language of § 2254(d)(2), demonstrates 
that the state court decision was “based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the state court,” is entitled to a de novo review of his legal 
claims and is not barred from adducing new facts conclusive of 
the constitutional injury in federal court.228 A showing under 
(d)(2) is AEDPA’s silver bullet insofar as the legal deference of 
(d)(1) and the cramped factual procedures of Pinholster are both 
rendered inapplicable. 
Lest one think that (d)(2) represents a rare mark of 
congressional generosity to state prisoners under AEDPA, it is 
important to note that the advantages of satisfying (d)(2), 
although substantial, are not disproportionate. Far from a 
windfall for the prisoner, it is reasonable that one who is able to 
demonstrate that the state court’s management of the factual 
record was unfair or unreliable would be entitled to develop a 
more complete and reliable factual record and obtain legal 
review unencumbered by the unfair proceedings. But the 
advantages of establishing a (d)(2) claim should not be 
understated. Because § 2254(d) is phrased in the disjunctive so 
as to impose two alternative limitations on relief, either (d)(1) or 
                                                                                                     
 226. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996). 
 227. Section 2254(d) limits federal habeas relief for a state conviction unless 
either (d)(1) or (d)(2) is satisfied.  
 228. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996). 
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(d)(2), a state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief where 
(d)(2) is satisfied without also satisfying the onerous limits set 
out in (d)(1) and defined in cases like Pinholster and Richter.229 
For example, a prisoner who satisfies (d)(2) may be entitled to 
relief, even without demonstrating a violation of his “clearly 
established” federal rights, insofar as the clearly-established-
law requirement exists only in § 2254(d)(1). In this way, relief 
under (d)(2) is actually more expansive than relief in many 
types of § 1983 actions; whereas a petitioner satisfying 
§ 2254(d)(2) need not demonstrate the existence of clearly 
established law, a plaintiff under § 1983 generally must 
overcome the qualified immunity standard announced in cases 
like Harlow v. Fitzgerald,230 which explicitly requires a 
deviation from clearly established law.231 Similarly, Pinholster 
imposes its limitations on factual development only in those 
cases where § 2254(d)(2) does not apply.232 Specifically, the 
majority in Pinholster holds that “evidence introduced in federal 
court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review,”233 but where the 
                                                                                                     
 229. Professor Evan Lee’s analysis of the statute supports this conclusion. 
See Lee, supra note 72, at 292 (“The statute should be construed in a way that 
makes sense of the separation between (d)(1) and (d)(2).”); see also Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1415 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that the text of the § 2254 compels the conclusion that (d)(1) analysis is not 
confined to the record before the state court). 
 230. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (“Reliance on the 
objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to 
clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”). 
 231. See id. (“We therefore hold that government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citations 
omitted)). This is a remarkable fact in view of the Supreme Court’s aggressive 
interpretation of (d)(1) and the Court’s extension of a habeas-like standard of 
review into the exclusionary rule realm. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
135, 144–46 (2009) (construing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
broadly so as to bar relief when the police errors were merely the product of 
negligence). 
 232. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on 
the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the 
limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.”). 
 233. See id. (majority opinion) (rejecting the previous assumption “that 
§ 2254(d)(1), despite its mandatory language, simply does not apply when a 
federal habeas court has admitted new evidence that supports a claim 
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petitioner satisfies (d)(2), this limit on factual development has 
no application.234  
In short, by challenging a state process as inadequate and 
therefore inconsistent with § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner can avoid 
the strictures of (d)(1), and thus likewise avoid the harshness of 
AEDPA’s deference as well as the stingy factual development 
rules announced in Pinholster.235 But there are limitations to 
this method of litigating challenges to the fairness of the state 
process, and the scope of such limitations remains to be 
developed through litigation.236  
                                                                                                     
previously adjudicated in state court” (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 
653 (2004))).  
 234. See id. at 1412–13 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a 
separate concurrence in Pinholster, which ostensibly serves but one purpose: to 
alert habeas petitioners that the sky is not falling and that the decision will not 
have terribly broad applications. Justice Breyer notes, for example, “[i]f the 
federal habeas court finds that the state-court decision fails (d)’s test (or if (d) 
does not apply), then an (e) hearing may be needed.” Id. at 1412 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). Most likely Justice Breyer is envisioning a scenario in which the 
state court assumes all facts in the light most favorable to the prisoner, or where 
the state court summarily denies relief, and thus implicitly assumes the truth of 
the prisoner’s allegations. But Justice Breyer’s opinion also leaves open the 
possibility that, at least in some circumstances, gross procedural violations 
might, in his words, “fail (d)’s test” by violating § 2254(d)(2) and thus factual 
development would be appropriate and necessary. Id. Several lower courts have 
attempted to apply Justice Breyer’s reasoning to avoid the Pinholster bar on 
hearings. See Skipwith v. McNeil, No. 09-60361-CIV, 2011 WL 1598829, at *2–3 
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2011); Hale v. Howes, No. 07-cv-12397, 2008 WL 2858458, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2008). 
 235. It is unfortunate that even Justice Sotomayor, who provided a reasoned 
and impassioned dissent to the procedural narrowing of factual development in 
Pinholster, has not acknowledged the full scope of the safety valve built into 
(d)(2). See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1413–36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
Although Justice Sotomayor rejects the majority’s willingness to punish diligent 
prisoners when unfairness in the state system prevents them from developing 
critical factual evidence, she is equally firm in her conviction that the evidence 
that is newly admitted through a federal evidentiary hearing should be 
considered in light of (d)(1). See id. at 1413 (“I also disagree with the Court 
that . . . § 2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state-court record.”). New 
evidence is not barred from consideration when the state process is unfair, but 
the unfairness of the state process, under this view, would not impede the 
application of (d)(1). 
 236. Scholars and judges that favor extreme deference to the states will no 
doubt respond to this reading of (d)(2) by asserting that such a reading is 
inappropriate insofar as it substantially undercuts the force of § 2254(d)(1), 
which is often regarded as the centerpiece of AEDPA. But just as the Court was 
content to conclude in Pinholster that “Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force 
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Although it seems eminently reasonable to conclude that 
(d)(2) will apply where, for example, the evidence before a state 
court on a material issue is in conflict or unclear and the state 
court resolves the issue against the prisoner without a fair 
hearing or other procedural steps to fairly determine the 
strength of the relative evidence,237 there is a wide range of 
rather less compelling factual scenarios that will arise after 
Pinholster. For example, many federal habeas petitioners will 
likely argue that Pinholster does not apply so as to bar federal 
fact development whenever the state court record is factually 
undeveloped through no fault of the petitioner. That is to say, so 
long as the petitioner was diligent—not at fault for purposes of 
§ 2254(e)(2)—then gaps in the state court record may be filled 
through factual development. This form of procedural challenge 
is likely to be very common, particularly in non-capital cases, 
where the prisoner’s post-conviction pleadings were filed pro se, 
or otherwise without considerable factual specificity so as to 
create material issues of fact. This narrow reading of Pinholster 
seems doomed to fail. Such a reading of AEDPA prioritizes the 
pre-Pinholster (e)(2) inquiry into diligence to the substantial 
exclusion of the analysis offered in Pinholster. Given the tenor of 
the Pinholster majority opinion and its focus on the need to 
generally limit federal review to the “record in existence” at the 
time of the state court adjudication, such a narrow reading of 
Pinholster, while not entirely implausible, seems unlikely.238  
                                                                                                     
where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief,” it is appropriate to note 
that Section 2254(d)(1) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(2) does not 
require relief. Id. at 1401 (majority opinion). 
 237. I have previously discussed a more detailed scenario that presents a 
similarly straightforward application of (d)(2). See Marceau, supra note 135, at 
390–93 (discussing a hypothetical in which a state prisoner did not receive fair 
process in state court). 
 238. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. This is not to suggest that a state process 
that is truly unfair will be deferred to under Pinholster. The point I am making 
here is simply that the pre-Pinholster analysis as to whether a hearing was 
required focused on § 2254(e)(2). See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 
424 (2000) (limiting the § 2254 issue to whether § 2254(e)(2) as amended by 
AEDPA “bars the evidentiary hearing petitioner seeks”). And after Pinholster it 
seems unlikely that a showing of diligence on the part of the petitioner, without 
more, will lead the Court to hold that federal factual development is permitted. 
The line between petitioner diligence for purposes of (e)(2) and state court 
unfairness for purposes of (d)(2) is surely undefined, subject to change, and hard 
to identify, but there is space between these two concepts. Whereas the diligence 
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Another potential limitation on the use of § 2254(d)(2) as a 
mechanism for litigating procedural unfairness in state post-
conviction procedures derives from the plain text of the statute, 
which provides that the prisoner must demonstrate that the 
state court decision “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.”239 Arguably, a state court decision is 
never based on an unreasonable determination of the facts when 
a state court concludes that the petitioner’s factual allegations 
fail to state even a prima facie case for relief. That is to say, 
when a state court concludes that the prisoner’s allegations, if 
regarded as true, do not entitle him to relief, it is difficult for the 
petitioner to colorably argue on federal habeas review that the 
state court’s factual findings were unreasonable; after all, the 
findings purportedly were all made in favor of the defendant. 
And this is not an altogether unlikely or uncommon occurrence. 
Many states, such as California, deny thousands of habeas 
petitions per year through summary dispositions, and many of 
these states have laws that prohibit summary dispositions 
unless the state court finds “that the claims made in the petition 
do not state a prima facie case entitling the petitioner to 
relief.”240 To be sure, a state court that purports to construe all 
factual conflicts in the defendant’s favor and nonetheless denies 
relief might be incorrect or even procedurally unfair; it is, 
however, difficult to characterize the defects in the state process 
                                                                                                     
required under (e)(2) might best be understood as subjectively focused on the 
reasonable efforts by the petitioner in light of available information known at 
the time, the unfairness required under (d)(2) might focus on some objective 
characteristic of the state process that was affirmatively unfair or obstructive of 
efforts to develop a claim. Notably, Justice Sotomayor seems to share the view 
that a distinction exists between factual development failures based on an 
unfair state process and factual development failures despite relative diligence 
by the petitioner. Compare Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“I fear the consequences of the Court’s novel interpretation of 
§ 225(d)(1) for diligent state habeas petitioners with compelling evidence 
supporting their claims who were unable through no fault of their own, to 
present that evidence to the state court.”), with id. at 1417 n.5 (“I assume that 
the majority does not intend to suggest that review is limited to the state court 
record when the inability to develop the facts . . . was the fault of the state court 
itself.”). 
 239. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996). 
 240. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.12 (majority opinion) (quoting In re 
Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 741–42 (Cal. 1993)). 
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as, strictly speaking, defects in the state court’s “determination 
of the facts” or fact-finding procedures as required in order to 
satisfy § 2254(d)(2).241  
Confronted with such a case, a savvy habeas defense lawyer 
might argue that a federal court considering a claim for which the 
state court assumed all facts in favor of the defendant, though 
perhaps unable to permit relief under (d)(2), would be required to 
review the claim for relief under (d)(1) based on the assumed 
facts from the state court record. The § 2254(d)(1) inquiry in cases 
where the state court purported to take as true the petitioner’s 
factual allegations should ask whether the state court’s 
application of federal law to the facts, as asserted (not proved) by 
the prisoner in state court, would amount to an unreasonable 
application of federal law. In other words, the question is whether 
clearly established law was applied in an unreasonable manner 
to the facts as alleged by the prisoner in his state pleadings. 
Thus, in most cases of summary disposition or where the state 
court explicitly states it is assuming the petitioner’s factual 
allegations are true, the analysis is purely one of law and not of 
process.242 In this way, an otherwise unfair state process may be 
insulated from expansive federal review, rendering § 2254(d)(2) 
an inconsistent and sometimes inadequate means of challenging 
state post-conviction processes. In order to obtain de novo review 
or a federal hearing in circumstances where the state court 
                                                                                                     
 241. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996). 
 242. As favorable as this formulation initially appears, a prisoner’s success 
under (d)(1) will hinge substantially on the quality and clarity of his state court 
pleadings. If the factual allegations that preceded a summary disposition were 
generic or overly conclusive, then there is no concrete set of facts upon which the 
(d)(1) inquiry can be conducted. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
state courts will not accept as true “wholly conclusory allegations.” Pinholster, 
131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.12. The quality and specificity of the briefing in the state 
court is, therefore, of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, this sort of 
speculative briefing is likely to be difficult in many cases and impossible in 
others, particularly where counsel is not appointed to the prisoner for state 
proceedings. Expecting a pro se prisoner to determine which constitutional 
provisions apply, much less which facts must be alleged in a state pleading or 
potentially waived forever, is expecting too much. Cf. Kenneth Williams, The 
Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 677, 689–90 (2000) 
(explaining that with the assistance of counsel, capital habeas petitioners 
“frequently include factually disputable claims in their habeas petitions” and 
noting that the petitioner does not even know the accuracy of some of these 
allegations until the facts are developed through a hearing). 
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assumed the facts as alleged by the prisoner, a federal court will 
have to be persuaded that § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied.243 To be sure, 
this presents a considerable burden to prisoners, particularly pro 
se prisoners, who, in presenting their claims to the state court, 
are expected, even without discovery, to colorably assert facts not 
yet known to them in order to meaningfully preserve the claims 
for federal habeas review. Viewed in this light, (d)(2) provides a 
meaningful but insufficient check on the fairness of the state 
procedures.244 
B. New Facts Creating a “New” Claim for Purposes of 
AEDPA Review 
An alternative framework for limiting the scope of Pinholster 
and indirectly providing a mechanism for challenging unfair state 
procedures relies on a prisoner arguing that the claim he is 
presenting to the federal habeas court is new or materially 
different from the claim he presented to the state court.245 The 
                                                                                                     
 243. It seems likely that federal hearings in this context will be limited to 
circumstances in which the federal court concludes that, based on the prisoner’s 
allegations, (d)(1) is satisfied but the court needs a hearing to confirm the 
validity of the allegations and conclusively establish the constitutional violation. 
This scenario could arise if the state court “assumed the habeas petitioner’s 
facts” and then a federal court concluded that the state court’s denial of relief, 
based on the petitioner’s version of the facts, was contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1412 
(Breyer, J., concurring). In these circumstances, a “hearing might be needed in 
order to determine whether the facts alleged [in state court] were indeed true” 
so as to justify relief. Id. 
 244. I reiterate, however, that (d)(2) is not an insignificant mechanism for 
reviewing state procedures in many cases. For example, when the state post-
conviction court refuses to fund a single defense expert despite the presentation 
of expert testimony by the State as to a material issue, a finding of fact in favor 
of the State as to the material issue should be regarded as satisfying the 
unreasonableness requirement of (d)(2) such that federal review is 
unconstrained by the Pinholster limitation on factual development and 
unconstrained by the deferential review of (d)(1). 
 245. In a habeas case, Bell v. Kelly, which the Court ultimately dismissed as 
improvidently granted, there was a significant amount of valuable briefing by 
the parties and amici for both parties. See Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55, 55 (2008). 
Members of the Court continue to cite the briefs and arguments in this case. 
See, e.g., Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223)). In 
Petitioner Bell’s opening brief, counsel explained with considerable care the 
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limitations on relief contained in § 2254(d) only apply to claims 
“adjudicated on the merits by a state court.”246 Consequently, if 
the claim presented to the federal habeas court is materially 
different than the claim presented to the state court, then 
§ 2254(d) would not apply. As a general rule, arguing that a claim 
or issue of law is new is not a desirable approach for a federal 
habeas petitioner. New rules of law are barred by the Teague rule 
governing retroactive application of new laws and by 
§ 2254(d)(1)’s requirement that federal habeas petitioners state a 
claim under “clearly established federal law as determined by the 
Supreme Court.”247 Likewise, if a claim is brought for the first 
time on federal habeas review, then the claim is typically said to 
be unexhausted and therefore defaulted.248 Thus, even though the 
odds of winning on habeas review are always immensely small, a 
denial of relief is typically certain if the prisoner alleges that 
something new, never before presented, justifies federal relief. 
Such a petitioner does not lose because of § 2254(d)(1); he loses 
because his claim is said to be procedurally defaulted.249  
                                                                                                     
notion that new evidence can render a claim new, and therefore unadjudicated 
for purposes of AEDPA. See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 
(2008) No. 07-1223, 2008 WL 2958115, at *23–39. Petitioner’s counsel 
specifically stated:  
[W]here, as here, a petitioner establishes his entitlement to fact 
development and proves facts not before the state court that 
significantly affect the court's application of the relevant 
constitutional rule (or one of its components) or its impression of the 
relevant facts, then the claim adjudicated by the state court ceases to 
be susceptible to meaningful review under § 2254(d). 
Id. at *20. 
 246. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (“[W]hen a prisoner 
alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates 
federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this 
claim and provide any necessary relief.” (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 
515–16 (1982); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950))). 
 249. Practically speaking, the new claim is simply unexhausted and thus 
non-cognizable. However, courts tend to recognize that when a claim is not 
presented to a state court and no state court remedy remains available, then the 
claim is “technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.” See, e.g., Lopez v. 
Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1210 (9th Cir. 2011). Some states completely bar all 
successive habeas applications, and thus a claim not presented in one’s first 
state petition is technically exhausted because there is no state court remedy, 
and the only question is whether the procedural default can be overcome. See 
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Significantly, however, there is an important exception to the 
rule that bringing a new claim on federal habeas review will 
result in an automatic denial of relief, and the exception may 
have relevance in the context of challenging state procedures. A 
prisoner’s procedural default for failing to raise a claim in the 
state courts is forgiven and federal habeas review is available if 
the defendant can demonstrate cause and prejudice from the 
failing to previously raise the claim.250 The sort of “cause” 
necessary to overcome a default is understood to require a 
showing “that some objective factor external to the defense 
impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural 
rule.”251 Accordingly, where state court procedures are so 
inadequate or unfair as to prevent the full development of a claim 
by the prisoner, cause exists to excuse the procedural default.  
Ordinarily, when a prisoner seeks to demonstrate cause and 
prejudice, he is pursuing an entirely new claim that came to light 
after the state post-conviction proceedings had already concluded. 
A paradigmatic example would be a due process Brady claim 
based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose certain exculpatory 
evidence.252 Equally strong would be a claim that the state court 
                                                                                                     
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1418 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting “that 
Virginia law bars all successive habeas applications, even in cases where the 
petitioner has new evidence”). 
 250. In addition to the cause and prejudice limitations, a claim can only be 
defaulted if the state procedural bar is independent and adequate. If the state’s 
procedures in defaulting a claim are patently unfair, one might also argue that 
the default is not predicated on an adequate state law. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 
534 U.S. 362, 366 (2002) (holding “that the Missouri Rules, as injected into this 
case by the state appellate court, did not constitute a state ground adequate to 
bar federal habeas review”); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965) 
(holding that “[t]he Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the 
introduction of illegal evidence” would not bar federal review). In other words, a 
state procedure that is, as-applied, unfair or inadequate cannot serve as a basis 
for barring federal review. 
 251. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also MEANS, supra note 
22, at § 9B:51 (interpreting Murray). Means specifically states: 
Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of objective impediments 
to compliance with a procedural rule, the Court in Murray identified 
the following: (1) interference by officials that makes compliance with 
the state’s procedural rule impractical; (2) a showing that the factual 
or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available; and (3) the 
procedural default was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id. 
 252. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the 
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procedures or mechanisms for litigation directly impede the 
development of a claim. For example, the Supreme Court has 
permitted relief on a new claim when the facts of a juror 
misconduct claim could not have reasonably come to light 
through the state process.253 So long as the best efforts of the 
defense are insufficient to discover and present a claim to the 
state court, there is said to be cause to excuse the failure to 
exhaust the claim. Moreover, when litigating a claim in state 
court was impractical because of procedural or prosecutorial 
unfairness, the federal review of the claim is de novo.254 That is to 
say, an unfair state procedure that prevents an entirely new claim 
from being presented to the state court will provide the prisoner 
an opportunity to develop and litigate the claim for the first time 
on federal review, unencumbered by AEDPA.255 
In an effort to benefit from the absence of AEDPA deference, 
state prisoners who are seeking a forum to challenge a state 
process as unfair ought to urge the Court to adopt a capacious 
view regarding what constitutes a new claim. As discussed 
immediately above, if a claim is truly new, then the restrictions 
on relief contained in § 2254 and Pinholster do not apply. Thus, 
                                                                                                     
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process” and will not procedurally bar petitioner from raising the 
claim in federal court). 
 253. See (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 442 (2000) (explaining 
that the state record lacked evidence suggesting material misrepresentations by 
a juror during voir dire). The Court noted that “[s]tate habeas counsel did 
attempt to investigate petitioner’s jury” by filing “a motion for expert services 
with the Virginia Supreme Court, alleging “irregularities, improprieties and 
omissions” in the empanelling of the jury. Id. at 442 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
189 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Court further noted that “the Virginia 
Supreme Court denied [the motion] and dismissed the habeas petition, 
depriving petitioner of a further opportunity to investigate,” and despite the fact 
that petitioner’s allegations of juror misconduct in the state court were “vague,” 
the Court concluded that such “vagueness was not the fault of petitioner” 
insofar as he had no knowledge that one of the jurors had concealed personal 
and professional relationships with the prosecutor. Id.; see also id. at 444 
(holding that the petitioner’s failure to present the claim to the state court was 
excused insofar as the unavailability of the evidence constituted “cause” and on 
remand the prejudice issue could be determined). 
 254. See id. at 444. 
 255. See id. (finding that the failure to exhaust is excused because there is 
cause and prejudice). AEDPA does not apply because the same claim at issue 
was not “adjudicated” on the merits as required by § 2254(d). Id. 
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the more robust the understanding of what constitutes a new, 
unadjudicated claim, the more opportunity there is for prisoners 
who are able to demonstrate an unfair state process, and thus 
cause for the non-exhaustion, to avoid AEDPA.256 Specifically, a 
state prisoner might plausibly argue that a claim was not 
adjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d) when new evidence 
discovered after the completion of the state proceedings 
substantially bolsters a legal claim raised in state proceedings. 
The broadest articulation of this principle—substantial new facts 
developed in federal habeas render (d)(1) inapplicable—was 
presented to the Court in a prior case, Bell v. Kelly.257 Although 
the Bell case was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted, 
the briefing and oral argument from the case continues to be cited 
by the Justices and considered by lower courts.258 The petitioner’s 
brief in Bell was the apotheosis of the argument that new facts 
will suffice to render a claim new:  
By its plain language, [§ 2254(d)] applies only to “claims” that 
were “adjudicated on the merits” in state court. A “claim” is 
the application of governing law to a particular set of facts. 
The admission of significant new evidence on federal habeas, 
therefore, may give rise to a new “claim” that no state court 
has previously “adjudicated on the merits.”259 
In Pinholster, the Court expressly rejected the broad notion 
of new claim that regarded the admission of any substantial new 
evidence during federal habeas review as precluding the 
application of § 2254(d).260 Nonetheless, the Court left open the 
                                                                                                     
 256. The scenario presented in (Michael) Williams, while an important limit 
on AEDPA, is likely to be less common because it requires habeas counsel to 
uncover an entirely new legal theory justifying relief, as opposed to merely 
substantial new facts in support of a claim raised in state court. In (Michael) 
Williams, the petitioner raised for the first time in his federal habeas petition 
an entirely new claim of juror bias. Id. at 427. 
 257. Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (denying cert. in part). 
 258. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1417 n.5 (2011) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 259. Brief for Petitioner at 19–20, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) No. 07-
1223, 2008 WL 2958115, at *19–20. 
 260. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (noting that in a prior decision the 
Court had assumed, without deciding, that (d)(1) did not apply when significant 
new evidence had been admitted, and holding that “[t]oday, we reject that 
assumption and hold that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on 
§ 2254(d)(1) review”). 
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possibility that, in certain circumstances, significant new 
evidence will justify regarding a federal claim as sufficiently new 
so as to be unadjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d) and therefore 
unaffected by Pinholster.261 Specifically, there is a footnote in 
Pinholster that is destined to be revered by habeas defense 
lawyers as the only redeeming feature of the decision and bound 
to be reviled by proponents of less federal habeas oversight as an 
unnecessary point of confusion. In footnote 10, the Court left a 
crack in the door leading to the habeas looking glass: “Though we 
do not decide where to draw the line between new claims and 
claims adjudicated on the merits, Justice Sotomayor’s 
hypothetical involving new evidence of withheld exculpatory 
witness statements may well present a new claim.”262 It may 
ultimately prove unwise to place too much weight on the Court’s 
failure to directly foreclose such an argument,263 but this single 
footnote will, for many habeas petitioners, be the strongest 
argument against the application of (d)(1) and the Pinholster 
prohibition on a court’s ability to consider new evidence on 
habeas review. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider with due 
care the hypothetical in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent that spurred 
this soon to be infamous footnote: 
Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently attempted in 
state court to develop the factual basis of a claim that 
prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court denied relief 
on the ground that the withheld evidence then known did not 
rise to the level of materiality required under Brady. Before 
the time for filing a federal habeas petition has expired, 
however, a state court orders the State to disclose additional 
documents the petitioner had timely requested under the 
State’s public records Act. The disclosed documents reveal that 
the State withheld other exculpatory witness statements, but 
state law would not permit the petitioner to present the new 
evidence in a successive petition.264 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 1401. 
 262. Id. at 1401 n.10.  
 263. Similar reliance was placed on Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004), 
which had assumed without deciding that the introduction of new evidence in 
federal court rendered (d)(1) inapplicable. Holland, 542 U.S. at 653. 
 264. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Responding to her own hypothetical,265 Justice Sotomayor makes 
a series of observations that all but forces the majority to concede 
that, at least in some circumstances, new evidence justifies 
regarding a legal theory or claim that was exhausted in state 
court as a new claim:  
Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his 
Brady claim to the state court at all, his claim would be 
deemed defaulted and the petitioner could attempt to show 
cause and prejudice to overcome the default. If, however, the 
new evidence merely bolsters a Brady claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is unclear how the 
petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s 
holding . . . . Because the state court adjudicated the 
petitioner’s Brady claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) would still 
apply. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), 
a federal court is now prohibited from considering the new 
evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state-court 
decision. 
The majority's interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) thus suggests the 
anomalous result that petitioners with new claims based on 
newly obtained evidence can obtain federal habeas relief if 
they can show cause and prejudice for their default but 
petitioners with newly obtained evidence supporting a claim 
adjudicated on the merits in state court cannot obtain federal 
habeas relief if they cannot first satisfy § 2254(d)(1) without 
the new evidence.266 
                                                                                                     
 265. It is interesting to note that the Justice’s hypothetical refers to a state 
court’s discovery order as providing the relevant new evidence. Id. If no such 
state procedures are available, then many state prisoners will never develop 
such evidence without the aid of a federal court’s discovery order. My research 
has not revealed any statistics regarding the frequency with which federal 
courts grant discovery prior to the filing of a federal petition, but my experience 
suggests that this is not the norm in most jurisdictions. 
 266. Id. at 1419 (citations omitted). Although Justice Sotomayor’s 
hypothetical does seem to uncover an anomaly insofar as prisoners who raise a 
claim are at a greater disadvantage than prisoners who do not raise the claim, 
this is not the only instance of such an anomaly under AEDPA. For example, a 
prisoner who raises a claim in his first federal habeas petition is absolutely, 
categorically barred from raising the same claim in a second or successive 
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(1). By contrast, a prisoner who has never before 
raised the claim may do so in a successive petition if, for example, the claim is 
subsequently announced as a new rule of law made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(A). 
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In response to this discussion in the dissent, the Pinholster 
majority responds in footnote 10 by noting that this hypothetical 
petitioner who obtains new Brady evidence “may well [have] a 
new claim” such that § 2254(d) would not apply.267 In short, if 
government misconduct, or state procedural unfairness, or even 
simply circumstances beyond the defendant’s control prevented 
the discovery of substantial new facts, then an “old” claim 
reviewed in federal court in light of the “new” facts might be 
deemed a new claim and thus free of the restrictions in § 2254.268 
The dissent seems to have prompted the majority to concede that 
the presentation of substantial new facts in support of a claim 
may be sufficient to render a preexisting claim “new” and 
therefore unadjudicated for purposes of § 2254(d),269 and, to be 
sure, this is one of the few chinks in the AEDPA armor. Notably, 
however, there remain some substantial deficiencies with this 
approach as a model for ensuring full and fair state court 
proceedings.  
Most importantly, it seems unlikely that any new facts can 
be considered after the filing of the federal habeas petition. That 
is to say, if there is an exception to Pinholster’s limitation when 
substantial new evidence is discovered to support the claim, the 
exception may extend only to evidence presented prior to the 
filing of the federal habeas petition. This rule necessarily follows 
from Pinholster because Pinholster bars the consideration of 
evidence outside of the state court record unless § 2254(d)(1) is 
satisfied.270 If the claim presented in the federal petition is not 
“new” based on the substantial additional facts, then it is the 
                                                                                                     
 267. Id. at 1401 n.10 (majority opinion). Of course, if the new evidence 
renders a claim new, then the claim is also unexhausted. If the state law bars 
the filing of a successive petition, see, e.g., id. at 1400 n.6, then the petitioner 
must overcome the default by demonstrating cause and prejudice. Cf. (Michael) 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432–33 (2000) (recognizing that the diligence 
required for § 2254(e)(2) will typically also constitute the cause needed to 
overcome a default). By contrast, if the state procedures would allow a new 
claim to be presented, then the claim would have to be exhausted. Notably, if 
the claim (or substantial new facts) were not discovered until after the habeas 
petition was filed in district court, then it is unlikely that the new claim can be 
added by amendment to the pending habeas petition. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 
U.S. 644, 657 (2005). 
 268. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (majority opinion). 
 269. Id. at 1418 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 270. Id. at 1398 (majority opinion). 
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same claim that was adjudicated by the state court. And “if a 
claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court,” 
federal review is constrained by (d)(1) and limited to the state 
court record.271 In essence, this means that a petitioner relying on 
this “new” claim approach must establish the facts in support of 
his claim prior to the filing of his federal habeas petition and 
without the assistance of the court in the form of subpoenas and 
discovery orders. This presents a number of barriers to relief that 
will often prove insurmountable unless federal judges, alerted to 
this conundrum, more regularly permit pre-petition discovery or 
hearings.272  
For example, in the vast majority of non-capital habeas 
cases, the prisoner will be unrepresented.273 The prisoner will 
finish his state post-conviction proceedings and, still without 
counsel, be expected to generate substantial new facts in support 
of his claims within the one-year statute of limitations for filing a 
federal petition as prescribed by AEDPA.274 In the absence of 
federal procedures, such as a court ordered evidentiary hearing to 
develop facts in support of the claims, it is all but impossible for 
the vast majority of prisoners to uncover relevant, substantial 
                                                                                                     
 271. Sotomayor’s dissent highlights this confusion when she notes: “Even if 
it can fairly be argued that my hypothetical petitioner has a new claim, the 
majority fails to explain how a diligent petitioner with new evidence supporting 
an existing claim can present his new evidence to a federal court.” Id. at 1418 
n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 272. It should be noted that recent limitations on certain types of civil 
actions under § 1983, particularly in the context of supervisory liability, impose 
similar burdens on prisoners. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (finding that in § 1983 suits, a government official is only responsible for 
his or her own actions and mere knowledge is not sufficient to hold an official 
liable for his or her subordinate’s discriminatory behavior). Certainly a prisoner 
seeking to construct a well-pleaded complaint so as to state a claim under the 
heightened standards of Iqbal would benefit from pre-filing discovery as well. 
Cf. Adam Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1336–39 
(2010) (positing that, in reality, the Iqbal standard does not impose a materially 
higher pleading burden on plaintiffs). 
 273. See Louis Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate 
Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 
479 (2002) (noting that a significant increase in habeas filings involve pro se 
litigants). 
 274. See id. at 483 (addressing the fact that pro se claims present complex 
issues because these applicants lack resources to interpret the law or to obtain 
evidentiary support for claims). 
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evidence in support of their claims.275 Presently, however, there is 
no federal procedure for obtaining an evidentiary hearing prior to 
the filing of a federal habeas petition.276 Moreover, in the unlikely 
event that a state prisoner who filed a federal petition convinced 
a federal judge to grant an evidentiary hearing in order to 
develop new facts, it is unlikely that the petitioner would 
ultimately be permitted to benefit from these new facts. On the 
one hand, if the new facts merely supported existing, exhausted 
claims, then Pinholster expressly holds that such facts are not 
relevant to the determination of whether habeas relief may be 
granted.277 On the other hand, if the petitioner claimed that the 
newly developed facts that resulted from the hearing were 
sufficiently substantial so as to render his claim “new” under the 
terms of footnote 10 from Pinholster, the new claim would likely 
not be cognizable because habeas petitions can be amended so as 
to add new claims only when the new claims relate back to the 
claims in the original petition.278 In Mayle v. Felix,279 the Court 
limited amendments to habeas petitions280 such that 
amendments are permitted only insofar as they arise out of “the 
same core facts as the timely filed claim.”281 It would obviously be 
difficult for a petitioner to argue that he is permitted to amend 
his petition because the newly developed facts arise out of the 
same “core of facts” while simultaneously arguing that the new 
facts that are the source of the amendment are sufficiently 
                                                                                                     
 275. See id. 
 276. The text of Habeas Rule 8 seems to explicitly foreclose the possibility of 
a pre-filing evidentiary hearing: “If the petition is not dismissed, the judge 
shall . . . determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.” Rules 
Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 8, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (2010). Likewise, in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 857–58 (1994), a 
closely divided Court concluded that the statutory right to counsel is triggered 
prior to the filing of a habeas petition. Id. 
 277. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (majority opinion). 
 278. Id. at 1419 n.10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 279. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). 
 280. The Mayle v. Felix issue applies only to efforts to amend that occur 
after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations has expired. Id. at 656. An 
amendment as of right that occurs before the one year deadline should be 
immune from this difficulty. Id. 
 281. Id. at 657. 
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material and different so as to render the previously presented 
claim unadjudicated by the state court.282  
I do not purport to have all of the answers about this rapidly 
developing and unsettled area of law, but as this brief discussion 
illustrates, the “new” claim approach suffers from substantial 
shortcomings. Even where a state process is patently unfair—the 
state actively obstructs the development of relevant facts in 
support of a colorable claim by denying funding, or experts, or 
hearing—the federal court probably can only consider new facts 
when those facts are discovered prior to the filing of the habeas 
petition and included in the federal petition. Perhaps the Court 
will simply read a procedural fairness requirement into the 
Pinholster rule, but if not, the new-claim approach, like the 
efforts to litigate procedural unfairness under § 2254(d)(2), are 
likely to prove an insufficient check on unfair state procedures. 
VI. Challenging Deficient State Procedures Through 
§ 1983 Actions 
In view of the fact that AEDPA poses procedural and 
substantive barriers that are often insurmountable, it is time for 
courts to consider seriously the viability of a non-habeas 
challenge to state procedures, i.e., a challenge under § 1983 
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief because of an unfair state 
practice. Ideally, a § 1983 action could serve as a collateral forum 
for litigating procedural fairness issues—it is collateral review of 
the collateral review.   
Until very recently, such challenges seemed unnecessary in 
view of the accepted wisdom that AEDPA was more legislative 
hyperbole (or hype) than bite. Moreover, lawyers have likely been 
deterred from bringing such actions, which thematically resemble 
a post-conviction or collateral challenge, by the Court’s repeated 
admonition that habeas proceedings are the exclusive vehicle for 
                                                                                                     
 282. Potentially the prisoner could file the "new" claim as a successive 
habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). However, in order to satisfy the limitation 
on successive petitions the new facts must not have been discoverable through 
“due diligence” and “the facts underlying the claim” would have to demonstrate 
the petitioner’s innocence. Id. 
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challenging the legality of one’s conviction.283 Presently, however, 
there is both a need for procedural challenges unconstrained by 
AEDPA and a viable option for such challenges based on the 
Court’s recent decision in Skinner v. Switzer.284 Whereas the 
Court’s recent decisions in Pinholster and Richter signal that 
AEDPA’s restrictions on federal review are maturing in their 
severity, within weeks of these two habeas decisions the Court 
also decided Skinner, which opens the door to procedural285 
challenges to state post-conviction286 proceedings under § 1983. 
As the remainder of this Article explains, a § 1983 challenge to 
state post-conviction proceedings seems to provide a plausible 
alternative (or supplement) to challenging unfair state processes 
through federal habeas proceedings. Assuming a mechanism for 
staying petitions during the pendency of non-habeas challenges 
so as to avoid the prohibitions on successive habeas petitions and 
amendments, civil litigation under § 1983 promises a unique 
opportunity to prompt systemic reform of state processes, like 
that urged by Professor Primus, without eliminating 
individualized habeas corpus review. As with procedural 
challenges brought within the habeas framework, it is an 
imperfect solution to a complicated problem, but § 1983 litigation 
provides advantages to prisoners seeking to challenge the 
procedural adequacy of their state court proceedings. 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994) (finding that certain 
claims, such as challenging the fact or duration of confinement, “must be 
brought in as habeas corpus proceedings, which do contain an exhaustion 
requirement”). 
 284. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1320 (2011) (allowing a claim 
under § 1983 to proceed so long as it does not demonstrate invalidity of 
conviction). 
 285. The Skinner majority is clear that challenges to a state’s procedures (or 
lack thereof) as a matter of substantive due process are not generally viable. See 
id. at 1293 (“Osborne rejected the extension of substantive due process to this 
area . . . .” (citing Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2321 (2009))); id. (holding that a viable claim is one that alleges that the 
available state procedures denied “him procedural due process”). 
 286. See id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Like Osborne, Skinner seeks 
to challenge state collateral review procedures.”); id. at 1301 n.2 (explaining 
that the procedure in question is a collateral, post-conviction procedure even 
though the challenged DNA procedure “does not itself provide a vehicle for 
obtaining relief” (quoting Ex Parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002))).  
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A. Understanding Skinner as Permitting § 1983 Actions 
In Skinner, the Court considered whether a state prisoner 
could assert a claim under § 1983 challenging a state’s DNA 
testing procedures or whether such a claim must be brought in a 
habeas petition under § 2254. Skinner brought a § 1983 action 
seeking an injunction forcing the state of Texas to allow him to 
test DNA evidence from the crime scene. More precisely, Skinner 
brought an action against the district attorney whose office had 
control of the evidence that Skinner sought to test, claiming that 
the failure to permit testing in his case was procedurally 
improper.287 In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a challenge to 
the procedural fairness of a “postconviction claim . . . is properly 
pursued in a § 1983 action.”288 This holding could prove to be 
pathmarking in the field of post-conviction review.289 
At the outset, however, it is critical to point out that 
Skinner’s allowance of non-habeas challenges to state post-
conviction proceedings is limited to challenges of process rather 
than challenges of substance.290 The first sentence of Skinner 
emphasizes the limits of the holding by explaining that the 
decision is limited to the narrow question “left unresolved in 
District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. 
Osborne.”291 In Osborne, the Court unequivocally held that there 
is no substantive right to access DNA evidence, and such a 
conclusion is consistent with the prior decisions concluding that 
there is no due process right to post-conviction proceedings more 
generally.292 As the Court has explained, “Osborne rejected the 
                                                                                                     
 287. See id. at 1294–95 (majority opinion). 
 288. See id.  
 289. Prior to Skinner, it was far from obvious that § 1983 authorized such 
challenges. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 152–54 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(holding that such claims could only be raised through habeas corpus because 
the ultimate relief sought was release); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 160 (“A 
forceful argument can be made that Younger abstention normally should 
preclude federal court relief that interferes with state post-conviction 
proceedings.”). 
 290. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322 (“Osborne seeks to defend the judgment 
on the basis of substantive due process as well . . . . We reject the invitation and 
conclude, in the circumstances of this case, that there is no such substantive due 
process right.”). As a general matter, courts operate on the assumption that 
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extension of substantive due process to this area, and left slim 
room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies 
him procedural due process.”293 There is, in short, no right to 
certain state post-conviction procedures, but when a state 
provides post-conviction review, and therefore earns federal 
deference to its review, the process must be fundamentally fair.294 
Skinner-type challenges, then, will be limited to claims that the 
state has deprived the prisoner of a liberty interest in a full and 
fair state post-conviction process in contravention of procedural 
due process.295 
                                                                                                     
there is no due process (or other constitutional) right to state post-conviction 
procedures of any particular form, or even at all. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (explaining that “[s]tates have no obligation to 
provide” opportunities for collateral challenges). However, when such 
procedures exist, they must be fundamentally fair as required by procedural due 
process. Cf. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (asking whether “the State’s procedures 
for postconviction relief ‘offends some principal of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or 
‘transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation’” 
(quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992))). The requirement 
of procedural fairness operates as a sort of quid pro quo—the state’s review is 
insulated with deference under the habeas common law and AEDPA, but the 
state’s review must earn such deference by honoring basic precepts of fairness. 
Cf. id. at 2332 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although States are under no 
obligation to provide mechanisms for postconviction relief, when they choose to 
do so, the procedures they employ must comport with the demands of the Due 
Process Clause . . . .” (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985))). 
 293. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293 (citations omitted). 
 294. The conclusion that there is no right to state post-conviction review is 
often explained by reference to the even more surprising conclusion that there is 
no constitutional right to a direct appeal. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the 
Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1992) 
(noting that the Court has bolstered its conclusion that state habeas is not 
required by relying on the conclusion that state appeals are not even required). 
As one commentator has explained,  
Criminal appeals did not exist at the time of the Founding; Congress 
did not provide for federal criminal appeals until the late nineteenth 
century; accordingly, the criminal appeal cannot form part of the 
historic tradition of due process. As recently as 1987, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its allegiance to this conventional view, stating that 
there is no constitutional right to appellate review of criminal 
convictions, a proposition that the Court has repeated with 
remarkable regularity since first enunciating it in 1894. 
Id. 
 295. As expressed in Osborne, “Federal courts may upset a State’s 
postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally inadequate to 
vindicate the substantive rights provided.” Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320. 
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In short, Skinner opens the door to § 1983 challenges to the 
procedural adequacy of state collateral proceedings. In Skinner, 
the challenge was to the state’s construction and application of a 
DNA access statute; however, subsequent challenges could be 
brought on procedural due process grounds against any state 
collateral proceeding implicating constitutional rights so long as a 
favorable outcome for the prisoner in the proceeding would not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.296 It is true that 
the “ultimate aim” of these procedural challenges by a prisoner is 
to undermine the validity of a conviction.297 And in this regard, 
Justice Thomas is surely correct that such a claim “sounds in 
habeas” and provides a “roadmap” for prisoners seeking to avoid 
the constraints of AEDPA.298 Nonetheless, Skinner leaves no 
doubt that, as a procedural matter, such challenges can be 
brought in a § 1983 action, and, as such, § 1983 may serve to 
impose an important additional deterrent on state courts such 
that they will be more careful about the procedures employed to 
review claims of unconstitutional incarcerations.299 
                                                                                                     
 296. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298. 
 297. See id. at 1299. 
 298. Id. at 1302. The Court has repeatedly held that “[c]hallenges to the 
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the 
province of habeas corpus.” See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) 
(holding that a challenge to the State’s proposed method of execution may be 
brought under § 1983) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). 
The Court reasoned that such claims must be more akin to a challenge to the 
conditions or circumstances of confinement than an outright challenge to the 
legality of one’s sentence or conviction, and thus, the habeas bar on successive 
petitions did not apply to such actions. Id. 
 299. See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298–99. The range of challenges to process 
available to petitioners is legion and far from hypothetical. For example, the 
Tenth Circuit observed a recurring procedural trap in Oklahoma: the state 
courts would treat a claim as defaulted if it was not raised on direct appeal, 
even if the claim in question could not be raised on direct appeal. See Miller v. 
Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In this case, the record 
contains no evidence that Mr. Miller had the opportunity to consult with 
separate appellate counsel in order to evaluate his attorney’s performance or 
that Oklahoma provided him with any procedural mechanism to develop the 
factual basis of his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.”). Professor 
Primus has gathered several other useful examples. See Primus, supra note 170, 
at 2 (noting, for example, that “[c]apital defendants in Idaho who discover six 
weeks after sentencing that the state withheld impeachment evidence about 
prosecution witnesses are statutorily barred from challenging the state’s 
misconduct in state court”). 
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B. The Advantages of a § 1983 Challenge to State Post-
Conviction Procedures 
Summarizing his objections to Skinner’s approval of § 1983 
challenges to state collateral proceedings, Justice Alito explained: 
“In truth, the majority provides a roadmap for any unsuccessful 
state habeas petitioner to relitigate his claim under § 1983: After 
state habeas is denied, file a § 1983 suit challenging the state 
habeas process rather than the result. What prisoner would not 
avail himself of this additional bite at the apple?”300 
The prospect that Skinner provides a procedural bypass 
around AEDPA is significant, and this section catalogues the 
various advantages that such litigation would provide to 
prisoners. Given that Congress has shown no signs of imminently 
overhauling AEDPA, a “roadmap” around the limitations would 
be a welcome development for those interested in restoring a 
system of more substantial oversight of state convictions. A well-
timed § 1983 challenge to state procedures would enable the 
prisoner to avoid, to varying degrees, the onerous exhaustion, 
discovery, and deference provisions of AEDPA and would likely 
even facilitate class actions that would conserve judicial 
resources, attorney time, and promote efficiency.301 Equally 
important, such litigation would carry with it the promise of 
attorney fees in successful cases and thus spur the representation 
of non-capital prisoners who, with few exceptions, are forced to 
litigate pro se in federal habeas review. All the while, because 
such litigation is done outside the realm of habeas corpus, one 
avoids the concerns raised by King and Hoffmann that the 
overuse of habeas corpus has the effect of diminishing the writ 
insofar as the judge who has to sort through the habeas haystack 
ends up resenting the needle.302 
Nonetheless, there is also reason to believe that the concerns 
raised by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy—that Skinner 
“undermines the [AEDPA] restrictions”—are substantially 
overblown. In view of the fact that federal habeas actions remain 
the only litigation vehicle through which a conviction can actually 
                                                                                                     
 300. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 301. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 73. 
 302. See id. 
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be set aside, the siren song of AEDPA’s fundamental demise is 
overstated.303 After briefly surveying some of the positive 
attributes of litigation under § 1983 as opposed to § 2554, I will 
consider the shortcomings of this § 1983 approach. 
1. Exhaustion 
The first significant advantage of § 1983 litigation is that, as 
a general rule, actions litigated under § 1983 do not require 
exhaustion.304 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires 
that prisoners bring grievances through the prison’s 
administrative processes before filing a § 1983 action,305 and the 
Court has interpreted this requirement as imposing a duty to 
timely and properly exhaust the available procedures for 
redressing prisoner grievances.306 The exhaustion of 
administrative remedies required of prisoners is, however, less 
onerous and less time consuming than AEDPA-based exhaustion, 
and, most importantly, it is limited to circumstances where the 
prisoner brings an action “with respect to prison conditions.”307 In 
other words, the limited form of exhaustion that applies to 
                                                                                                     
 303. For example, rigid limitations on filing successive habeas petitions, 
without more, substantially ameliorate Justice Thomas’s concerns. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b). 
 304. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). There is good reason not to require exhaustion 
in the context of such litigation. As Professor Martin A. Schwartz has observed, 
the “1983 remedy exists, in part, because of congressional mistrust for the 
‘factfinding processes of state institutions,’” and thus § 1983 is designed to 
provide persons with “immediate access to the federal judicial system despite 
state laws to the contrary.” Schwartz, supra note 63, at 98. It should be noted 
that insofar as exhaustion does not apply to § 1983 actions, the procedural 
default barriers applicable to habeas actions are also inapplicable. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). 
 305. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners had no exhaustion requirement prior to 
a 1979 enactment that provided a milder exhaustion requirement. See Woodford 
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (“Before 1980, prisoners asserting constitutional 
claims had no obligation to exhaust administrative remedies.” (citing 
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971))). 
 306. See Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93 (“[E]xhaustion requirement requires proper 
exhaustion.”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740–41 (2001) (finding that 
Congress amended § 1997e(a) to demand exhaustion of administrative remedies 
regardless of relief offered). 
 307. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). 
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prisoners bringing § 1983 actions is inapplicable to prisoners 
challenging state post-conviction review procedures.308 Indeed, in 
Osborne, the Court expressly stated that nothing in the opinion 
should be construed as requiring a petitioner to “exhaust state-
law remedies,”309 and Skinner himself did not exhaust his 
“challenge to Texas’[s] procedures for postconviction relief to the 
Texas courts.”310  
The avoidance of an exhaustion requirement is a significant 
advantage for prisoners seeking to challenge state procedures.311 
Under § 2254(b)–(c), a prisoner is explicitly required to exhaust 
all federal claims in state court, and a prisoner “shall not be 
deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of 
                                                                                                     
 308. Indeed, if a petitioner were to raise a federal claim in state court and, 
after losing, proceed with the identical claim in a § 1983 action, the so-called 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the preclusion doctrines would likely deprive a 
federal court of jurisdiction. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 
486 (1983) (holding that federal courts other than the Supreme Court do not 
have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions arising out of judicial 
proceedings); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (stating 
that appellate jurisdiction over final state court decisions rests solely with the 
Supreme Court of the United States). In Skinner, rather than bringing a federal 
challenge to a state court’s adjudication of his challenge to state procedures, 
Skinner “target[ed] as unconstitutional” the specific procedures applied in his 
case. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) (recognizing that 
while a state court decision is not reviewable by a federal court under § 1983, 
the statute or rule governing the decision may provide a basis for a federal 
action). 
 309. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2321 (2009) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982)). 
While rejecting the exhaustion requirement, the majority commented, “[i]t is 
difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has not invoked 
them. . . . These procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying them, 
Osborne can hardly complain that they do not work in practice.” Id. 
 310. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 311. The significance of the fact that exhaustion does not apply to § 1983 
actions, particularly as they relate to challenges predicated on state post-
conviction review, has not escaped the attention of several of the Justices. In a 
concurring opinion in the Osborne judgment, Justice Alito, writing also for 
Kennedy and Thomas, observed that exhaustion is not required when the 
challenges to post-conviction procedures are pursued under § 1983. Osborne, 129 
S. Ct. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that such challenges ought to be 
forced into the habeas jurisdiction because exhaustion is not required for § 1983 
actions); see also Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1304 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing 
the majority opinion as facilitating an intrusion by § 1983 “into the boundaries 
of habeas corpus” and lamenting the absence of an exhaustion requirement in 
cases like Skinner). 
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the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question 
presented.”312 Exhaustion, in other words, requires complete 
exhaustion in the sense that the prisoner must invoke “one 
complete round” under all of the established state review 
procedures.313 Complete exhaustion is time consuming and filled 
with procedural pitfalls, and, for these reasons, Professor Martin 
Schwartz has identified the exhaustion requirement as being “at 
the heart” of the reasons why individuals prefer § 1983 over 
habeas litigation.314 
2. Section 2254(d)(1) & Factual Development 
Prisoners seeking to challenge the fairness of state 
procedures under § 1983 will also enjoy the opportunity to avoid 
the centerpiece of AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1), and one of the more 
onerous pre-AEDPA limits on habeas relief: the rule of non-
retroactivity.315 As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent, the 
                                                                                                     
 312. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 313. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). 
 314. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 98 (“The exhaustion requirement under 
the federal habeas corpus doctrine lies at the heart of the section 1983—habeas 
corpus conflict.”). It is also worth noting that § 1983 does not contain a statute of 
limitations; instead, the federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury 
statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (agreeing 
to adopt, for a § 1983 action, the statute of limitations for recovery of damages in 
personal injury cases). In many actions under § 1983 the statute of limitations 
would be more generous than AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline. See id. at 280 
(applying New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations governing actions “for 
an injury to the person or reputation of any person”); see also Owens v. Okure, 
488 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1989) (applying “New York’s 3-year residual statute of 
limitations for claims of personal injury” rather than the one-year statute of 
limitations urged by the State).  
 315. As a general rule, new constitutional rules announced by the Supreme 
Court that do not “place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond 
power of States to proscribe” and that are not “‘watershed’ rules of criminal 
procedure,” do not apply retroactively to cases that are already final. Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989)). If, however, the challenge is brought as an injunctive action under 
§ 1983, the limitations imposed by Teague ought not apply. See Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 308–10 (describing exceptions where a decision will apply retroactively, 
including when the decision requires adherence to procedures that are “implicit 
in the concept or ordered” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Palko v. 
Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). Accordingly, a prisoner could theoretically 
challenge a state procedure as insufficiently full and fair and obtain an 
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Skinner rule allows prisoners to “undercut[] the restrictions 
Congress and this Court have placed on federal review of state 
convictions,” including the “significant deference” afforded to 
state courts under (d)(1).316 This means that the severe 
limitations on relief dictated by decisions like Richter do not 
apply to prisoners challenging the adequacy of the state process 
under § 1983. To the extent that the challenges to state 
procedures prove ineffectual under § 2254(d)(2) or the new claim 
approach, discussed above, a § 1983 challenge to the process 
provides a viable alternative that is unencumbered by the 
exhaustion and deference provisions of AEDPA.317 
                                                                                                     
injunction ordering the state court to comply with the new procedural rule. Of 
course, the § 1983 challenge’s ultimate goal must be the undermining of the 
state review procedures and not the overturning of the prisoner’s conviction. See 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (stating that if a § 1983 judgment 
in favor of a plaintiff necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction, the 
complaint must be dismissed absent proof of the conviction’s prior invalidation). 
On the other hand, one could reasonably argue that many new rules of state 
post-conviction procedure could be announced on federal habeas review—that is 
to say, the Court has never addressed whether Teague’s retroactivity rule 
applies to new rules of post-conviction procedure, and there is good reason to 
believe that Teague does not bar the announcement of new rules of procedure on 
habeas review when the new rule implicates the state post-conviction 
procedures rather than the trial procedures. Cf. Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 
731 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (U.S. June 6, 2011) (No. 10-
1001). 
 316. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 317. Although the fact that § 1983 litigation is not subject to the limitations 
contained in § 2254 is obvious, I do not mean to overstate the advantages of 
litigating under § 1983 in this regard. It must be acknowledged, for example, 
that I do not think that a claim of procedural unfairness in the state process 
raised under § 2254(d)(2) would be constrained by the limits in (d)(1) either. In 
other words, to the extent that a petitioner is able to challenge the unfairness of 
a state proceeding through federal habeas proceedings, it seems unlikely that 
(d)(1) would apply to this determination. Moreover, it must be acknowledged 
that a prisoner challenging a state’s procedures under § 1983 would, at the very 
least, be required to state a claim under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a task that is increasingly difficult in the wake of cases like Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009), which held that Iqbal failed to state a 
claim because he did not allege sufficient facts “to plausibly suggest petitioners’ 
discriminatory state of mind.” Cf. Steinman, supra note 272, at 1294 (“If a 
plaintiff seeking judicial redress is unable to provide an adequate ‘statement of 
the claim’ at the pleadings phase, then that claim is effectively stillborn.”). 
Nonetheless, it still appears safe to assume that developing a well-pleaded civil 
complaint is easier than satisfying the strictures of § 2254(d)(1). 
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Equally important, where a prisoner litigates an issue 
outside of the shadow of § 2254(d)(1), Pinholster’s newly 
announced limitations on factual development would not apply. 
Pinholster holds that new evidence presented for the first time in 
federal court may not be considered and that instead, review 
“under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the 
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”318 An action 
under § 1983 is, of course, unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1), and 
consequently, federal review of the state procedures is not limited 
to facts raised in the state court. In fact, the general federal 
discovery rules have been applied to civil rights actions, as 
opposed to habeas cases, so as to facilitate “broad discovery.”319 
Despite the fact that the Court has “long recognized the need 
to impose sharp limits on state prisoners’ efforts to bypass state 
courts with their discovery requests,” and although litigation 
under § 1983 challenging state procedures “implicate[s] precisely 
the same federalism and comity concerns,” a challenge to the 
state collateral proceedings litigated under § 1983 is permitted to 
proceed unencumbered by the discovery and deference provisions 
applicable to federal habeas review.320  
                                                                                                     
 318. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 
 319. See, e.g., Inmates of Unit 14 v. Rebideau, 102 F.R.D. 122, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 
1984) (“Federal policy favors broad discovery in civil rights actions.”). For a 
useful example of the sort of evidence that might be available through federal 
discovery in order to demonstrate the unfairness of a judicial process, see 
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 217 (1988) (“[W]hile petitioner was pursuing his 
direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, an independent civil action in 
federal court brought to light a scheme by the District Attorney and the Jury 
Commissioners of Putnam County to underrepresent black people and women 
on the master jury lists. . . .”). While evidence relating to the exclusion of jurors 
on the basis of race or gender might undermine the verdict and prove 
impermissible as a basis for a collateral civil rights proceeding, similar evidence 
regarding the unfairness of the state post-conviction process—racial 
discrimination, funding shortages, judicial bias, etc.—might be discoverable 
through a civil rights action and ultimately serve as evidence of an unfair state 
process.   
 320. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 
2308, 2325 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is no answer to say, as respondent 
does, that he simply wants to use § 1983 as a discovery tool to lay the foundation 
for a future state postconviction application . . . .”). 
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3. Class Actions and Attorney Fees 
In the past, habeas corpus was associated with correcting 
systemic failures as well as protecting individual rights. 
Recalcitrant states that were either unable or unwilling to 
enforce federal rights were forced into compliance through habeas 
corpus actions.321 And the inability of the AEDPA model of 
habeas review to efficiently redress systemic failures of the 
justice system is one of the major motivations for recent 
reformers to suggest that federal habeas review, as we currently 
know it, should be abandoned.322 To be sure, class action 
litigation is a powerful method of spurring reform,323 and review 
under § 2254 is currently not amenable to such litigation. 
However, rather than scrapping § 2254 litigation, in the wake of 
Skinner, in some cases it may make sense to supplement it with 
§ 1983 litigation, which does permit class actions. 
At least from the 1960s through the early 1990s, a wide 
range of systemic failures in state justice systems could be 
efficiently consolidated for litigation in federal habeas class 
actions.324 The efficiency and structural benefits of aggregated 
litigation in this context are easily appreciated when one 
considers that this form of litigation allowed prisoners to 
collectively challenge, for example, the validity of a jurisdiction’s 
death penalty,325 or limited access to counsel or legal materials, 
                                                                                                     
 321. See Primus, supra note 170, at 14 (“[F]ederal habeas review of state 
court criminal convictions was not only about emancipating wrongly convicted 
individuals; it was also about coercing reluctant states to enforce federal 
rights.”). 
 322. King and Hoffmann regard habeas as a protection against systemic 
failures and note that the modern writ, as applied in review of criminal 
convictions, is substantially incapable of curing these defects. KING & 
HOFFMANN, supra note 8, at 87–108. 
 323. There is a robust literature documenting the important role that class 
actions, generally speaking, have in prompting social reform. See, e.g., Kevin R. 
Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group 
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 645 (providing examples of class actions 
brought in hopes of spurring social change). 
 324. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
383, 404 (2007) (“[T]o remedy systemic criminal procedure violations, courts did 
for a time certify class actions in federal habeas corpus . . . .”). 
 325. See Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D. Ariz. 1980) (describing a 
challenge to Arizona’s death penalty procedures as proceeding as a class action 
pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
178 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012) 
or the question of whether a jurisdiction had complied with 
federal procedures so as to “opt-in” under a special provision of 
AEDPA that provides for, among other things, an accelerated 
statute of limitations for capital prisoners.326 Collective 
challenges or habeas class actions reduced the strain on the 
courts of litigating the claims individually and allowed prisoners, 
who lack a right to counsel in post-conviction, to prioritize their 
shared or aggregate interests such that a single lawyer could 
represent many prisoners in a single case.327 Class actions in this 
context promote the efficient use of scarce resources, draw 
judicial attention to common systemic problems, and even protect 
the innocent by facilitating aggregate claims brought by persons 
who were unable to afford counsel or competently prepare a pro 
se pleading.328 
In 1998, the Supreme Court effectively rendered the practice 
of litigating a habeas class action impossible by holding that the 
systemic challenges raised by prisoners could not be addressed 
until each petitioner has properly and completely exhausted the 
claim, on his own, through state court proceedings.329 As has 
happened repeatedly in the realm of modern habeas review, 
questions of constitutional substance were delayed, side-stepped, 
or permanently evaded by shifting attention to a procedural rule. 
In this instance, the efficiencies and advantages of collective 
litigation were bypassed in favor of a requirement that trial 
courts ensure that each prisoner had fully exhausted the claims 
                                                                                                     
 326. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 324, at 405 (compiling cases). 
 327. Professor Primus has recognized that class actions “would preserve 
judicial time, energy, and resources and would ensure that habeas petitioners 
had counsel to raise their common claims.” Primus, supra note 170, at 52. 
 328. As Professor Garrett points out, the story of Earl Washington, Jr. 
illustrates that, at least in one circumstance, the use of class-action habeas 
litigation saved an innocent man from execution. Garrett, supra note 324, at 
407. Garrett discusses a lawsuit in which a “jailhouse lawyer” brought a pro se 
class action arguing for a right to counsel in post-conviction “largely because of 
his concern for a fellow inmate, Earl Washington Jr., who could not bring a case 
himself because he had ‘an IQ of 69, an execution date three weeks away, and no 
lawyer.’” Id. The case eventually resulted in a stay, and “we now know, Earl 
Washington was actually innocent.” Id. 
 329. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 748 (1998) (“[I]f 
respondent . . . is allowed to maintain the present action, he would obtain a 
declaration as to the applicable statute of limitations in a federal habeas action 
without ever having shown that he has exhausted state remedies.”). 
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at issue before any of the claims could be joined together. Given 
the one-year statute of limitations for habeas cases and the fact 
that it is very rare for two prisoners to be at the same stage of 
exhaustion so as to be able to collectively bring such a challenge, 
for all practical purposes, the Court’s decision in this regard 
“meant the end of the habeas corpus class action.”330 Moreover, if 
any vestiges of the class-action model of habeas review survived 
this exhaustion rule, they have certainly been eviscerated by 
AEDPA’s strict limits on second or successive habeas petitions.331 
Notably, however, collective challenges to systemic or 
common procedural failings through class action litigation is 
permitted in litigation under § 1983.332 Professor Primus has 
recognized the advantages of cumulative or collective litigation in 
spurring systemic reforms of procedure; however, she ultimately 
concludes that the “procedural obstacle course and the deferential 
merits review . . . prevent habeas [class actions] from deterring 
systemic state violations.”333 Even accepting the questionable 
assumption that challenges to state processes would be governed 
by AEDPA deference in a habeas action, as discussed above, the 
exhaustion and deference provisions of § 2254 do not apply to 
litigation under § 1983. Accordingly, § 1983 class actions provide 
a viable vehicle for systemic challenges to state processes insofar 
as neither AEDPA deference nor the Court’s exhaustion rules 
apply to such actions.334  
                                                                                                     
 330. Garrett, supra note 324, at 406.  
 331. Id. As Garrett points out, the bar on successive habeas petitions 
codified in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, provide an even “harsher procedural 
barrier to habeas corpus class actions.” Id. at 409. No prisoner can afford to 
participate in a class action as to some shared systemic issue if the filing of that 
petition will bar him from litigating his own individual claims in a separate and 
subsequent petition. 
 332. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment, Defendant 
Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 284 
(1985) (“[T]he defendant class action is a powerful, albeit uncommon, procedure 
for vindicating constitutional and statutory civil rights.”). 
 333. Primus, supra note 170, at 53. 
 334. The recent challenges to lethal injection procedures and methods serve 
as a useful analogue. In Pennsylvania, for example, death-row inmates brought 
a class action under § 1983 challenging the state’s lethal injection procedures. 
See Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (describing the 
class action claim that lethal injection subjects prisoners to the risk of 
“excruciating pain and suffering” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments); Jackson v. Danberg, 601 F. Supp. 2d 589, 591 (D. Del. 2009) 
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Whereas the availability of class action litigation 
considerably assists the plight of indigent prisoners who have no 
right to habeas counsel by allowing the work of a single pro bono 
attorney to directly benefit an entire class of prisoners, another 
feature of § 1983 litigation makes access to counsel for procedural 
challenges even more likely. Section 1983 litigation improves the 
chances that indigent defendants seeking to challenge a state 
post-conviction system will be able to obtain the assistance of 
counsel for either an individual or systemic challenge insofar as 
there is statutory authority for attorneys’ fees for prevailing 
parties.335 Whereas habeas petitioners in non-capital cases will 
frequently be appearing pro se or relying on overworked pro bono 
counsel, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 a prevailing party may be 
entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.336 Moreover, although 
awards for attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party are a 
matter of trial court discretion, the Supreme Court has implied 
that § 1988(b) awards should not be parsimoniously granted. In 
rejecting an individual’s argument that it would be too difficult to 
find an attorney to bring § 1983 actions for technical Fourth 
Amendment violations, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
explained that “42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) answers this objection.”337 In 
other words, the Court assumes that fee awards will be 
generously awarded to deserving prevailing parties, even where, 
as may be the case with a procedural challenge to the state post-
conviction process, damages might be nominal unless or until the 
prisoner’s conviction is ultimately reversed. 
                                                                                                     
(same). Even where these challenges have failed on the merits, they provided 
prisoners a forum to litigate these challenges as a consolidated unit, 
independent of the normal procedural abyss that accompanies habeas litigation. 
 335. The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976 allows attorneys’ 
fees for prevailing plaintiffs in § 1983 actions, a benefit that is not available to 
prisoners seeking to challenge the fairness of the state process through habeas 
corpus actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (permitting a court to award, in 
its discretion, reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action). 
Significantly, under § 1988, fees may also be awarded for experts retained by 
the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). 
 336. “Section 1983’s no-exhaustion rule and statutory fee authority are the 
two major distinctions between the two remedies and generally render section 
1983 more desirable than federal habeas corpus to state prisoners.” Schwartz, 
supra note 63, at 106. 
 337. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006). 
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**** 
In short, litigation challenging state collateral proceedings is 
permitted under § 1983, and challenges in this posture avoid 
many of the most cumbersome procedural hurdles presented by 
AEDPA. The opportunity to engage in collective litigation of 
systemic problems, the possibility of attorneys’ fees awards, the 
absence of exhaustion requirements, and the inapplicability of 
§ 2254(d)(1)’s discovery and substantive limitations create 
substantial incentives to challenge state processes through non-
habeas litigation. 
C. The Defects and Disadvantages of § 1983 Challenges to Process 
The notion that a litigant might prefer § 1983 challenges over 
AEDPA-based review has not been overlooked by Justices 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, who have voiced concern that 
allowing § 1983 challenges to state collateral proceedings 
threatens to undermine the restrictions imposed by AEDPA.338 In 
separate opinions in both Osborne and Skinner, this trio has 
lamented what they regard as a readymade path or “roadmap” 
around AEDPA for those wise enough to “artful[ly] plead” their 
claims under § 1983 rather than § 2254.339 Observing that the 
federalism and comity issues are no less forceful in challenges to 
process,340 these Justices have complained that the Skinner rule 
allows a prisoner to challenge state “collateral review procedures 
under § 1983 [and thereby] impeach the result of collateral 
review without complying with any of the restrictions for relief in 
federal habeas.”341  
To be sure, Skinner-based challenges to procedure provide a 
novel vehicle for prisoners to “impeach” the state post-conviction 
                                                                                                     
 338. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2324 (Alito, J., concurring); Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 
1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 339. “The rules set forth in our cases and codified in AEDPA would mean 
very little if state prisoners could simply evade them through artful pleading.” 
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2325. 
 340. Some have suggested that “injunctive relief associated with section 
1983” might create greater “federalism concerns” than the sort of outright 
release relief available on habeas. Primus, supra note 170, at 49. 
 341. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1303. 
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processes that is, at least initially, unencumbered by AEDPA. 
However, while it is premature to attempt to catalogue all of the 
difficulties or shortcomings of Skinner-based challenges to 
process, it is clear that the predictions of AEDPA’s untimely 
death are, at least for now, substantially overstated and 
misdirected. This section identifies a few of the key limitations on 
relief under the Skinner approach to litigation, paying particular 
attention to difficulties that may arise as to the proper remedy 
and the timing for filing such actions. 
First, given that Skinner arose on a motion to dismiss, it 
remains to be seen what sort of circumstances will warrant a 
merits-based determination that due process has been violated. 
Skinner holds that a state’s collateral proceedings are subject to 
federal review under § 1983,342 but the Court did not decide 
whether Skinner will “ultimately prevail on his procedural due 
process claim.”343 Thus, the question of what exactly constitutes a 
sufficient transgression of fundamental fairness so as to violate 
due process remains to be developed in specific cases. It is clear 
that due process does not require state proceedings to take a 
particular form or to provide the most comprehensive set of 
protections imaginable, but it seems equally clear that a state 
post-conviction process that is largely a sham or entirely 
ineffectual for purposes of developing and litigating fact-intensive 
claims will run afoul of due process.344 Until additional cases are 
decided on this issue, it is impossible to predict just how broad or 
narrow the due process right is in the context of challenges to 
state collateral review, but there is no reason to believe that such 
                                                                                                     
 342. Id. at 1298 (majority opinion). 
 343. Id. at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 344. The Court did address a process-based challenge to the Alaska law 
governing procedures for DNA testing and concluded that the procedures did not 
violate due process. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2319 (acknowledging that a state-
created post-conviction system, while not constitutionally required, can “beget 
yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 
452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981))). And while it denied Osborne relief, the Court 
recognized that federal intervention is necessary if the state post-conviction 
process is “fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights 
provided.” See id. at 2320 (recognizing that the state has some “flexibility in 
deciding what procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief” and 
that “due process does not ‘dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must 
assume’” (quoting Pennsylvania. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987))). 
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review will be less hospitable to prisoners than AEDPA-based 
review; indeed, the very novelty of such a claim is likely to 
produce some favorable judicial outcomes that might not have 
been achieved through pure habeas litigation alone. 
A second limitation on the viability of Skinner-based 
challenges to state processes concerns the relationship between 
§ 1983 and habeas actions. More precisely, a second limitation on 
the scope of challenges to state post-conviction proceedings under 
Skinner relates to the appropriate remedy resulting from such 
litigation. It is well settled that § 1983 challenges, even if 
successful, must not “‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of [the] 
conviction”345 because only habeas corpus actions are permitted 
as a basis for challenging the validity of one’s conviction or 
sentence. Consequently, damage or injunctive actions premised 
on the invalidity of one’s conviction generally are not permitted 
under § 1983.346 Indeed, any action that will “necessarily spell 
speedier release” must be brought under § 2254.347 This 
recognition that claims relating directly or necessarily to the 
                                                                                                     
 345. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1298 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
487 (1994)). 
 346. Similarly, challenges to a search or seizure that, if successful, would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction are also not permitted under 
§ 1983 unless the conviction has already been set aside on appeal or through 
habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 997 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“If, as alleged, Wiley was arrested and prosecuted solely on the basis 
of drugs planted by the arresting officers, then any attack on the arrest would 
necessarily challenge the legality of a prosecution premised on the planted 
drugs.”). By contrast, when evidence is not suppressed because of an exception 
to the exclusionary rule, a § 1983 challenge based on the illegality of the officer 
conduct is generally permitted. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 
(2006) (rationalizing a refusal to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment by virtue of the prisoner’s ability to bring a civil action 
under § 1983). There is thus a distinction between civil actions that undermine 
the validity of one’s conviction, which are not cognizable until the conviction has 
been overturned, and challenges that do not necessarily undermine the validity 
of the conviction. But in many instances, even where the illegal government 
conduct could theoretically be challenged through a § 1983 action insofar as it 
does not undermine the conviction, a plaintiff is not entitled to any 
compensatory damages if his conviction has not been reversed.  
 347. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). A claim under Brady v. 
Maryland, for example, cannot be brought under § 1983 because a Brady claim, 
if successful, necessarily undermines one’s conviction and thus lies at the “core 
of habeas corpus.” Id. 
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validity of one’s conviction lie at the “core of habeas corpus” and 
outside of the reach of § 1983 actions, though a significant 
limitation on the form of remedy available from such actions, 
does not undermine the purpose of a Skinner challenge to one’s 
post-conviction proceedings. In fact, the analysis regarding 
Skinner’s challenge to the post-conviction procedures for DNA 
access in Texas demonstrates the viability of such challenges 
against a state’s post-conviction system more generally: 
Skinner has properly invoked § 1983. Success in his suit for 
DNA testing would not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his 
conviction. While test results might prove exculpatory, that 
outcome is hardly inevitable; [the] results might prove 
inconclusive or they might further incriminate Skinner.348 
The same can be said for a state prisoner’s challenge to the 
procedural unfairness of a state post-conviction proceeding. A 
federal court’s holding that the process was flawed would not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of one’s conviction. In order to 
overturn a conviction, one must demonstrate, per § 2254(a), that 
his conviction was unconstitutional. Standing alone, a finding of 
unfairness as to the state post-conviction process will require 
corrective procedural actions by either the state or federal 
system, but it does not imply the invalidity of the underlying 
conviction.349 At most, such a finding would result in an 
injunction ordering a new state process or a federal habeas 
proceeding unencumbered by the state review, either of which 
might result in a definitive determination that the conviction 
does not rest on a constitutional violation.350 Simply stated, a 
                                                                                                     
 348. Id. at 1298. 
 349. Skinner reverses the Fifth Circuit’s holding that such challenges are 
not cognizable under § 1983, but it does not prescribe a remedy should such an 
action ultimately succeed. Id. at 1293. One option would be to simply allow the 
prisoner to proceed to federal habeas for a review of his constitutional claims 
unencumbered by AEDPA. A remedy that is more consistent with the federalism 
concerns that arise in this area of the law would be to remand the case to the 
state for a post-conviction review process that comports with due process. 
Assuming that the tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations would be 
available for the remand proceedings, this latter remedy seems to better fulfill 
the deterrence role I envision federal oversight playing in this arena.  
 350. To be sure, a challenge to state post-conviction procedures does, as 
Justice Thomas observed, “concern the validity of the conviction.” Id. at 1302–03 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). But it only does so indirectly. A victory by the plaintiff 
does not “necessarily imply” that his conviction is invalid any more than the 
CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS 185 
prisoner who is ultimately successful in challenging a state’s 
procedures as fundamentally unfair is not entitled to release. The 
prisoner who obtains a judgment of procedural inadequacy would 
certainly prefer a grant of conditional release rather than 
damages or a procedural “redo” in the state court. The paradox of 
Skinner, however, is that the more robust the remedy provided by 
federal courts for procedural violations, the less viable the 
Skinner procedure remains as a metric for testing the fairness of 
state procedures.  
A state prisoner is permitted to proceed under § 1983 
precisely because such a victory would not, without more, 
undermine his conviction or entitle him to relief.351 In practical 
terms, this means that a state prisoner wishing to take 
advantage of Skinner must proceed through two tiers of federal 
litigation—§ 1983 and habeas review—and it means that at least 
some of AEDPA’s restrictions on relief likely continue to govern 
the habeas portion of the litigation through which the prisoner 
seeks to directly challenge the validity of the conviction or 
sentence. Stated another way, the injunctive relief, or perhaps 
declaratory relief,352 available through § 1983 challenges to the 
state collateral processes does not directly lead to a prisoner’s 
conviction being set aside. But it certainly has promise as a 
means of augmenting challenges to state processes in the federal 
courts.  
The caveats about the nature of the § 1983 remedy do not 
displace the previously discussed advantages to litigating 
                                                                                                     
right to test DNA evidence does; instead, the prevailing party simply wins the 
right to a process through which he might eventually test the ultimate validity 
of his conviction. 
 351. For this reason alone, the concerns expressed by the dissenters in 
Skinner, that AEDPA’s restrictions are effectively bypassed through “artful 
pleading,” is considerably overstated. See id. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Allowing Skinner to artfully plead an attack on state habeas procedures 
instead of an attack on state habeas results undercuts [AEDPA].”). 
 352. Declaratory judgments are likely not available as to matters collateral 
to the ultimate dispute: the constitutionality of the conviction. See Calderon v. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (noting that federal courts may issue 
declaratory judgments only in limited situations). Although the language in 
Calderon suggesting that any bypass of the exhaustion rule applicable to habeas 
proceedings is impermissible, id. at 748, is overruled in light of Skinner, the 
Court’s limitations on declaratory judgments likely remains applicable in this 
context.  
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procedural unfairness through § 1983 actions. To be sure, a two-
tier litigation track is cumbersome, but for many prisoners, 
particularly non-capital prisoners who lack counsel for federal 
habeas review, the benefits will sometimes outweigh the costs. As 
previously noted, the independent value of § 1983 challenges 
includes the ability of the proceedings to facilitate the discovery 
of the facts necessary for a habeas claim without the 
entanglements of AEDPA. I concede that, as to specific 
procedural challenges, a prisoner will only be able to get 
discovery if he states a claim in the manner required by the Rules 
of Civil Procedure—that is, § 1983 litigation does not promise 
unhinged and limitless discovery opportunities. However, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that many prisoners will be able to 
provide “a short and plain statement”353 describing the 
procedural unfairness of the state post-conviction system in their 
particular cases, and the resulting access to discovery, among 
other procedures, will likely be more favorable for a § 1983 
plaintiff than it would be for a habeas petitioner. For one thing, a 
federal court ordering discovery and ultimately relief on a § 1983 
action is at liberty to merely remand the case for additional state 
proceedings, a remedial step that avoids some of the stickiest 
federalism concerns that plague decisions to grant relief in the 
habeas context. Scholars have observed that, when it comes to 
constitutional adjudication, context matters,354 and when the 
context involves setting aside a final state conviction, the 
resulting judicial decisions may tend to be less favorable to the 
prisoner than an action under § 1983.355 Moreover, although the 
concurrence in Osborne concluded that “[i]t is no answer to say, 
as respondent does, that he simply wants to use § 1983 as a 
discovery tool to lay the foundation for a future,”356 in Skinner the 
Court implicitly approved the notion that a § 1983 claim is an 
entirely permissible vehicle for facilitating discovery that might 
                                                                                                     
 353. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 354. For an insightful account of how context matters for the constitutional 
adjudication of the Fourth Amendment, see Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 91 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719774. 
 355. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 63, at 179 (suggesting that courts might 
be less disposed to grant relief in the habeas context). 
 356. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2325 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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ultimately be useful during habeas litigation.357 Consequently, 
litigation under § 1983 designed to compel discovery in aid of a 
federal habeas petition may become critical after cases like 
Pinholster—if “new” evidence cannot be considered after a federal 
habeas petition has been filed,358 then discovery through an 
independent § 1983 action so as to obtain critical new details 
prior to the filing of the federal habeas petition may justify the 
cumbersome nature of this two-track litigation.  
To reiterate this important point, Skinner-type actions 
present a unique remedial problem insofar as they do not promise 
relief from the underlying conviction or sentence. However, the 
availability of an injunctive form of relief through which state 
courts would conduct a post-conviction redo ultimately reflects a 
proper remedy.359 Indeed, if, as many commentators assert, 
collateral review in several states is disastrously unfair and 
incomplete, then a federal court decision ordering the state to 
redo a particular prisoner’s review, perhaps after providing 
discovery on the issue, has the triple benefit of leaving the first 
                                                                                                     
 357. A pre-AEDPA circuit court case is generally illustrative on this point 
regarding how § 1983 actions might facilitate discovery for federal habeas 
review. In Qualls v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976), a Texas prisoner whose 
requests for information from the state had been repeatedly ignored obtained a 
discovery order based on a § 1983 challenge. Id. at 319. The federal court 
deemed the information necessary to the prisoner’s ability to fully plead his 
federal habeas case, and because the state would not willingly provide the 
information, § 1983 provided a useful workaround. Id. 
 358. Recall the majority’s concession in Pinholster that “new evidence [in 
support of a claim] . . . may well present a new claim.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 
1401 n.10. If new evidence can convert an old claim (bound by (d)(1)) into a new 
claim (unencumbered by (d)(1)), then § 1983 discovery practices may prove 
valuable in litigation prior to the filing of a federal habeas petition. 
 359. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, should not bar such action 
by a federal court. The text of the Act reads: “A court of the United States may 
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 
protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. By its plain text, the Act 
only applies to stays and not to injunctions forcing proceedings to occur. 
Moreover, it is accepted wisdom that “§ 1983 is an exception to the anti-
injunction statute.” 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.15(f)(iv) (4th ed.) (compiling citations including HENRY 
M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1249 (2d ed. 1973)); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) 
(concluding that actions under § 1983 are exempt from the limitations contained 
in the anti-injunction statute).  
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and primary review in the control of the state,360 while 
facilitating both structural reforms and case-specific relief. As 
Justice Scalia has recognized in a related context, the “precepts of 
fundamental fairness inherent in ‘due process’ suggest that a 
forum to litigate [constitutional] challenges like petitioner’s must 
be made available somewhere,” and principles of comity and 
federalism would suggest that the state, as the “rendering 
jurisdiction,” should be given an opportunity to correct the 
error.361 In short, § 1983 offers a viable litigation forum for 
spurring systemic reform in state systems, and it could do so 
while leaving substantial discretion and responsibility for federal 
constitutional adjudication in the hands of the states—it is a 
federalism-respecting form of federal intervention.  
The final and perhaps most pressing potential problem with 
§ 1983 challenges to state post-conviction procedures is the issue 
of the proper timing for filing such challenges—that is, when 
should a Skinner challenge be filed? Both § 1983 and § 2254 
impose limitations on when an action may be filed—in certain 
circumstances, both prohibit filings that are too late as well as 
filings that are too early. Although § 1983 actions must be filed 
within the time allotted by the applicable state statute of 
limitations for personal injury actions, the ultimate application of 
a prudential abstention doctrine may be determinative as to 
when Skinner-type challenges should be litigated. Specifically, 
the appropriate time for filing may require considering the 
interaction between the Younger abstention limits on § 1983 
actions,362 AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and the 
complementary limits on subsequent or successive federal habeas 
petitions. Based on these considerations, if Younger abstention 
applies to these challenges, then, as discussed below, the Skinner 
challenge cannot be made until after the state post-conviction 
                                                                                                     
 360. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 386 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part) (“Fundamental fairness could be achieved . . . by holding 
that the rendering jurisdiction must provide a means for challenge . . . .”); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223) 
(providing Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the appropriate course in cases of 
state unfairness might be to return the matter to the state for additional 
proceedings).  
 361. Daniels, 532 U.S. at 386. 
 362. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (citing a “fundamental 
policy” of abstention by federal courts from interfering with state prosecutions). 
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proceedings are complete, thus presenting challenging issues 
regarding the AEDPA statute of limitations. By contrast, if 
Younger does not apply, then perhaps such a challenge can be 
made simultaneously with the completion of state post-conviction 
litigation. The details of this doctrinal interaction are set forth 
below.  
Under Younger v. Harris,363 “absent exceptional 
circumstances creating a threat of irreparable injury both great 
and immediate, a federal court must not intervene by way of 
either injunctive or declaratory relief in a pending state law-
enforcement proceeding.”364 Moreover, an action is deemed 
pending for purposes of Younger until all state appellate remedies 
have been exhausted.365 In a typical case of Younger abstention, 
this means that a defendant wishing to enjoin his prosecution 
under a criminal statute may not have his claim heard in federal 
court until all of his state appeals are complete. Although post-
conviction proceedings are nominally civil rather than criminal 
proceedings, and although I could not locate any cases applying 
Younger to bar a challenge to state post-conviction proceedings, I 
predict that it is nonetheless very unlikely that a federal court 
would, barring extraordinary circumstances, intervene and hear 
a challenge to a state process that is not yet complete.366 In this 
way, it is arguable that Younger would impose a quasi-exhaustion 
procedure on prisoners such that it is unlikely that a federal 
court would intervene and declare a state system fundamentally 
unfair if the prisoner has not attempted to secure relief through 
that system in his own case.367 In this way, even a § 1983 action 
                                                                                                     
 363. Id. at 37. 
 364. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 1:617 (2011) (explaining 
the rule from Younger). 
 365. See, e.g., Brown v. Day, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (2007) (“For 
purposes of the first Younger element, a proceeding is ‘pending’ if—as of the 
filing of the federal complaint—not all state appellate remedies have been 
exhausted.”). 
 366. It is likely that Younger would apply such that a prisoner seeking to 
make an individualized or as-applied challenge to the state procedures must 
have attempted to use the state procedures himself. The abstention principle, to 
the extent it has any application in this context, may have less force when the 
prisoner is bringing a more generalized, systemic challenge to the state 
system—that is, perhaps a facial challenge could be made to state procedures 
even where the prisoner has not utilized the flawed state process. 
 367. Cf. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (“His attempt to sidestep state process 
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challenging state procedures faces something akin to an 
exhaustion requirement, but unlike a habeas petitioner who must 
exhaust each claim in question, a potential § 1983 plaintiff would 
simply need to let the state process he seeks to challenge run its 
course. 
Even assuming that such a quasi-exhaustion requirement 
exists because of abstention principles, standing alone, the 
requirement that a prisoner utilize the state review process 
before challenging the process as fundamentally unfair does not 
present a material barrier to litigation for most prisoners serving 
substantial sentences. However, considered in conjunction with 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and the limitations on 
second or successive habeas petitions, this limitation on Skinner 
could prove substantial. It is unlikely that a federal challenge to a 
state’s post-conviction proceedings under § 1983 could be 
researched, filed, litigated, and any appeals conclusively resolved 
all before the one-year limitation for filing a federal habeas 
petition expires. This means that if Younger requires the prisoner 
to use the available state procedures before challenging them as 
unfair, in many cases a prisoner will have to file a federal 
petition, which is due within one year of the completion of state 
proceedings, without the benefit of being able to complete 
litigation of his § 1983 challenge and without any discovery, 
injunctions, or other benefits that such Skinner litigation might 
yield. The three-way interaction of Younger’s limits on § 1983 
actions, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on filing federal 
habeas actions, and the AEDPA bar on second or successive 
habeas petitions, then, presents a bit of a conundrum for Skinner 
litigation.  
The limits on filing a successive habeas petition are set out in 
28 U.S.C. § 2244. Under this provision, raising the same claim in 
                                                                                                     
through a new federal lawsuit puts Osborne in a very awkward position . . . . It 
is difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has not invoked 
them.”); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 161 (“[T]hese claims will normally be 
denied under Younger abstention principles.”). Alternatively, a § 1983 action 
might be a viable platform for challenging an unreasonable delay by the state 
court in adjudicating an appeal. Cf. Vasquez v. Parrott, 318 F.3d 387, 389 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (considering whether a claim challenging unreasonable delay in 
adjudicating an appeal is properly considered on § 2254 review and thus 
whether a subsequent filing is a successive petition).  
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a new habeas petition is categorically prohibited.368 Accordingly, 
if § 1983 litigation (either directly or through a state court 
remand) yields additional useful, factual evidence relevant to a 
federal habeas claim that was already exhausted, then filing a 
new petition with the same claim bolstered by the new evidence 
is absolutely prohibited.369 Moreover, even if the § 1983 action (or 
related state remand procedures) yields evidence sufficient to 
give rise to a new claim, the presentation of a new claim in a 
second or subsequent habeas petition is barred unless the claim 
relies on a new rule of law made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court, or the claim rests on a newly discovered factual predicate 
that substantially demonstrates the petitioner’s innocence.370 In 
short, the circumstances in which a new petition may contain a 
claim discovered or developed for the first time after the filing of 
a habeas petition are extremely limited.371 Likewise, the 
circumstances in which a petitioner can amend a pending federal 
petition to add a new claim, or perhaps even substantially better 
develop the claim, are similarly limited.372 
Stated more directly, although Justices Thomas, Alito, and 
Kennedy have lamented the impact that Skinner will have on 
federal habeas actions, it is important to realize that the 
avoidance of the classic AEDPA burdens—deference, discovery, 
and exhaustion—are of truly limited and indeed symbolic value if 
                                                                                                     
 368. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006) (stating that such claims shall be 
dismissed). 
 369. Likewise, under Pinholster, using the new evidence developed through 
§ 1983 litigation to support the same claim that was adjudicated in state court is 
prohibited. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011) (discussing the 
restrictions on new evidence). 
 370. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006) (clarifying under what circumstances 
such a claim shall not be dismissed). 
 371. Notably, there are no circumstances in which a successive petition can 
be filed to present for a second time the “same” claim that was previously 
presented, perhaps with new support or stronger legal arguments. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(1) (2006). 
 372. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005) (“An amended habeas 
petition, we hold, does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year 
time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ 
in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.”); see also 
MEANS, supra note 22, § 9A:149 (“If the claims in the original petition are 
conclusory, however, they will not provide the requisite notice for relation back 
purposes.”). On the other hand, “relation-back is permitted if the amended claim 
only serves to add facts and specificity to the original claim.” Id. § 9A:150. 
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the court rules or practices do not permit, at the very least, some 
form of equitable staying of the habeas petition so as to avoid the 
limitations on second or successive petitions. Fortunately for 
prisoners, however, some of the stepping stones necessary to 
facilitate the use of the fruits of successful Skinner challenges in 
federal habeas litigation already exist, and it is reasonable to 
conclude that a common-law principle of equity will emerge in 
these circumstances such that prisoners will be permitted to file 
federal habeas petitions within the statute of limitations and 
have them stayed pending completion of the § 1983 litigation in 
appropriate circumstances.  
In Rhines v. Weber,373 the Court confronted a similar trap-of-
timing by sanctioning the use of a stay and abeyance 
procedure.374 Specifically, in a pre-AEDPA case, Rose v. Lundy,375 
the Court held that exhaustion by a state prisoner requires total 
exhaustion—that is, a district court must dismiss entirely any 
habeas petitions that are a mix of claims that were exhausted 
and unexhausted in state court.376 Initially, Rose presented 
relatively few problems for state prisoners because the dismissal 
was without prejudice and would simply permit them an 
opportunity to complete the exhaustion process and return to 
federal court.377 However, in Rhines, the Court recognized that 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations “dramatically altered the 
landscape.”378 The combination of a rule requiring dismissal of 
habeas petitions containing any unexhausted claims and a one-
year statute of limitations meant that the many petitioners who 
file a petition for federal habeas relief close to the one-year filing 
deadline will be completely deprived of federal habeas review. For 
example, “[i]f a petitioner files a timely but mixed petition in 
federal district court, and the district court dismisses it under 
                                                                                                     
 373. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 
 374. See id. at 278 (discussing the appropriate use of stay and abeyance 
procedure). 
 375. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
 376. See id. at 520 (mandating that “before you bring any claims to federal 
court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court”). 
 377. A procedural dismissal of a habeas petition does not trigger the second 
or successive filing limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 
 378. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274. 
CHALLENGING THE HABEAS PROCESS 193 
Lundy after the limitations period has expired, this will likely 
mean the termination of any federal review.”379 
Recognizing the “gravity of this problem” of timing born out 
of the interaction of Rose’s complete exhaustion requirement and 
the AEDPA statute of limitations, in Rhines, the Court approved 
a stay and abeyance procedure under which a federal district 
court will, for good cause, stay a mixed petition and hold it in 
abeyance so as to provide the petitioner an opportunity to return 
to state court and exhaust the unexhausted claims without 
forfeiting his federal habeas petition.380 In essence, the harshness 
of the interplay between the statute of limitations and the 
exhaustion requirement prompted the Court to recognize that 
federal courts must occasionally stay a federal proceeding to 
permit full state court exhaustion.381 The rigid application of 
habeas rules was softened to comport with basic principles of 
equity.  
Notably, a similarly harsh result arises when a petitioner 
attempts to fully utilize a state procedure so as to avoid potential 
                                                                                                     
 379. Id. at 275. Moreover, the Court recognized that this problem is not 
limited to persons who file close to the AEDPA deadline because even “a 
petitioner who files early will have no way of controlling when the district court 
will resolve the question of exhaustion.” Id. Cf. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 
849, 857–58 (1994) (holding that a mere request for counsel initiates a habeas 
corpus proceeding, thereby conveying power to a federal judge to stay a state 
execution); O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
district courts are entitled to discretion in managing cases within the federal 
system . . . .”). 
 380. As one Circuit has summarized the law, “Rhines declared that ‘in 
limited circumstances,’ federal district courts have the authority to stay a mixed 
habeas petition and hold the entire petition—exhausted and unexhausted 
claims alike—in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust 
his remedies there.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2009). It 
must, therefore, be conceded that even under a stay and abeyance procedure, 
the ultimate claims litigated typically must relate back to the claims raised in 
the first federal habeas petition prior to the stay. See, e.g., id. at 1142 (holding 
that amendments to a claim following a stay and abeyance must relate back to 
the claims pending during the stay).  
 381. In Rhines, the Court recognizes that “[d]istrict courts do ordinarily 
have authority to issue stays . . . where such a stay would be a proper exercise of 
discretion, [and] AEDPA does not deprive district courts of that authority.” 
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted); see also CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE § 86:140 (2011) (“[A] stay and abeyance of a federal habeas 
proceeding is appropriate only when the district court determines there was 
good cause . . . .”). 
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abstention problems only to have insufficient time to complete a 
§ 1983 challenge to the state court process before his federal 
habeas petition becomes untimely. Just as the Rose complete 
exhaustion rule might leave state prisoners without a federal 
habeas remedy, an attempt to obtain full and fair review through 
an unsound state process may deprive a prisoner of adequate 
time to challenge the state procedures and benefit from the 
discovery or the injunctive relief that flows from such a § 1983 
action. To this end, federal habeas courts should exercise their 
discretion and grant a stay and abeyance to prisoners who have a 
pending § 1983 action challenging state procedures and a likely 
chance of obtaining injunctive relief or discovery through the 
federal civil rights action. When good cause exists for a stay, 
federal habeas courts are authorized, indeed required, to grant 
the stay. 
Where, for example, a § 1983 challenge has yielded an order 
enjoining a state court to conduct additional post-conviction 
proceedings, it would seemingly amount to an abuse of discretion 
under Rhines for a federal court to refuse to stay the federal 
habeas petition. Likewise, where a colorable procedural challenge 
has been advanced under § 1983 and diligently pursued by the 
prisoner, a practice in favor of staying the habeas proceedings 
pending the resolution of the § 1983 challenge is appropriate.382 
In short, district courts retain considerable discretion to grant a 
stay and abeyance even under AEDPA, and a pending challenge 
to state processes under Skinner, like mixed habeas petitions, 
will occasionally provide good cause for such stays. Given the due 
process concerns underlying the need for a fair state collateral 
review process, a pending, colorable § 1983 challenge to the state 
post-conviction process should be understood to be among the 
“limited circumstances” in which a stay and abeyance of a habeas 
petition is justified.383 If courts take seriously the authority under 
                                                                                                     
 382. As with a mixed petition, a stay ought to be available only if the 
petitioner’s pending § 1983 action is not obviously without merit. CYCLOPEDIA OF 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 86:140 (2011) (“[A] court should not grant a habeas 
petitioner a stay and abeyance in a proceeding involving a mixed petition of 
exhausted and unexhausted claims when the petitioner’s unexhausted claims 
are plainly meritless.”). Likewise, if the § 1983 claim is filed for purposes of 
delay or as abusive litigation tactic, a stay would not be available. 
 383. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (noting the reasons 
limiting action by the district courts). 
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Rhines to stay habeas proceedings, and if petitioners construe 
their claims broadly such that facts newly discovered through the 
§ 1983 action are merely supporting the pre-existing claims,384 
then Skinner promises to be a valuable way of augmenting 
habeas litigation without the burdens of AEDPA. By gathering 
new facts in support of claims, either through federal discovery or 
new state procedures (rather than arguing that the new facts give 
rise to new claims), Skinner may yet prove substantially useful to 
state prisoners. 
However, § 1983 challenges, supplemented with reasonable 
stay and abeyance procedures, will not solve every problem 
induced by unfair state procedures. To be sure, merely staying 
the proceedings does not solve the problems that will arise if a 
§ 1983 action or a related remand procedure in state court 
ultimately result in the discovery of an entirely new claim. 
Current habeas procedures only permit amendments to the 
federal petition if the amendments relate back to the claims 
contained in the original petition.385 A claim is said to relate back 
only insofar as it derives from the same “common ‘core of 
operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted 
claims.”386 Perhaps courts faced with instances of unfair state 
procedures will simply exercise their equitable authority over 
habeas cases so as to permit amendments even when truly new 
claims are developed.387 Or more likely, on the rare occasion 
when a § 1983 action (or resulting state remand) produces 
evidence of a truly new claim that was not contained in the 
                                                                                                     
 384. Amendments to habeas petitions are permitted where the amendment 
is not “factually and legally unrelated to the claims in the original petition.” See 
United States v. Henry, 37 F. App’x 343, 345 (10th Cir. 2002); see also LARRY W. 
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 8:2 (2010) (discussing the standard for 
permitting amendment). 
 385. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005) (discussing the rationale 
for the rule). 
 386. Id. at 659. 
 387. The Court has recognized that the statutorily enacted one-year 
deadline for filing federal habeas petitions may be excused based on equitable 
considerations. See Holland v. Florida., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) 
(acknowledging that equitable tolling may be applied in extraordinary 
situations). If the statute of limitations, which is expressly codified in AEDPA, 
can be excused for equitable considerations, the right circumstances ought to 
justify an equitable exception to the rigid, court-created rules regarding 
amendments to federal habeas petitions. 
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initially filed federal habeas petition, perhaps the petitioner will 
have to raise the issue in an original habeas petition to the 
Supreme Court.388 While a full recounting of the original writ’s 
function is beyond the scope of this Article, the critical point is 
that scholars have recognized that successive habeas petition 
restrictions do not “apply in original habeas proceedings.”389 It is 
an imperfect solution insofar as original habeas actions are filed 
directly in the Supreme Court,390 granting review in such cases 
requires five votes rather than four,391 and the Court’s rules 
specify that review is limited to truly “exceptional 
circumstances.”392 However, the combination of bars on 
successive habeas petitions and a showing that state procedural 
unfairness caused a claim to go undiscovered could well satisfy 
the criteria. When no viable alternatives exist for federal review 
of a claim of unconstitutional detention, circumstances are said to 
be sufficiently exceptional so as to warrant the Court’s original 
habeas review.393 Original habeas review may prove an 
important, if infrequently necessary, corollary to the sort of 
§ 1983 challenges authorized in Skinner.394 
                                                                                                     
 388. For a thorough and impressive history and explanation of the original 
writ, see generally Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61 
(2011). 
 389. See id. at 115 (noting that this conclusion is supported by the Troy 
Davis case). 
 390. Id. at 62–63. 
 391. See id. at 77 (noting that a 4–4 vote effectively denies relief). 
 392. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (noting district courts might decline 
jurisdiction when compelling reasons arise). 
 393. See Kovarsky, supra note 388, at 112 (“[T]here is a strong case that the 
exceptional circumstances requirement does not obstruct review in the same 
way it would if the Court could grant certiorari.”). 
 394. Consider the following illustrative hypothetical: Prisoner (P) is 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. P attempts to litigate a Brady 
claim during state post-conviction procedures, but the prosecution refuses to 
cooperate with discovery, and the state courts, despite a colorable argument, 
refuse an evidentiary hearing and discovery. When P files his federal habeas 
petition, he has two options, but neither are favorable: (1) he could just omit the 
Brady claim, recognizing that he lacks the facts to substantiate it; or (2) he 
could raise the claim but realize that, under Pinholster, the federal review is 
limited to the record before the state and that he will not be able to garner 
factual support for his claim through a federal hearing. By contrast, if P files a 
§ 1983 action, he has two potentially favorable alternatives: (1) he could include 
the bare-bones Brady claim in his federal petition, seek a stay and abeyance to 
complete § 1983 litigation relief in the form of a remand for additional discovery 
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In sum, a § 1983 challenge to state procedures bypasses the 
pitfalls of AEDPA litigation and may serve as a meaningful check 
on state collateral processes, but in many instances, this will 
require federal courts to exercise their authority and duty to stay 
pending habeas petitions pending the resolution of colorable civil 
rights challenges. At first blush, the utility of bifurcating the 
federal proceedings into civil rights challenges and habeas 
petitions may seem cumbersome and unnecessary. But the 
advantages ultimately outweigh the costs. Skinner litigation 
allows federal courts, by issuing stays in the habeas proceedings, 
to further principles of comity and federalism by respecting the 
autonomy of the states to address the challenges of prisoners in 
any manner they choose, so long as it comports with due process. 
That is to say, the federal oversight is aimed only at ensuring a 
minimum floor of fair process, but much more discretion and 
responsibility—fact-finding and conclusions of law—will rest with 
the state courts than would be the case when a federal court 
simply grants a hearing, makes findings, and issues a conditional 
release for a state prisoner. In this way, § 1983 provides a vehicle 
for systemic reform of state processes, where necessary to 
comport with due process, in a way that is more deferential to 
state sovereignty than traditional models of habeas relief. In 
addition, § 1983 litigation in this arena may ultimately prove 
more efficient. As habeas lawyers and federal judges know, a 
substantial portion of federal habeas litigation relates to the 
deference owed to state findings and the fairness of the state 
process. If the fairness of the state process is litigated under 
§ 1983 in advance of a federal habeas decision and afforded res 
                                                                                                     
and litigation in the state court, and ultimately attempt to amend his petition; 
or (2) if the facts uncovered through the § 1983 litigation rendered the claim too 
novel such that amending the petition was not permitted, then in order to 
overcome the bar on successive petitions, he could file an original habeas action 
in the Supreme Court based on the unfairness of the state procedures and the 
strength of the newly discovered constitutional claim. Cf. Cullen v. Pinholster, 
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 n.10 (2011) (recognizing that new evidence may, if it is 
particularly powerful, render a claim “new,” but apparently assuming that the 
new evidence would be discovered prior to filing the federal petition and 
included in the petition); id. at 1398 (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is 
limited to the record that was before the state court”). There will be instances 
where, absent a change in the current practices of federal habeas courts in 
reviewing procedural challenges, Skinner-type litigation will offer decided, if 
limited, benefits to the state prisoner.  
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judicata effect, then far fewer issues of procedure will remain 
unresolved at the time of the habeas action.395 Obviously, there 
remain considerable questions about the proper workings of 
Skinner litigation, and the ultimate desirability of this form of 
litigation will depend on how the questions raised in this Article 
and others that will arise are resolved, but the potential import of 
§ 1983 challenges in this field is presently untested, and in view 
of the diminished force of § 2254 review, deserving of judicial 
attention and resources. 
VII. Conclusion 
In 2005, one of the leading habeas scholars, John Blume, 
concluded that AEDPA had turned out to be “more hype than 
bite”—that is, the access to federal habeas relief had not been 
substantially diminished under AEDPA.396 As demonstrated in 
this Article, both as a doctrinal and an empirical matter, over the 
last six years AEDPA’s bite has matured and taken hold. AEDPA 
deference has emerged as a suffocating force in most cases, and, 
as a result, state post-conviction review will typically represent 
the only viable forum for the constitutional review of issues 
regarding the legality of one’s sentence or conviction. 
Acknowledging the diminution of the federal courts’ power to 
review the merits of state decisions and accepting the profoundly 
important role that state courts now play in adjudicating 
constitutional criminal procedure rights, some scholars have 
suggested substantially abandoning federal oversight of state 
convictions. This Article rejects this conclusion and seeks instead 
to reorient federal oversight so that it serves, at the very least, 
                                                                                                     
 395. There remains, of course, the question of whether an unfair state 
process can be afforded AEDPA deference, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), without 
offending due process. I have detailed my research on this question in a previous 
article. See Marceau, supra note 13, at 45–49 (exploring the tension between 
AEDPA deference and due process). If federal courts defer to the sovereignty of 
state courts by providing the remand remedy advocated in this Article, then this 
issue is avoided. That is to say, if litigants pursue the Skinner-based challenges 
to the state system, then federal courts, upon finding an unfair state process, 
ought to simply enjoin the state to provide a more adequate state post-conviction 
process, and thus the (d)(1) deference applies only to proceedings that are full 
and fair.  
 396. Blume, supra note 4, at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the critical function of ensuring the fairness of the state process. 
Because federal oversight of the merits of state review is 
substantially diminished, it is increasingly important that there 
be some minimal federal review of state procedures. It is time to 
take seriously the need for challenges of process rather than only 
challenges of result, and this Article takes the first steps toward 
identifying frameworks for such challenges. 
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